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Notes on Transliteration 
The chart below1 has been used to transliterate proper nouns, 
geographical references and some particular terms in the text while 
popular names and concepts have not been transliterated. 
The letter hamza (ء) has been written as a normal apostrophe (’) 
and has not been rendered when it appears in the initial position. 
The alif maqṣūra (ى) has been rendered à. 
The tā’ marbūṭa (ة) has been rendered a when it appears isolated 
and at when in iḍāfa constructions. 
The nisba ending has been rendered -iyya (e.g., sūriyya) 
The scientific transcription of the names of the intellectuals of 
the “1967 generation” has been given in brackets only in their first 
occurrence and in the section titles, while for the other occurrences a 
more common and recognizable transcription is used; for example, 
Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Ǧābirī is found as al-Jabri after the first mention. 
  
                                                          
1 The translation and transliteration system codified and used in IJMES, the 
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
https://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/IJMES_Translation_and_Transliteration_Guide.htm 
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State of the art 
Arab (national) identity is a vast field of research and Middle 
Eastern scholars have been studying it for years, aiming to grasp its 
complexity. Christopher Phillips in Everyday Arab Identity: The Daily 
Reproduction of the Arab World (2012) focuses on the concept of 
Arabism (or Neo-Arabism), a special bond that ideally links the Arab-
speakers and transcends boundaries being, in the author’s definition, 
“supra-national”. Phillips tries to understand why Nation-States have 
been forced to promote this peculiar sort of identity to gain and maintain 
their legitimacy to rule and how this narrative interacted with the 
national one. For instance, as Paul Ghali (1934) pointed out, Arab 
societies consist of different religious, cultural, ethnic and even 
linguistic groups and the concept of Nation-State in the Arab world is 
relatively new. In fact, the birth and formation of modern national Arab 
states started between the late eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, under the influence of European colonization2. This 
important stage in contemporary history of the Arab world has been 
intertwined with the development of the regional system through the 
foundation of inter-Arab policies and by means of renewed Arab 
nationalism. Dawn (1991) questioned this explanation of the origins of 
Arab nationalism and the excessive significance attributed both to the 
contact with the West and to the Christian bourgeoisie and its 
missionary schools. According to him “Arab nationalism arose as an 
                                                          
2 European colonial domination over the Arab countries lasted a century: from the 
mid-1800s (in 1830 the French captured Algiers; in 1839 the English took Aden) to 
the mid-1900s (in 1961 Kuwait gained independence from Great Britain; in 1962 
Algeria from France). 
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opposition movement in the Ottoman Empire […]: Throughout the 
nineteenth century […] Arab nationalism arose out of the failure of its 
immediate predecessor and its ideological parent, Islamic modernist 
Ottomanism”3. The relationship between Islamic modernism and 
Arabism has been discussed also by Sylvia G. Heim who disagrees with 
Dawn and considers Arab nationalism a Western import, and Elie 
Kedourie who pointed out the role of the military officers installed in 
power by the British after the First World War. In his turn Lockman, 
who contributed to the well-known volume edited by Gershoni and 
Jankowski (1997) on the topic, underlined how nationalism “always 
means different things to different people in different contexts”4 and 
that, in the MENA region, it was conveyed both by new ideologies and 
by transnational Arab solidarity in the anti-colonial struggles which 
different countries had to face, Palestine above any other5. Instead, Uri 
Davis (1995)’s discourse focuses on terminology. According to him, it 
is crucial to analyze the Arabic terms for identity and citizenship in 
order to understand the concepts from an inner perspective6. In this 
regard, the work of the Arab historian Ibn Ḫaldūn—and later on of 
                                                          
3 Ernest Dawn C., “The origins of Arab Nationalism,” in The Origins of Arab 
Nationalism, ed. Khalidi Rashid, Anderson Lisa, Muslih Muhammad and Simon S. 
Reeva (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 23. 
4 Zachary Lockman, “Arab Workers and Arab Nationalism in Palestine: A View from 
Below,” in Rethinking nationalism in the Arab Middle East, ed. James Jankowski and 
Israel Gershoni (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 249. 
5 In fact, following the break-up of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, each state 
adopted its own national laws according to conditions imposed by or agreed with the 
occupying colonial powers and in 1916, Great Britain and France defined their 
mutually agreed spheres of influence and control in Southwestern Asia (Sykes-Picot 
agreement). Finally, the Treaty of Sèvres of 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 
— that led to the international recognition of the sovereignty of the new Republic of 
Turkey as the successor state of the defunct Ottoman Empire — were to contain all 
the provisions relating to citizenship. 
6 Davis discusses the difference between ğinsiyya and muwaṭana which he defines 
respectively as “passport citizenship” and “democratic citizenship. See Uri Davis, 
“Jinsiyya versus Muwatana: The Question of Citizenship and the State in the Middle 
East: The Cases of Israel, Jordan and Palestine,” Arab Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1/2 
(Winter and Spring, 1995), 19-22. 
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Mansoor Moaddel (2001, 2002, 2005)—has been fundamental, 
especially in the latter’s efforts to clarify the concept of 'asabiyya, a 
type of pre-Islamic solidarity to be discussed in the following sections.  
Likewise, Khoury, Kostiner and the Kuwaiti historian al-
Naqeeb7 further analysed the tribal element and its role in the state-
building processes. Moreover, the view of the Moroccan philosopher 
al-Jabri (Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Ǧābirī, 1935-2010) on this kind of 
primordial kinship in relation with the religious component is essential, 
as well as the contribution of the Syrian poet and philosopher Adonis 
(‘Alī Aḥmad Sa‘īd Isbir, b. 1930) in An Introduction to Arab Poetic 
(1990), as he underlines the alien nature of the mentioned concepts: in 
fact, he defines modernity as “illusory and specious”, arguing that “the 
intellectual principles which gave birth to modernity are lost to us, their 
substance wiped out8”. Finally, the Moroccan philosopher Abdou 
Filali-Ansary (‘Abduh Filālī al-Anṣārī, b.1946), who presented the 
quest for legitimacy in Muslim conetxs as a “four-act tragedy”, 
speaking of the fourth act (new deceptions) said: 
Recently born states arising from independence brought neither the 
freedom nor the prosperity expected. They did not allow the 
rediscovery of a legitimacy that people had started to associate with 
a national identity9. 
The present study entered into this debate, albeit through a narrower 
path: the historical and political developments experienced by the 
MENA region from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire are analyzed 
and discussed through the perspectives of the Arabic thinkers of the 
                                                          
7 See the “Khaldoun al-Naqeeb archive,” 
http://www.khaldounalnaqeeb.com/en/index.jsp 
8 Adonis, An Introduction to Arab Poetics (London: Saqi Books, 1990), 85. 
9 Abdou Filali-Ansari, “The Quest for Legitimacy in Muslim Contexts: A Four-Act 
Tragedy?” ResetDOC (15 July 2016): 27, https://www.resetdoc.org/story/the-quest-
for-legitimacy-in-muslim-contexts-a-four-act-tragedy/ 
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time mainly following Albert Hourani’s landmark work Arabic 
Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (1962), a watershed in the 
history and historiography of colonialism and its relations with 
liberalism, published in the very year of Algerian independence from 
France (and Jamaican independence from Great Britain). Periodization 
and categorization of these thinkers became a central issue and 
analyzing the proposed systematizations of different leading scholars 
proved to be both necessary and insightful. For example, Hisham 
Sharabi (Hišām al-Šarābī, d. 2005) in Arab Intellectuals and the West: 
The Formative Years, 1875-1914 (1970) studied the Arab intellectuals 
during the formative years 1875-1914 by classifying them in groups and 
trends while Hourani chose not to focus his attention on schools of 
thought fearing that it could confer a false unity upon the works of very 
different thinkers. Instead, he decided to study writers and intellectuals 
“who saw the growth of European power and the spread of new ideas 
as a challenge to which they had to respond by changing their own 
societies, and the systems of beliefs and values which gave them 
legitimacy through acceptance of some of the ideas and institutions of 
modern Europe”10. Indeed, Hourani articulated his analysis presenting 
the thought of four generations of writers and intellectuals, mostly 
Egyptians and Syrian-Lebanese that had a leading role in the 
development of the Arabic thought of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Barakat (1993) instead, divided the modern Arab awakening 
in three phases and in each one he identified a religious, a liberal and a 
progressive radical trend. They are: the formative phase from the 1850s 
to World War I; the period of nationalist struggle for independence 
between the two world wars; and the independence and post-
                                                          
10 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962), Preface. 
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independence periods. Instead, the first two generations in Hourani’s 
account (1830-1870; 1870-1900) essentially include the nahḍa11 
pioneers like the Lebanese Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883), the 
Egyptians Rifāʿa al-Tahtāwī (1801-1873) and Muḥammad ‘Abduh 
(1849-1905) and Ǧamāl al-Dīn al-Afġānī (1838-1897) while the third 
takes into consideration the works of some leading disciples of 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh such as the proto feminist Qāsim ‘Amīn (1863-
1908), Aḥmad Luṭfī Sayyīd (1872-1963) and Rašīd Riḍā (1865-1935) 
whose views represent different outcomes of ‘Abduh’s legacy. In the 
present study, particular attention will be given to Riḍā’s account of the 
Islamic Caliphate. In fact, for the purposes of this research it proves to 
                                                          
11 Hourani never used the term nahḍa preferring the expression “Liberal Age”. 
Nevertheless, the term has a long history that reflects the criticalities of the time and 
the struggle of the thinkers that witnessed and tried to explain them. The term nahḍa 
was first used by the Syrian Adīb Isḥāq (1856-1885) and Lebanese Aḥmad Fāris al-
Šidyāq (1804-1887, who stated that “there is no nahḍa without a women’s nahḍa”) 
but, after an initial period of harmony and syncretism, the publication of some 
controversial texts such as ʿAbd al-Rāziq (1888-1966) al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Uḥkm 
(Islam and the Foundations of Rule, 1925) and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn (1889-1973) Fī al-Ši‘r 
al-Ǧāhilī (On the Pre-Islamic Poetry, 1926) disrupted the balance and the term begun 
to be used in relation to different versions of Arab nationalist resurgence (Mīšīl 
‘Aflaq’s perspective is a well-known example of it). Later on, when the Arab states 
had gained independence, the nahḍa discourse were marginalized and, after the 1967 
defeat, Arab scholars took different stands about the notion, for example Mohammad 
al-Jabri (Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Ǧābirī) criticized it while Laroui (‘Abd Āllah al-‘Arwī, 
b. 1933) defended it. Sadeq al-Azm (Ṣādiq Ǧalāl al-‘Aẓm, 1934-2016) believed that 
many contemporary scholars, included himself, erroneously believed that the issues 
debated during the nahḍa such as progress, modernization, modern science, 
secularism, socialism and national liberation, were surpassed in the second half of the 
20th century, while instead the struggle initiated by Ǧamāl al-Dīn al-Afġānī and 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh was far from being concluded. Remarkably, the Tunisian 
political leader Rashid Gannoushi (Rāšid al-Ghannūšī, b. 1941) changed the name of 
his movement “Islamic Tendency” in Ennahda Party (ḥizb al-nahḍa) to distance 
himself from his more radical origins and stress his acceptance of liberal democracy. 
Finally, after the Cold War and the Lebanese war (1985-1989) the nahḍa theme re-
emerged in the Arab public discourse especially among the leftist intellectuals in 
Beirut and Damascus that used it to criticize the liberals who were supporting 
American interventionism in the region. Notably, Elias Khoury (Iliyās Ḫūrī b. 1948) 
after the American invasion of Afghanistan wrote an essay entitled “Toward a third 
nahḍa” where he called for “a return to modern Arab history to search for the truth 
that might help Arabs to escape from the decline in which they have slid in the 21st 
century”. 
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be very useful to understand how the Islamic reformer faced the great 
political transformations of his time, such as the end of the Ottoman 
caliphate, the beginning of European domination in the MENA region, 
the First World War and the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. 
Riḍā’s account of ‘Abduh’s legacy also goes to the  grounds on which 
he legitimated such a political and religious entity, which today is far 
from being forgotten, as the so-called Islamic State —an expression 
defined by Wael B. Hallaq (2012) as both impossible and inherently 
self-contradictory— made it the core of its narrative of power. 
Moreover, the Syrians Adīb Isḥāq (1856-1885) and Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī 
(1880-1968) have been included in the discussion following Tibi’s 
account of Arab Nationalism (1997). In fact, he defined Adīb Isḥāq as 
“the first political theorist of Arab nationalism”12 since, unlike his 
contemporaries, his definition of the Nation transcended literature; 
likewise Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī’s is a central figure in Tibi’s discourse because 
of his crucial contribution to the political debate as he separated the 
concept of Nation and State following the lead of the German Romantic 
philosophers (e.g. Herder, Fichte and Arndt), attempting a synthesis 
between their idea of Nation and the notion of ‘aṣabīyya formulated by 
Ibn Ḫaldūn (d. 1406)13. Lastly, Hourani placed a fourth generation after 
the Second World conflict only sketching its features in the Epilogue of 
his text. In the present study, the contemporary developments of the 
Arabic thought, defined by Campanini (2018) as “locked between the 
opposing tensions of modernity and tradition”14, are discussed mainly 
following Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab Contemporary Arab Thought: 
Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective (2010) and Ibrahim Abu 
                                                          
12 Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism between Islam and the Nation-State, 3rd edition 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 104. 
13 Ibid., 125-127. 
14 Campanini Massimo, “The new roads of Islamic thought,” ResetDOC (6 September 
2018), https://www.resetdoc.org/story/new-roads-islamic-thought/ 
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Rabi‘ Contemporary Arab Thought Studies in Post-1967 Arab 
Intellectual History (2004). As for Abu Rabi‘, he divided the 
development of Arab Nationalism into four stages (in the Mashreq) and 
defined ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1849-1903) and al-Ḥuṣrī as the 
best representatives of the first one.   
The stages are: the Ottoman phase, the interwar period, the 1948-70 
phase and the 1970 to the present15. 
 The Ottoman phase started with the Tanẓīmāt at the beginning 
of the 19th century; through those reforms the Ottoman Empire 
sought to achieve the same goals that the European Power had 
already reached; accordingly, the aim of Ottoman nationalism, 
whether it were Arab or Turkish, was to create a new civil 
society bound by new constitutional rules. 
 The defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World 
Conflict and the consequent French and British conquest of the 
Arab East changed the situation; the new phase is represented 
by Qustantin Zurayq (Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq, 1909-2000)16, one of 
the most distinguished Arab nationalist thinkers and historians 
in the twentieth century Arab world who reflected critically on 
the intricate aspects of composing a cultural identity. 
 Within the post 1948 phase arose the pan-Arab ideology, as 
Arab Unity was considered the only way to face the challenges 
of post-colonial capitalism. Accordingly, 1945 saw the 
                                                          
15 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab 
Intellectual History (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 77-78. 
16 Constantin Zurayq, an Orthodox Christian from Damascus, published in 1939 a 
volume of essays on national consciousness where he defined nationalism as a sense 
of collective responsibility, a will to create and maintain a community, which takes 
inspiration on its own religion that for Arab can only be Islam. Hourani, op. cit., 309, 
310. 
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establishment of al-Ǧāmiʻa al-ʻArabiyya, the Arab League17 
that currently counts 22 members (even though Syria has been 
suspended since 2011). 
Additionally, this phase is divided into three subcurrents: 
• The Ba‘aṯ Party represented by Mīšīl ‘Aflaq (1910-
1989) and Ṣalāḥ al-dīn al-Biṯār (1912-1980) 
• Nasserism 
• The Arab Nationalists’ Movement represented by 
George Habash (Ǧūrǧ Ḥabaš, 1926-2008) who was 
“committed to the liberation of Palestine and to Arab 
unity18”. 
 The 1967 defeat and the Camp David Accords (1978), 
considered “the second foundation of the State of Israel”19, 
meant the end of the Pan-Arab ideology. The United States took 
the place of British and French as imperialist power and grew 
as the major supporter of Israel weakening Arab Nationalism. 
On the domestic front, the Arab socialist political system 
collapsed, Egypt abandoned its leading role initiating the Open 
Door policy (infitāḥ) and signing a separate peace agreement 
with Israel (1979). Finally, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
gave to the US a way to undermine Iraq, the last major bastion 
of Arab nationalism in the Arab World, harming its economy 
and giving legitimacy to the artificial rentier states of the Gulf. 
                                                          
17 Notably, during the World War I the ‘Arab nation’ was placed in Asia; later on, in 
the Twenties and Thirties, ‘Arabhood’ begun to be defined by language rather than 
geography and in 1945 a strong African country was one of the founder members of 
the Arab League: Egypt. Finally, in 1958, the League reached the Atlantic with the 
admission of Morocco. John F. Devlin, “The Baath Party: Rise and 
Metamorphosis,” The American Historical Review 96, no. 5 (1991): 1397. 
18 As'ad Abu Khalil, “George Habash and the Movement of Arab Nationalists: Neither 
Unity nor Liberation,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28 no. 4 (Summer 1999): 91-103.  
19 Anouar Abdel-Malek, “The Occultation of Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly 1, no. 
3 (Summer 1979): 177. 
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However, both Kassab and Abu Rabi‘ underline the centrality of the 
defeat of 1967, defined by the Syrian philosopher Sadeq Jalal al-Azm 
(Ṣādiq Ǧalāl al-‘Aẓm, 1934-2016) as “an exceptional event in every 
sense of the word, a terrifying explosion which destroyed the 
foundations of the Arab liberation movement”20. Accordingly, this 
generation is called “the post 1967 generation” and describes the major 
changes and challenges faced by the Arab world through the 
perspectives of some leading contemporary Arab thinkers such as two 
of the major representatives of the early post-colonial liberal trend, 
Sadeq al-Azm and the Moroccan Abdallah Laroui (ʿAbd Allāh al-
ʿArawī, b. 1933); the Egyptian Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (Naṣr Ḥāmid 
Abū Zayd, 1943-2010) and the Algerian professor Mohammad Arkoun 
(Muḥammad ’Arkūn, 1928-2010) who defined the Arab contemporary 
thought as an idéologie du combat21, both liberal hermeneutics; the 
Egyptian phenomenologist and Islamic Leftist Hassan Hanafi (Ḥassan 
Ḥanafī, b. 1935), the political theorist Muhammad Abed al-Jabri and 
the Tunisian politician and thinker Rashid al-Ghannushi (Rāšid al-
Ghannūšī, b. 1941), co-founder and current president of Ennahda Party 
(Ḥizb Ḥarakat al-Nahḍa, Renaissance Party), the country’s ruling party 
until January 2014. 
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning another crucial event that had 
the same disrupting weight of the 1967 defeat: the so-called “Arab 
Spring”, an unfortunate and misleading Western label that somehow 
implied an unrealistically immediate transition of the uprising States 
from autocratic to democratic political systems. The “Arab Spring”, 
which started when a Tunisian peddler set himself on fire in December 
                                                          
20 Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in 
Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 98. 
21 Massimo Campanini, Il pensiero islamico contemporaneo, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2005), 15. 
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2010, will not be discussed within the present chapter, first of all 
because it is a recent and still ongoing upheaval whose dynamics and 
profound reasons are yet to be understood and whose outcomes are not 
clearly defined; secondly, because this chapter has a different focus: it 
analyses the origin of the national identity in the MENA region and the 
development over time of the concepts of Nation and nationalism, by 
retracing the key steps of the nation and state building process in the 
area aiming to discover whether the feeling of national belonging is a 
sufficient ground for the legitimacy of the Arab-Muslim States or not. 
However, aiming to be as complete as possible in presenting the issue, 
it proves necessary to underline the centrality of the “Arab Spring” or, 
as Marwan Muasher (2014) calls it, “The Second Arab Awakening”, 
the first one being the intellectual revolution that took place between 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries against the Ottoman rule, firstly 
documented by George Antonius (1939) in The Arab Awakening: The 
Story of the Arab National Movement and object of this chapter. 
According to Muasher (and Abu Rabi‘ agrees on this point), the first 
Arab Awakening failed as military-backed single parties took the power 
leaning on their revolutionary legitimacy, thus the post-independence 
era in the Arab world paid a too little attention to developing political 
systems, while the new regimes continued to consider pluralism a 
potential threat; moreover, the Palestinian issue had not been solved and 
all the necessary political and economic reforms remained unrealized.  
Thus, Political Islam emerged as the only alternative to the one-
party rule because Islamist parties were the only ones to have the 
organizational capabilities necessary to run nationwide campaigns. It is 
within this context that the Second Arab Awakening takes place willing 
to promote a truly democratic third force, as both Islamists and the 
17 
 
military élite failed in a genuine commitment to pluralism22. Probably, 
it will soon be possible to individuate a “post 2011 generation” 
committed to discussing the challenges faced by civil society within the 
new political asset, as the movements that overthrew the regimes placed 
national identity above all other considerations: “Tomorrow’s Middle 
East will not be the same as yesterday’s. Its ultimate shape is, of course, 
unknown”23. 
  
                                                          
22 Marwan Muasher, The Second Arab Awakening and the Battle for Pluralism (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014), Introduction. 
23 Ibid., 159. 
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Introduction: from waṭan to waṭaniyya 
The Arab national identity has a complex, multilayered nature 
and has been influenced by both internal and external factors. Have the 
Western sovereignty and the new form of power and legitimacy 
replaced the old authorities? On which grounds do the nation states 
legitimate themselves? The aim of this work is to examine on which 
identity criteria the legitimacy of the Arab Muslim countries is founded. 
This in mind, the main argument presented here is that in the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and in the State of Kuwait, chosen as exemplary 
cases of “hybrid” systems (in Bacik’s account, 2008), national 
belonging as political sentiment reveal to be the dominant identity 
criterion but indeed in a hybrid form within which primordial loylaties 
coexist with the Western institutions. Notably, by legitimacy I simply 
mean the elements that make a government rightful and thus legitimate 
at the eyes of its people. 
Hence, the project starts by retracing the key steps of the State-
building process within the MENA region from the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire to the European colonization and decolonization both 
historically, politically and especially theoretically, aiming indeed to 
highlight the legitimacy foundations of the present-day Arab states. In 
fact, such developments are discussed and analyzed in the first chapter 
through the voices of the Arab thinkers that lived that peculiar reality, 
from the nahḍa pioneers to the “post 1967 generation”. 
Accordingly, the third chapter focuses on the state and nation-
building process of Kuwait and Jordan highlighting the findings of the 
data analysis, meaning 80 individual interviews I made in the two 
countries. As already noted, the national belonging revealed to be the 
prevalent identity criterion with the other types of affiliation (religious, 
tribal, linguistic) being its components rather than its challengers. 
19 
 
Notably, the second chapter studies the methodological and 
ethical challenges that need to be dealt with when discussing the MENA 
region, especially focusing on the qualitative approach’s crucial aspect 
of the “positionality” that refers indeed to the different “positions” 
occupied by the researcher and the participants, often not part of the 
same cultural and social community and how this may affect the 
research outcomes. 
*** 
When discussing the existing relation between the pre-modern 
Muslim state and the modern Nation-State, an analysis of the Arabic 
term for “nation” will be essential. Indeed, the building-process of the 
present “independent Nation-States increasingly [asserting] their 
differences and separate identities”24 is somehow mirrored by the 
transition from the pre-modern use of the term waṭan25 as homeland to 
the modern sense of national homeland, from which the term 
waṭaniyya26, patriotism, originated. The classical waṭan “stands as a 
                                                          
24 Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993), Introduction. 
25 Originally, waṭan did not have any political acceptation. Notably, when talking 
about waṭan the 18th century Indian encyclopedist Muḥammad b. ‘Alā’ al-Tahānawī 
(1191-1777) differentiated between the place of birth about which men do not have 
choice, and the place of residence deliberately chosen as the place to live for a limited 
period; while the Sufi authority Abū Sualymān al-Dārānī (d. 830) talks about waṭanāt 
(s. waṭna), solid foundations, as opposed to ḫaṭarāt referring to something furtive, not 
to be proud of. Moreover, in the prophetic tradition waṭan is considered as an 
approximate synonym of dār (house) and bilād (country). Interestingly, the Egyptian 
National Anthem says bilādī, laki ḥubbī wa fūʾādī (“My homeland, you have my love 
and my heart”). Ulrich Haarmann, Waṭan in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd Edition, ed. 
P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 
See also Zayde Antrim, “Waṭan before Waṭaniyya: Loyalty to Land in Ayyūbid and 
Mamlūk Syria,” Al-Masāq 22 no. 2 (2010), 174-175. 
26 The term waṭaniyya (nationalisim, patriotism) did not appear until the end of the 
19th century. The Egyptian writer Rifāʿa Rāfi‘ al-Tahṭāwī had a crucial role in the 
development of the concept; in fact, ḥubb al-waṭan (the love for the homeland) 
pervades all his work. Starting from the Ottoman millet he overcame its initial 
acceptation of confessional community by including also territorial communities such 
as al-ahālī (indigenous people), al-ra‘iyya (subjects), al-ğins [or more correctly al-
‘irq] (ethnic group) and abnā’ al-waṭan (inhabitants, compatriots) united by a patriotic 
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primary pre-modern thematic of the self”, and if it is true that it has 
rarely had a political meaning and a precise geographical content, it is 
also noteworthy that it usually evokes a localized area of personal 
attachment (a neighborhood, a town or a village) and has a strong 
subjective meaning: the waṭan is the affective birthplace of individuals 
and it is on this affective structure that the modern ideal of patriotic 
sentiment rooted itself27. The poetic waṭan is a lost, irrecoverable 
Golden Age at both a personal (childhood/youth) and social level, a 
mythical place where desire and necessity marvelously coincided28. 
The feeling that people had toward their waṭan in classical writings, 
named ḥanīn (yearning), was more an overwhelming passion rather 
than a sentiment like it is in modern patriotism and it was not only a 
human prerogative: animals, especially camels, were entitled to it too, 
as longing for the homeland was perceived as a natural, even biological 
force. During the early Omayyad period this natural longing widened 
by absorbing a family-idyllic waṭan of folkloric origins and the themes 
of the love poetry (ġazal); this resulted in “the image of the poet 
nostalgically remembering his homeland where he enjoyed familial as 
                                                          
brotherhood and to whom the adjectives waṭanī/bilādī are referred. For many decades, 
waṭaniyya meant the nationalist form of the Egyptian patriotism in its quest for the 
independence from the British control. Then, just before the Second World Conflict, 
arose the difference between waṭaniyya, as referred to territory and qawmiyya, as 
referred to people, that would later become the core of the Nasserist ideology. Jacques 
Couland, Waṭaniyya, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd Edition, ed. P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 
27 Yaseen Noorani, “Estrangement and selfhood in the Classical Concept of Waṭan,” 
Journal of Arabic Literature, 47 no. 1/2 (2016): 19. 
28 However, Noorani argues that the poetic waṭan has a dual meaning, as it is also the 
‘homeland of birth’ that should be abandoned for the higher ‘homeland of maturity’: 
in this sense the self need to deny its primordial desires to gain virtue and rationality. 
Moreover, regarding this point it is significant to mention the poet Maysūn bint 
Baḥdal. Syriac Orthodox Christian from the Kalb Bedouin tribe, she converted to 
Islam after marrying the Omayyad caliph Mu‘āwiya (602-680). She wrote about the 
life in the desert, the love for her husband and the nostalgia for the places dear to her. 
Francesca Maria Corrao, Antologia della poesia araba (Roma: La biblioteca di 
Repubblica, 2004), 113,114. 
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well as romantic love, and plenitude despite poverty”29. Moreover, the 
association between waṭan and a golden age of innocence, inevitably 
reveals the Bedouin substrate of the concept, in fact the image of 
Bedouin women yearning for their homelands that they were forced to 
leave due to marriage is a standard. It is this topos of an idealized, 
primitive state of life associated with the Bedouin sense of belonging 
that the Abbasid scholars transmitted to the next generations, when the 
region of Najd became the proverbial homeland in Arabic poetry30. 
Therefore motherhood, childhood, familial affections, early love and 
kin are part of the same chronotope, the waṭan. 
To conclude, it is possible to say that—although the modern 
love toward waṭan is a morally oriented emotion that “gives rise to 
citizenship and self-sacrifice for the nation” and not a primordial, 
uncontrollable desire—“the relation between emotional investment and 
virtue contained in the classical topos of waṭan allowed it to serve as 
the basis for developing the modern sense of homeland of the 19th 
century31”: its idyllic lost time coincides with the “homogeneous empty 
time” theorized by Anderson in his 1991 landmark work, while the 
longing for someone’s lost birthplace becomes the longing for the 
nation’s lost splendor. Accordingly, Antrim (2010) criticizes Lewis 
(1991) according to whom the term waṭan initially only meant ‘place 
of residence’, and therefore lacked any political content, as, he argued,  
it was not focused on loyalty, and only to a limited extent on identity, 
                                                          
29 Noorani (2016), op. cit., 24. 
30 To this point, it is pertinent to mention the poet Ibn Ḥamdīs (1056-1133) famous 
because of the nostalgic verses that he wrote thinking about “his” Sicily, while 
emigrated in Andalusia at the court of al-Mu’tamid (1048-1095). Corrao (2004), op. 
cit., 40. 
31 Noorani (2016), op. cit., 41. 
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but instead was related to feelings of affection or nostalgia32. On the 
contrary Antrim states that: 
Waṭan was, in the pre-modern era, an evolving concept, one that 
often held personal, effective resonance but that was also used 
[…] to evoke religious and political ties to land. While […] the 
existence of such ties does not constitute nationalism, […] it 
nonetheless reminds us that, like their modern counterparts, pre-
modern Middle Easterners at time found that representing a 
particular territory as waṭan acted as a powerful idiom for 
expressing loyalty33. 
Tibi’s Arab Nationalism between Islam and the Nation-State 
(1997) is interesting in this regard as it discusses different social science 
interpretations of Nationalism and of Nation formation in the ‘Third 
World’34. Tibi does not consider Arab Nationalism a purely exogenous 
phenomenon, in fact he says that “foreign influences can only take 
effect when conditions for their reception and subsequent 
transformation exist”35. Moreover, he somehow separates nationalism 
from the concepts of nation and consequently of nationality in colonial 
and semi-colonial countries affirming that in such contexts 
“nationalism is not sui generis connected with the process of nation 
formation, since nationalism is not always based on a clearly defined 
notion of nationality36”. Besides, he lists three theories, worth briefly 
discussing, that attempt to explain nationalism in the ‘Third World’: the 
“Modernization ideology”, the “Process of Acculturation” and the 
“Nation Formation in the Colonies in the Context of Decolonization 
achieved by Armed Struggle”. 
                                                          
32 Bernard Lewis, “Watan,” Journal of Contemporary History 26 (London: SAGE, 
1991): 523-533. 
33 Antrim, op. cit., 190. 
34 Tibi, op cit., ch. 2. 
35 Ibid., 75. 
36 Ibid., 39. 
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According to the “Modernization ideology”, nationalism in 
socio-economically less-developed countries is a factor at the service 
of modernization: the aim of nationalism thus conceived is 
modernization in the sense of the industrialization of the country and 
such a process can only be led by the Western-educated colonial élite 
since the indigenous one only attempts to perpetuate traditional social 
structures. Moreover, the borders resulting from decolonization 
generally form national states only in a legal sense but not ‘true’ 
nationalities, therefore perspective nationalism is detached by 
nationality. The “Process of Acculturation” theory gives the Western-
educated élite leading role as well, but the issue of modernization is not 
central anymore. According to this theory ‘marginal people’ receive a 
creative impulse from the ‘nuclear peoples’ and consequently start a 
process of imitative adaptation that leads to a cultural synthesis between 
the autochthonous and the received culture (that can be unconscious if 
the process of acculturation is passive-imitative or conscious if the 
process is active-syncretic). Regarding a possible application of the 
acculturation theory within the Middle Eastern context Tibi wrote: 
Social change in the Middle East may be explained in terms of 
acculturation theory, to the extent that the archaic-chiliastic and 
secular-nationalist variants of the literary and political 
renaissance which took place in the Arab provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire in the early nineteenth century were generated 
by forces from outside the area. However, this theory cannot be 
particularly fruitful if it implies a Euro-centric approach. […] It 
is clear that Arab nationalism and the movements which 
preceded it have largely developed under the influence of 
Europe. However, such an approach cannot by itself lead to a 
real understanding of the phenomenon37. 
                                                          
37 Ibid., p. 75. 
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Finally, the third theory considers the formation of nations as a 
necessary consequence of the decolonization process. According to this 
theory, national unity shapes itself initially as group solidarity in the 
anti-colonial struggle and then, in the course of the revolutionary 
struggles, true nationalities start to develop. However, the nationalism 
that emerges in these peculiar circumstances is usually a form of ethno-
centric nationalism rather than a national consciousness. In fact, the 
national bourgeoisie often turns to pre-national structure and normative 
systems that provide fertile soil for ultra-nationalism, chauvinism, 
racism and therefore the installation of semi-fascist military 
dictatorships.  
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I. The Arab nation in Arab thought: Between kinship, 
religion and national identity 
 
Introduction 
The chapter follows a chronological order. The first section 
discusses the peculiarities of the Islamic community (umma) in order to 
retrace how this crucial multilayered reality – as it is at once a religious, 
ethnic and moral community —changed and developed over time. In 
fact, all the political regimes that succeeded the Prophet in leading it, 
being exogenous or endogenous, had eventually to face its actual and 
symbolic value by questioning its universal character or exploiting it in 
order to gain legitimacy. To give a significant example, when 
Bonaparte first attempted to approach the Egyptians, he addressed them 
in his famous introductory proclamation as al-umma al-miṣriyya (the 
Egyptian community)38. Then, moving along an ideal timeline begun 
with the birth of the Prophet and continued with the challenges faced 
initially by the Rightly Guided caliphs and later on by the Omayyads 
and the Abbasids until the Mongol invasion (and the centuries of 
fragmentation that followed), the focus shifts onto the role of the 
Ottoman Empire, its social structure, its legitimacy claims, its 
contribution to the modernization process and the reasons for its 
decline, as it is from its ashes that the modern Arab Nation-Sates arose. 
Consequently, the second section discusses the period that goes from 
the European rule (materially started with the French occupation of 
Tunisia in 1881 and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882) to the 
formation of the Arab Nation-States, as the rising Western presence in 
the region with the political and cultural domination that followed, had 
                                                          
38 Ami Ayalon, Language And Change In The Arab Middle East The Evolution of 
Modern Political Discourse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 23. 
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a central role in the formation of the Arab states and their nation-
building process. These historical and political developments are 
discussed and analyzed through the voices of the Arab thinkers that 
lived such a peculiar reality, well-described by Barakat (1993) as 
follows:  
[…] Arab thought can best be understood in the context of 
ongoing external and internal contradictions and challenges in a 
highly transitional era. The historical tasks of forging a nation 
out of conflicting communities, of achieving independence, and 
of establishing social justice have been central to the ongoing 
Arab debates. In these debates, the West has been viewed as a 
challenge, and in most instances as an exploitative and 
repressive force. So the need to confront the West has coexisted 
with the emulation of Western models and paradigms39. 
At this point, it is important to stress how the faiths of the Fertile 
Crescent, the Arabian Peninsula, the Nile valley and the North African 
coast differ greatly as each area experienced Western occupation or 
influence in its own terms. Accordingly, the rise of nationalism in the 
MENA region has to be considered not as a singular trend but rather as 
a series of smaller realities born largely (but not exclusively) in 
response to Western imperialism, each with its peculiar outcome40. 
Hence, the aim of the following sections is neither to discuss each and 
every outcome nor to present an unrealistic uniformity, but rather to set 
the ground of the inquiry in order to both clarify the conceptual 
dimensions used to analyze the empirical data gathered from the 
interviews, and to frame the historical and political background of the 
case countries, Jordan and Kuwait, to be discussed in detail in the third 
chapter through the analysis of the empirical data collected in the field 
work. 
                                                          
39 Barakat, op. cit., 242. 
40 Omar Ali, “The Two Nationalism of the Arab word,” The Ali Papers (13/03/2018),  
http://thealipapers.com/papers/2016/12/18/the-two-nationalisms-of-the-arab-world 
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Finally, the third section analyzes the Arab sovereignty and its 
“hybrid” nature, following Bacik’s account of Hybrid Sovereignty in 
the Arab Middle East (2008). The two sub-sections of the segment take 
into account the tribal and the religious components of the Arab Nation-
States that, alongside the political implications of external revenues, are 
among the major sources of power and legitimacy of the Arab-Muslim 
regimes. 
  
28 
 
1. Sources of legitimacy: from the first Islamic community to the 
Ottomans 
1.1 The Islamic Umma 
Bernard Lewis (1988) described the umma41 as “the single 
universal Islamic community embracing all the lands in which Muslim 
rule is established and the Islamic law prevails” and he underlined its 
multifaceted identity: 
It can be ethnic, since the Qur‘ān speaks of the umma of the 
Arabs. It can be religious, since the Qur‘ān also speaks of the 
umma of the Christians. It can be moral, since the Qur‘ān speaks 
of the umma of the good people, as opposed to the umma of bad 
people42.  
Such a complex community (which is also a ‘collective 
identity’43) could not come but from a complex background: The pre-
Islamic Arab society had a kin-structure, a type of bond that Ibn 
                                                          
41 Umma is considered an imported term from the Hebrew ummā or the Armenian 
ummeṯā. Initially, the Prophet Muḥammad considered the Arabs in general and his 
Meccan compatriots in particular to be a closed umma. Later on, when in Medina, he 
started a new community that did not include only the actual Muslims and had a 
political nature (regulated indeed by the Chart of Medina), a development imposed 
only by necessity. Hence, once his position became strong enough he excluded the 
non-Muslims from his community: the original umma of Arabs became an umma of 
Muslims. Rudi Paret, Umma, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st Edition, ed. M. Th. 
Houtsma, T.W. Arnold, R. Basset, R. Hartmann. 
42 Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1988), 32, 33. 
43 Riaz defines collective identity as follows: “Collective identity is grounded in the 
socialization process in human societies. Individuals develop it by first identifying 
with the values, goals and purposes of their society, and then by internalising them. 
This process, besides constructing the individual identity, also constructs the 
collective identity. Rituals and ritualised behaviours of the society further reinforce it 
and give the members a sense of similarity, especially against the 'Others' whose 
collective identities are different. The key role in the construction of a collective 
identity is played by symbolic systems of shared religion, language and culture, which 
also act as a boundary defining the mechanisms of the collective identity”. Riaz 
Hassan, “Globalisation's Challenge to the Islamic umma,” Asian Journal of Social 
Science 34, no. 2 (2006): 314-315. 
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Ḫaldūn44 articulated in the above mentioned concept of ‘aṣabiyya, a 
sense of belonging mostly based on blood ties, generally translated as 
group feeling, sense of solidarity, group loyalty or esprit de corps45. 
According to Asyiqin et al. (2012) the spirit of ‘aṣabiyya,  despite losing 
its centrality over time, has been essential in spreading the teachings of 
Islam, as it constituted the basis upon which to build a truly cohesive 
society, reinforced by a common faith; in other words, unless ‘aṣabiyya, 
common good, and law were combined in some form, stable Sates could 
not come into being; quoting Ibn Ḫaldūn “the Arabs only became a 
political force when their religion cemented their leadership with the 
religious law and its ordinances”46. However, it is important to 
underline that while religion is considered a powerful social glue that 
strengthens the rulers’ power it is not a conditio sine qua non in Ibn 
Ḫaldūn’s account. On the contrary, the Prophet, the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs, and later the Omayyads and the Abbasids needed the ‘aṣabiyya 
to legitimate their role47. Nevertheless, the religion of Islam created a 
moral solidarity to support the structure of rights and duties shared by 
                                                          
44 Ibn Ḫaldūn (1332, Tunis – 1406, Cairo) was a jurist, a politician, a diplomat and a 
courtier. A master of the Maliki school of law, he was the first political philosopher 
that analyzed the Islamic world from a sociopolitical perspective, thus retracing the 
Islamic political experience in a secular way. His originality lies above all in the 
method imbued with great realism (human reality is subject both to materialistic, such 
as climate and geographic conditions, and ethical-spiritual variables) and fully aware 
of history and its cyclicity. Accordingly, history has to be considered, 
methodologically and philosophically, both as a search for the causes and for the 
social and human truth. Peculiar of Ibn Ḫaldūn is the concept of ‘umrān bašarī 
(human “sociability”), a set of economic, social, political and cultural conditions 
which is divided into the Bedouin (badawī) and the urban (ḥaḍarī) societies, held 
together by the natural institution of the ‘aṣabiyya, a group spirit derived by blood 
ties, clientelistic affiliations and other forms of partnerships. Massimo Campanini, 
Islam e Politica, 3rd edition (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2015), 132-139. 
45 Abdul Halim Asyiqin, Roslan Mohd Nor Mohd, Ahmad Zaki, Ibrahim Berahim and 
Faisal Ahmad Faisal Abdul Hamid, “Ibn Khaldun’s Theory of ‘Asabiyyah and its 
Application in Modern Muslim Society,” Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 
11, no. 9 (2012): 1232-1237. 
46 Hourani (1962), op. cit., 24. 
47 Campanini (2015), op. cit., 132-139. 
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its community of believers and the šarī‘a was conceived as both a 
system of laws and a system of morality: it changed the Arab tribes into 
an Arab community and later different groups of Muslims into a 
community of believers. 
Even though the internal divisions did not take long to emerge48, 
the unity of the community had never been in question: It embodied the 
universalism of Islam and established a religious and cultural supra-
national identity that to this day remains strong and deep-rooted, being 
the most legitimate basis of collective consciousness. 
Nevertheless, in the intermediate stages the disconnection of the 
first proselytes from their kin relations was everything but linear and 
progressive. Indeed, Parolin (2007) identified three phases in the 
formative period of the Islamic community. The first coincides with the 
Meccan stage (610-622) and it is characterized by the indifference and 
even the rejection of Muḥammad’s preaching. The second phase starts 
after the hiǧra (622), when the political dimension of the community 
began to take shape: Muḥammad organized the people of Medina 
through the sahīa or ‘Charter of Medina’ that somehow marginalized 
the kinship (even if the pre-Islamic kin-order never fully disappeared) 
by including within the community Jews as well as Christians. 
However, this organization proved to be unstable and the Arab 
character of the prophetic message prevailed, as it differentiated Islam 
                                                          
48 In the early days of Islam the question of the succession of the Prophet (d. 632) was 
the most problematic because of the lack of indications left by Muḥammad himself. 
The rivalries for power, which divided the Medinese elite, ended up in a civil war 
started in 656 with the assassination of the third rightly guided caliph ‘Uṯmān and 
ended in 661 when the son-in-law of the Prophet and fourth rightly guided caliph ‘Alī 
concluded a treaty acknowledging the rule of the first Omayyad caliph Muʿāwiya. The 
war, called al-fitna al-kubrà, remained very significant not only for the political future 
of Islam, but especially for the meaning of religious authority in Islam that changed 
ever since. 
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from the other monotheistic faiths (Christianity and Judaism)49. After 
627—when no more Jews were allowed in the city—the umma entered 
in the third phase and acquired its distinctive and ultimate characters, 
reaching a full, although short-lived, political and religious unity50: in 
fact, in the earliest stages, the Prophet and his successors (to whom the 
community owed complete obedience51) had the responsibility of ruling 
the umma, although the true sovereignty rested in God’s hands. About 
the Medinese system al-Jabri wrote: 
[…] the system did not have a political denomination, because 
Mohammed always refused to be clled “king”. The classic Arab 
vocabulary had not any term except “king”, to indicate the 
“political presidency”. However, the Islam refuses and condemn 
this term, because the only true king is God52. 
1.2 The Rightly Guided caliphs and the Islamic empires 
More identity challenges to the new born community arrived 
with the death of ‘Alī, the last caliph who could claim a religious 
legitimation according to An-Na’im (the Omayyads tried to legitimate 
their authority by maintaining “the fiction that the authority of their 
caliphs was an extension of the authority of the Prophet”53), and with 
geographical expansion. ‘Umār, the second of the Rightly Guided 
caliphs (al-Ḫulafā' al-Rāšidūn, 632-661), conquered Syria, Egypt and 
                                                          
49 Christians and Jews were recognized as ‘People of the Book’, left free to profess 
their religions but requested to pay a tax per capita (ǧizya) and recognize the political 
authority of Islam. 
50 Gianluca P. Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World. Kin, Religion and Nation-Sate 
(Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research, Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 41-47. 
51 Within the pastoral representation, the ruler is called shepherd, ra‘iyya, while the 
ruled are its herd, the ra‘āyā. (Parolin, op. cit., p. 24). Moreover, the sūrat al-nisā’ (4, 
59) affirms: “Obey God, obey His Prophet, and obey those in authority over you”. 
Lewis (1988), op. cit., 91. 
52 Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 7-9. 
53 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State; Negotiating the Future 
of Shari‘a (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 61. 
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Persia in the 7th century, leading in the long term to processes of 
Islamization and Arabization and changing the umma’s social structure, 
then composed of a majority of non-Arab Muslims led by an Arab 
Muslim élite. The campaign of expansion started by ‘Umār, continued 
under the Omayyad caliphate (661-750), who conquered Spain, 
Transoxiana and parts of India. Moreover, the Arab element, significant 
in the first Medina period, became more essential: despite all, the umma 
grew up to be an ethno-religious community where Islam and Arabhood 
were impossible to disentangle. As Halliday (2002) pointed out: 
[…] under the first Arab dynasty, the Ummayads, a sense of 
strong Arab identity led to a reduction in commitment to the 
broader community, which by now included Persians and 
others, while under the Abbasids, who were strongly influenced 
by Persia, and under the Ottomans, who ruled a multi-ethnic 
empire, umma became a symbol of unity54. 
Indeed, under the Omayyads all documents and official papers 
had to be rewritten in Arabic, and non-Arabs suffered from different 
kinds of discrimination and marginalization: the mawālī, the non-Arab 
Muslims newly converted, became victims of cultural bias; they were 
banned from any task involving authority and they could not act as 
imams, judges or governors. The 8th caliph, ‘Umār II (682-720), tried 
to solve these problems, especially regarding the tax burden and his 
vision was later taken up by the Abbasids (750-1258) who built a 
cosmopolite and heterogeneous society where Arab and non-Arab 
Muslims were treated almost as equals. In fact, under the Abbasids the 
political weight of the Arabs was reduced while the mawālī were 
politically recognized and started to occupy positions until then 
                                                          
54 Fred Halliday, “The politics of the Umma: states and community in Islamic 
movements,” Mediterranean politics 7, no. 3 (2002): 24. 
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reserved only to Arab Muslims. Nevertheless, it was still not possible 
to talk about full rights for the minorities55. 
Moreover, under the Abbasids the professionalization of the 
military became official and at the time of the caliph al-Mu’tasim (796-
842) the utilization of Turkish slaves was pretty normal: many dynasties 
such as the Mamelukes56, owe their origins to this practice. 
Notably, as stressed by Patricia Crone (2003) the Abbasids tried 
to legitimate their authority by affirming to descend from the Prophet’s 
family: 
Like the Umayyads, the Abbasids were the best of creation after 
the Prophet, almost prophets themselves57, and chosen by God 
to be heirs of the prophets, but of the Prophet above all. Unlike 
the Umayyads, they were also kinsmen of the Prophet, to whose 
legacy they had a hereditary right, and thus able to pride 
themselves on the fact that they did not make the rasūl [Prophet] 
secondary in importance to the khalīfa [caliph]58. 
Under the Abbasids “messianic” caliphate a new society took 
shape, a society “characterized by the cohesive powers of a common 
language and currency and a unifying religio-political center”59 
embodied by their capital Baghdad with its symbolic round shape, “the 
City of Peace” (madīnat al-salām). However, the golden age was short 
                                                          
55 Francesca Maria Corrao, Islam, religion and politics (Roma: LUISS University 
Press, 2017), 39. 
56 The Mamelukes reigned in Egypt since 1250 to 1517. Their reign is divided in two 
periods: the baḥrī or Turkish period (1250–1382) and the burǧī or Circassian period 
(1382-1517). 
57 Abu al-‘Abbās ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muhammad al-Saffāḥ (721-754), the first Abbasid 
caliph, “duly styled himself al-mahdī to indicate that the world had now been filled 
with justice.” Patricia Crone, God's Rule - Government and Islam: Six Centuries of 
Medieval Islamic Political Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 
87. 
58 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God's Caliph: Religious Authority in the First 
Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 81, 82. 
59 Tayeb El-Hibri, Reinterpreting Islamic Historiography: Harun al-Rashid and the 
Narrative of the Abbasid Caliphate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
1, 2. 
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lived and, along with the territorial expansion and the growing presence 
of the Turkish element introduced into the army, the Abbasid caliphate 
faced crises on both the political and a social level. Politically, some 
provinces became semi-independent states, their source of legitimacy 
still being the caliphate toward which they maintained a certain degree 
of loyalty. Socially, the level of injustice and inequality among the 
various communities increased because of the inadequate practices 
undertaken by the Turkish soldiers; as a result, several opposition 
groups arose60 causing the formation of sectarian movements. In the 
945 the Shiite dynasty of the Buwayhids61 gained power at the expenses 
of the Abbasids. However, they both remained in charge. In fact, the 
Buwayhids, such as the Seljuks— the defenders of Sunnism62 that 
overthrown them in 1055— held a military and political power and 
legitimized themselves claiming to protect the Caliph, holder of the 
spiritual power. 
In the 1285 Hulagu— grandson of Genghis Khan and founder 
of the Ilkhanid dynasty— put an end to the Abbasid Caliphate even 
though he kept alive a symbolic Caliphate to legitimate his power. The 
Ilkhanids represented a true watershed in Arab-Muslim history, in fact 
they followed for the most part Tibetan Buddhism or Nestorian 
Christianity and even when they converted to Islam, showed a marked 
preference for Sufism. The Ilkhanids were then defeated by the 
Timurids (1370-1500) but neither Tamerlane nor its successors 
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managed to successfully unite the conquered territories, and from this 
fragmentation emerged the Mughal Empire in India, founded by Bābur 
(Zahīr al-Dīn Muḥammad, 1483-1530)63. 
This brief overview aimed to retrace the different forms of social 
aggregation and point out how the relations between the ruler and the 
ruled changed within the Islamic community after the death of the 
Prophet. In fact, governments, leaders and thinkers have always 
widened and narrowed the ideal boundaries of the umma according to 
the necessities of their time and in order to legitimate their standpoints. 
Indeed, under Muḥammad’s rule “religious and political values and 
religious and political offices were inseparable”64 but after the four 
Rightly Guided Caliphs such unity slowly shifted into two separated 
spheres. Later on, according to Lapidus (1975), the Omayyads stressed 
the absolute authority of the Caliph’s rule favouring political decisions 
(such as the strengthening of the army and the administration) over 
religious ones while the Abbasids, supported by the population of 
Khurasan, attacked the corrupted Caliph in the name of the “true Islam” 
and gave life to a more legitimate Caliphate for the umma. Then, in the 
middle of the 10th century 
The effective control of the empire passed into the hands of 
generals, administrators, governors, and local provincial lords; 
the Caliphs lost all effective political power. Governments in 
Islamic lands were henceforth secular regimes – Sultanates – in 
theory authorized by the Caliphs, but actually legitimized by the 
need for public order65. 
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While, since the 8th century, religious representatives developed 
a certain autonomy from the Caliphs’ authority because of their role of 
experts in Islamic jurisprudence and some judges became influent and 
reached leading positions being more in touch with the Muslim masses 
than the Caliph himself. 
After the Abbasid caliphate fragmentation and before the 
assumption of power over most of the Western Islamic world by the 
Ottomans, for half-millennium many dynasties continued to rise and 
fall, unable to mantain the umma united, neither as religious nor as 
ethnic community. 
Under the Ottoman rule, the Muslim umma was partly re-united 
and the conquest of Mecca and Medina gave to the Sultan the 
opportunity to strengthen his legitimacy through the title of “Guardian 
of Sacred Places”. Besides, from the Arab-Islamic system the Ottomans 
inherited the ḏimma that they extended to the ethnic groups and 
substituted with the millet system granting non-Muslims a great deal of 
autonomy. The millet would be abolished only with the Tanẓīmāt 
reforms. Such reforms, to be further analyzed in the next section, turned 
the subjects into citizens and terminated the special status of the 
autonomous communities for strengthening the central power. Indeed, 
the millet system gave each of the major religious communities “a great 
degree of legal autonomy and authority” to the extent that “the millets 
were able to set their own laws, have their own milli courts, and collect 
and distribute their own taxes”66; however, it is due to remember that 
they still payed the taxes to the Sultan. 
During the final phase of the Ottoman Empire, by the end of the 19th 
century, the caliphate was resumed to revive the sense of community in 
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the Empire. However, the corruption of the central government gave 
little credibility to the utopia of the Caliphate while the modern Nation-
State seemed both a plausible alternative and a useful tool by which 
renew the damaged administration of the Empire. 
Clearly, such transitional period is sensitive and not easy to 
analyze. The core of the present chapter aims precisely to discuss how 
the Arab thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries faced such a challenging 
concept and whether they gave a secular (Western-style constitutional-
liberal thought) and/or a religious answer (Islamic modernism). In the 
very beginning, the first standpoint generated two trends, one gave 
priority to the common ethno-linguist origins and the other believed that 
the sole unifying element of a homeland was socio-economic interest. 
Likewise, the religious standpoint soon was divided into two currents. 
Both believe that the constitutional system should be the guarantor of 
the Islamic caliphate, but they disagree about the extent to which they 
could accept the very principles of constitutionalism and weather to be 
open to certain socialist tendencies67. 
As for the religious answer, the most influent representatives 
were the Islamic reformist Ǧamāl al-Dīn al-Afġānī who purified the 
concept of nation of its secular connotations and declared that all 
Muslims were a single Nation, and his disciple Muḥammad ‘Abduh 
who continued the process, started by his predecessors, of identifying 
certain traditional concepts of Islamic thought with the dominant ideas 
of modern Europe. 
Instead, the Syrian scholar al-Kawākibī, considered the theorist 
of Arabism, claimed the existence of an independent Arab umma 
alongside the Islamic one, making one step toward Western secularism 
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and promoting an almost racial theory of nationality while remaining 
an orthodox Muslim68. Notably, the fact that al-Afġānī, ‘Abduh and al-
Kawākibī were in Cairo at the same time surely stimulated the debate 
leading to the formation of generations of future nationalists. Among 
them stand two figures: the prominent Egyptian lawyer, journalist and 
activist Muṣṭafà Kāmil (1874-1908), who in 1907 founded the Ḥizb al-
waṭan (National Party) and its newspaper al-Liwāʾ (the Standard), 
immediately joined by Muḥammad Farīd (1868-1919), the party’s 
secretary and the successor of Kamīl after his death, and Aḥmad Luṭfī 
Sayyid (1872-1963), a lawyer and student of Afġānī and ‘Abduh who 
gradually distanced himself from Farīd and Kāmil, for he believed that 
independence was to be considered a result rather than a premise.  Luṭfī 
Sayyid stressed the importance of a Western-like school reform that 
would raised the Egyptians’ political awareness. Hence, alongside 
Qāsim ’Amīn and a number of other intellectuals that developed 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh’s ideas toward secularization, he founded the Ḥizb 
al-umma (People’s Party, 1907) and its newspaper al-Ğarīda (the 
newspaper), giving to the term umma the narrower meaning of nation 
proper to the European perspective.  
Moreover, Kāmil and Sayyd had different views regarding the 
role of the Caliphate too. For the founder of the National Party, the 
Ottoman Empire was the last bulwark against European imperialism 
while Sayyid did not believe in the panislamic discourse convinced as 
he was that the pillars of the States’ very existence are shared interests 
rather than shared feelings. The Caliphate had for him only a symbolic 
and spiritual value while he looked at the British as his privileged allies 
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in in his effort to reform the country at all levels: scholastic, juridical, 
administrative and economic69. 
A completely different conception of the caliphate is the one of 
Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949) according to which the caliph is the 
symbol of Islamic unity. Indeed, in an atmosphere of such intellectual 
ferment, in 1928, when many Egyptians had lost confidence in the 
Western ideas of modernization and liberalism, the Egyptian 
schoolteacher and imām founded the Muslim Brotherhood (ğam‘iyyat 
al-Iḫwān al-Muslimīn), a transnational Sunni Islamist organization 
focused on educational, social, economic and religious activities that 
soon became involved into the Egyptian politics. Al-Bannā’s statement 
at the Fifth conference of the Brotherhood well summarizes his 
religious-political thought: 
We believe the rules and teachings of Islam to be 
comprehensive, to include the people's affairs in the world and 
the hereafter. Those who believe that these teachings deal only 
with the spiritual side of life are mistaken. Islam is an ideology 
and a worship, a home and a nationality, a religion and a state, 
a spirit and work, and a book and sword70.' 
Later on, the Syrian scholar Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī (born in Aleppo he 
received a Turkish education in Constantinople) formulated a 
complitely different theory by developping the definition of the Arab 
umma in its German acceptation of “a living organism which has 
developed organically through common language and history and […] 
is determined by subjective impulses”71. Al-Ḥuṣrī’s pan-Arab 
perspective, which the Brotherhood opposed, was as universal and 
transnational as the Pan-Islamist one, and later the founder of the Ba‘aṯ 
                                                          
69 Corrao (1985), op. cit. 24-36. 
70 Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred W.  Wenner, “Modern Islamic Reform 
Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” Middle East Journal 
36 no. 3 (Summer 1982): 340. 
71 Tibi, op. cit., 152. 
40 
 
Party Mīšīl ‘Aflaq (1910-1989) added to it a social component by 
opposing the collective character of the umma to Western 
individualism. 
It is not easy to conclude this section as the term umma never 
stopped evolving, modifying and being modified. Indeed, Hassan 
(2006) by focusing on the effects of the globalization stresses how 
modern technology changed the very essence of the umma since 
worldwide communication made it easy to reveal not only similarities 
but also differences among Muslims of different countries in some 
cases causing the emergence of Islamic movements that sought the 
community’s lost “authenticity”. Moreover, such transformations may 
have de-centered the Islamic world, conferring a kind of legitimacy to 
its regional “ummas”, each one with a peculiar and unique character. 
1.3 Significance and decline of the Ottoman rule 
During the 15th and 16th centuries most of the Muslim world was 
ruled by three great empires: the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire 
(Persia) and Mughal Empire (India). Alongside Anatolia and 
southeastern Europe, all the Arabic speaking countries were governed 
by the Ottomans, except for some parts of Arabia, the Sudan, and 
Morocco. The language of the military and administrative élite (largely 
composed of converts to Islam coming from the Balkans and the 
Caucasus) was Turkish while religious education and law were the 
Arabic language’s prerogatives. 
The Ottomans based the legitimacy of their system of 
government and their military expansion on Islamic grounds. In fact, 
Islamic ideological universalism implicitly authorized the supra-
national character of the Empire, and the sultans had been declared the 
legitimate heirs to the caliphate by the Ottoman court historians.  
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According to the myth they created, the last Abbasid Caliph in 
Cairo al-Mutawakkil III (d. 1543) — who most likely was imprisoned 
in Istanbul— handed over his office to Sultan Salim I in 151772, the 
year in which Cairo fell to the Ottomans. Such legend, gained in 
credibility also because the Ottomans menaged to seize both the stick 
and the mantle of the Prophet, until then safeguarded by the Abbasids 
in Cairo. Furthermore, the historians made up genealogies for the 
sultans, tracing their Arab origin back to the Prophet Muḥammad and 
its tribe, the Qurayš73. Later on, Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī attributed to this 
manipulation of history the Ottomans’ success in securing the loyalty 
of the Arabs to the Empire, and the consequent delay in the rise of the 
Arab National movement74. However, following this narrative, the 
Ottoman Empire presented itself as a champion of Sunnism, a warrior 
state that fought a holy war against the Byzantine frontier; it took the 
responsibility of protecting and extending the frontiers of the Muslim 
world, guarding the holy cities of Arabia and organizing the pilgrimage 
toward them. Moreover, the Ottoman Sultan, alongside the Moghul 
emperor, was considered the defender of Sunnism against the Shiite 
Persia and, although he never claimed the title of caliph (that gradually 
disappeared after the Mongol conquest of Baghdad), Muslims owed 
him loyalty and religious allegiance as he justified his legitimacy on the 
divine right of those who rule and maintain the power in the interest of 
Islam.  
However, by the end of the 17th century, the Ottoman system 
started to decline: the power passed into the weak hand of the grand 
vizier; the tax-collection method was no longer efficient; the slave-élite 
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relation weakened as free-born Muslims were allowed to enlist in the 
military, and the Janissaries (disbanded by Mahmud II in 1826) of the 
provincial capitals turned into an actual political party75. Moreover, in 
the 18th century two interconnected balances changed: the one between 
Ottoman central and local governments—that gave room to local ruling 
families or groups to gain a relative autonomy, while remaining faithful 
to the Ottoman state—and the one between the empire and the states of 
Europe, which after the scientific revolution and a considerable growth 
of their economic power were threatening it militarily from the west 
and from the north76. At this regard, the capitulations77 are of special 
interest because of their impact on the society. Indeed, these Sultans’ 
decrees that regulated the relations between the Empire and the Western 
nations, by granting large privileges and powers to Europeans resident 
on Ottoman soil contribueted to the formation of a bourgeois class 
among the non-Muslim population at the expense of the Muslims, thus 
opening the way to the European domination of the Arab-Muslim lands’ 
internal affairs78. Besides, Ottoman Catholics were protected by 
European missions: the Maronites of Lebanon were under the French 
umbrella while the Orthodox Christians, especially Greeks, were 
connected with Russia. Meanwhile, in central Arabia the Wahhabi 
movement arose, a movement of reform led by Arabs, aimed at 
returning to the beginnings of Islam and born within the strictly 
orthodox legal school (maḏhab) of Hanbalism—especially within the 
political theology of Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328). The founder of the 
movement, Moḥammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), denied the 
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legitimacy of the Ottoman Sultan as leader of the Islamic umma by 
accusing the Ottoman rule of corruption and by affirming that “only 
Arabs could bring Islam back to its original pristine purity”, he 
formulated potentially nationalist aspirations against the Ottomans. The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia owes its origins to the alliance of ʿAbd al-
Wahhāb with the small dynasty of Ibn Sa‘ūd; this alliance gave to the 
Wahhabi political and theological notions the possibility to form “the 
ideology of a political and religious revivalist movement of an archaic 
and millenarian kind”79 that survived its founder80. 
When the Ottoman ruling élite became aware of a relative 
weakening in power and independence, it decided that a step toward the 
modernity was necessary for its survival. The empire should have 
become a modern centralized Sate composed of semi-autonomous 
provinces. Therefore, a plan to reform was enacted in order to make the 
empire a modern centralized State composed of semi-autonomous 
provinces: The Tanẓīmāt (1839-1876). These reforms were based on 
two models: traditional confessional communitarianism (whose goal 
was to reorganize the major religious communities of the Empire in 
order to limit their autocracy) and Ottomanization, aimed at 
strengthening the equality of all Ottomans, regardless of their ethnic or 
religious affiliation, strongly opposed by the Arabs. Thus, a process of 
secularization took place alongside the centralization and 
modernization of the administration: the fiscal system was improved, 
European codes of law were introduced, students were sent to Europe 
to study and different sectors of state bureaucracy, such as the military 
and economic organization were reformed. However, as far as the 
(proto) national identity is concerned the most important reform was 
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the Vilayet Law of 1864 that provided a standard framework for 
provincial administration, dividing the empire into provinces ruled by 
a governor, thus leading to the crystallization of local identities by 
starting a process of territorial definition and creating the earliest forms 
of modern and central statehood in the Arab lands. Lisa Anderson 
(1987) affirmed that those reforms “inaugurated a period of state 
formation, comparable to that in Europe during the 17th and 18th 
centuries81”. However, it should be stressed that not all the countries 
had the same faith, for example Transjordan was not one of those new 
provinces, therefore a Jordanian political society in the true sense of the 
term did not emerge, and the area suffered from isolation and 
negligence; nevertheless, the Ottoman influence in Jordan remained 
essential to the extent that the new Nation-State continued to use 
Ottoman legal codes until the late Forties. 
Moreover, officers of the Ottoman Army started to be trained 
either in Europe or in the Empire by European instructors and this 
originated a class of Westernized officers of bourgeois origin that later 
played a decisive political role in the region, in fact from their ranks 
emerged the Young Turks82 and then the Kemalists83 who actually 
dissolved the Empire. The same origin is shared also by the Arab 
nationalist officers, crucial for the Arab national movement. Regarding 
this, Bernard Lewis (1979) wrote: 
Of all the groups in Middle Eastern society, the army officers 
have had the longest and most intensive exposure to Western 
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influence, and have the most vital professional interest in 
modernization and reform. This may help to explain the 
phenomenon, unusual in other parts of the world, of the 
professional officer as the spearhead of social change84. 
Furthermore, in 1869 the first Ottoman Law on citizenship, 
which was deeply inspired by the 1851 reform of the French legislation 
on naturalization, was ratified. The 1869 Law discussed citizenship as 
a political authority issue, outside the Islamic Law: the principle of 
paternal jus sanguinis (art. 1) was adopted, every individual born on 
Ottoman soil by foreign parents could apply for Ottoman citizenship 
three years after having come of age (art. 2) and citizenship by 
conversion could only be requested but not imposed, as it was before. 
Moreover, the 1869 law was modified for the citizens of those 
provinces that during the 19th century had gained a certain autonomy, 
such as the mountains of Lebanon and northern Palestine, Kurdistan in 
northern Iraq and Egypt. Accordingly, within the Arab countries, where 
people knew only religious and kinship bonds, the indigenous 
nationality (al-ra‘awiyya al-mahalliyya) emerged as an additional form 
of secular membership, alongside the Ottoman nationality85. At the end 
of the First World War, the Ottoman nationality ceased to exist 
alongside the political unity of the Ottoman rule, following some 
decisive events such as the Great Arab revolt86 and the Sykes-Picot 
agreement (1916), the Balfour Declaration of (1917) and especially the 
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post-war peace treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) that 
completed the partition of the Empire and drew new political 
boundaries in the region. The two treaties were very similar as far as 
the nationality issue was concerned: 
[They] granted former Ottoman subjects the right to opt for 
Turkish nationality (art. 124) or the nationality of the state the 
majority of whose population was of the same race as the person 
exercising the right. […] Jews of other than Turkish nationality 
who were habitually resident within the boundaries of Palestine 
on the treaty’s coming into force became ipso facto citizens of 
Palestine to the exclusion of any other nationality. Natives of a 
certain territory who were resident abroad at the time of the 
treaty’s coming into force were allowed to exercise the right of 
option for the nationality of the territory they were natives of, 
with the consent of the government exercising authority therein 
(art. 23)87. 
Notably, Turkey refused to sign the 1920 treaty and, after the 
Turkish War of Independence led and won by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
in Losanna, Turkish sovereignty was preserved through the 
establishment of the Republic of Turkey in Anatolia. The Turkish 
republic in the interwar period adopted the Swiss Civil Code and in 
1928 enacted a Turkish Nationality Law. 
This brief overview clarifies that nationality as a political 
principle started to become significant among Muslims since the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire because of both the Vilayet Law and 
increasing contact with the West: by the end of the 19th century some 
Ottoman Arab intellectuals introduced theories against the right of 
Turks to rule Arabs, formulating the ideology of Arabism. In fact, when 
Abdülhamid II (1842-1918) accessed to power in 1876 there was a 
drastic change in the state’s education and linguistic policy (for 
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example Turkish became mandatory) that indicated both a 
centralization and a growing of Turkish nationalism. As a consequence, 
the space for the cultural and literary production of non-Turkish Muslim 
groups such as Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds lessened and, quoting 
Soleimani (2016): 
[…] it becomes evident that the Ottoman élite’s effort to 
differentiate themselves from other Muslims was informed by 
their nationalism and ethnic self-perception as the only ethnic 
group capable of modernizing “the rest”88. 
Later on, patriotism obtained political significance and 
nationality started to connect with territoriality. Accordingly, Hourani 
(1962) identifies three main overlapping types of nationalism between 
the French Campaign in Egypt and the beginning of World War II: 
religious nationalism, territorial patriotism (especially in Egypt, 
Lebanon and Tunisia), and ethnic or linguistic nationalism.  
2. From European rule to the formation of the Arab Nation-States 
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, defined by Hourani (1991) 
as “the last great expression of the universality of the world of Islam89”, 
but especially the rising Western presence in the region with the 
political and cultural domination that followed, had a central role in the 
formation of the Arab states and their nation-building processes. In fact, 
Islamic modernism and Pan-Islamism, Arab nationalism and Pan-
Arabism shaped themselves in response to this foreign threat. 
Nevertheless, the Arab national awakening cannot be considered only 
an exogenous phenomenon: the West was its counterpoint rather than 
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its leading cause, as Arab nationalists made of the Western colonizer 
the ‘other’ to fear and fight against. Therefore, the national movement 
was triggered by colonialism and its implicit denial of the national 
existence of the people to whom it was applied, and by doing so 
it generated both a movement of resistance within the colonial world.  
This contributed to the formation of the multilayered Arab 
national identity, a result of  the supra and sub-state identities90 with 
which the state builders would have to cope and that, by implicitly or 
explicitly separating the territory (state) from the identity (nation), 
would be one of the major causes of the Arab Nation-States’ 
sovereignty and legitimacy crisis over time91. 
2.1 The nahḍa pioneers 
Notably, this process was neither fast nor linear. In fact, when 
the Ottoman Empire was about to collapse, Arab nationalism was still 
in an initial stage and took the form of a literary renaissance. According 
to Tibi (1997) “the early Arab nationalists confined themselves to 
emphasize the existence of an independent Arab cultural nation without 
demanding a national state”92, meaning that they either uncritically 
accepted the existence of a ‘nation’ under Ottoman rule or criticized the 
Ottoman government for its despotism but never questioned its social 
organization. The First Generation of reformers (1830-1870) in 
Hourani’s categorization were mostly linguists and men of letters. In 
fact, at that time in the Middle East there were neither the subjective 
nor the objective conditions for a political movement. However, as 
already stressed, every region followed its peculiar path during the 
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collapse of the Ottoman Empire and its consequent fragmentation, and 
so did the writers and the intellectuals of those regions due to many 
factors. Among these were the extent of the autonomy from the central 
government reached by their respective countries and their 
consequential access to the West and to Western thought. In Egypt 
Napoleon Bonaparte, after his brief campaign (1798-1801), was 
defeated by the Albanian officer Muḥammad ʿAlī (1769-1849) who —
with only nominal rcognition of the Sultan’s suzerainty— ruled the 
country independently93. The dynasty that he established governed until 
the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. ‘Ali is considered the founder of 
modern Egypt. In fact, he created the basis of the country’s modern 
economy, and reformed the transportation and the military system; 
notably, although high posts in the military hierarchy continued to be 
awarded to non-Egyptians, within the civilian administration the 
number of Egyptians started to grow and to secure important positions 
to the point that not long after Arabic replaced Ottoman Turkish as the 
language of administration94. 
Most importantly, Muḥammad ‘Ali opened professional 
schools, changed schools’ curricula, sent students to Europe, and 
established a press and an official newspaper thus contributing to the 
formation of the first intelligentsia of modern Egypt (e.g. al-Tahtāwī)95. 
Conversely in Syria, at the beginning of the 19th century Arab Muslims, 
embedded in their Islamic background, were still untouched or even 
hostile to the “new” ideas of reform. Besides, unlike Egypt, they had 
not yet experienced European occupation, as Bonaparte failed to 
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occupy Syria. On the other hand, the Christian Syrians had already been 
in contact with European thought since the 16th century through the 
religious missions established by the Catholic Church within the eastern 
Christian communities (such as Maronites, Armenians, Copts and 
Nestorians) under the French protection that created the conditions for 
the establishment of a network of schools, especially in Lebanon and in 
Aleppo. It was from these schools that later came many families of 
religious and laymen intellectuals, fully aware of European thought and 
masters in Italian, Latin and Arab languages, such as the Bustānī and 
the Šidīāq families. If it is true that Muslim thinkers of this generation 
were aware that modern reform was not only a legitimate but a 
necessary component of the social teaching of Islam, it is also true that 
Christian thinkers did not have to face the problem of becoming part of 
the modern world while remaining Muslim, in other words they did not 
need to defend modern civilization in traditional Islamic terms. 
Moreover, for Christians, the transformation of the Ottoman Empire 
into a secular State on the European model meant that they could finally 
become full-fledged citizens with equal rights and a ‘supra religious’ 
national feeling.  
Therefore, they could embrace and support such a 
transformation without the hesitation of those Muslims who still had a 
deep loyalty to the Empire96. Meanwhile Tunisia—officially under 
Ottoman rule since the 16th century— had been virtually independent 
since the 17th century, when power passed into the hands of a local 
military group; later, in the 18th century the Husaynid dynasty took the 
title of Bey even though the country remained under the formal 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The messengers of the new political 
ideas in the North African region were the officers of the modern army 
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and in 1860 Tunisia was the first between the other Muslim countries 
to issue a constitution (a member of the Commission who drafted the 
Constitution was Ḫayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī). Although the constitutional 
government was a short-lived experiment, it formed a political 
consciousness in the country contributing in the creation of a group of 
intellectuals and writers that played a crucial role in its future political 
and cultural development, coming either from the Islamic background 
of the Zaytuna Mosque or from the School of Military Sciences 
established by Ahmad Bey (Husaynid Bey of Tunis, d. 1855).  
Finally, the intellectuals of Constantinople were still defining 
themselves as a part of the Ottoman community which included both 
non-Turks and non-Muslims, they were democrats but stressed the 
Islamic roots of their fatherland trying to justify the Western institutions 
that they were willing to adopt in Islamic terms. In the second half of 
the 19th century these figures organized themselves into a political 
group, the Young Ottomans97, politically liberal but with a strong 
Turkish and Muslim patriotic substrate to which Cairo responded with 
a form of Egyptian territorial patriotism, articulated by Rifāʿa al-
Tahtāwī. 
2.1.1 Rifāʿa al-Tahtāwī (1801-1873) 
Al-Tahtāwī was one of the imams chosen by šayḫ Ḥasan al-
ʿAṭṭār (rector of al-Azhar, d. 1835) to lead a group of students within 
the first study mission in Paris organized by Muḥammad ‘Alī. He 
remained in France for five years, from 1826 to 1831, and the 
experience deeply affected him. He thoroughly studied the French 
language, Greek philosophy and mythology, geography, arithmetic, and 
logic; however, what left a permanent mark on him was the thought of 
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the French Enlightenment, gained from a full access to the works of the 
major French thinkers of the 18th century, such as Montesquieu, 
Rousseau (Social Contract, 1762), Voltaire, Racine, and Condillac. Al-
Tahtāwī kept a diary while he was in Paris, published shortly after his 
return in Egypt (1834) under the title Takhlīṣ al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīṣ Bārīz 
(The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris, known as Paris 
Diaries) and then translated into Turkish and made a compulsory 
reading for Egyptian civil servants; in this document he described 
institutions and customs of French society, looking at Europe only as a 
cultural and socio-economic example to follow and never as a colonial 
power, which happened with the next generations of Arab intellectuals. 
Regarding this, Abu Rabi‘ (2004) wrote: 
R. R. al-Tahtāwī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh and their colleagues 
thought that the tension between stagnation and science could 
be resolved only if the intellectual Muslim élite of the nineteenth 
century linked its own doctrinal philosophy to the logic of 
Western science and philosophy. That is to say, all of them 
advocated the central concept of nineteenth century European 
modernity: progress. However, in resolving this first 
contradiction, a second and perhaps more astounding one was 
revealed: the contradiction of colonialism and science, two 
givens in the West98. 
As for al-Tahtāwī’s perception of the European countries, 
terminology and geography are indeed noteworthy. In fact, in his early 
works he regarded Europe as a single land (bilād), considering countries 
such as England or Switzerland as its regions (iqlīm) or provinces 
(wilāya). However, as soon as he studied geography in France such 
terminology became unsatisfactory and, by the 1840, he started to use 
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the term bilād to refer to the single European states rather than to the 
whole continent99. 
Once back in Egypt al-Tahtāwī became editor of the newspaper 
al-Waqā’i‘ al-Miṣriyya (the Egyptian affairs) and in 1836 founded a 
language school, and launched through it an important movement of 
translation. He then wrote many books promoting modern education 
both for girls and boys and urging the clergy to integrate secular modern 
disciplines in the training of its members100. 
As far as political authority is concerned, al-Tahtāwī had a 
conventional Islamic view, thus he always remained within the tradition 
of Islamic thought while enriching it with new and significant 
developments. In other words, according to al-Tahtāwī, the principles 
on which European progress was based had their equivalents in Islamic 
culture: šarī‘a structure was close to the rationalist Natural Law of 
modern Europe (even though he claimed that the door of iǧtihād needed 
to be reopened to reinterpret the Islamic law in conformity with modern 
needs), French patriotism corresponded to Islamic solidarity, and 
reason, as used in Western science, was applied even in the most 
traditional of Islamic disciplines, jurisprudence. He was clearly 
concerned with pushing for these principles, while giving them an 
indigenous character and even a universal character. He also stressed 
the centrality of political justice as the necessary condition for the 
subjects’ well-being, prosperity and the advancement of knowledge. 
Moreover, according to him, Rousseau’s legislator—the embodiment 
of reason that helps the masses to pursue the good as they are not 
equipped for self-government101—has affinities with the function of the 
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Prophet as Muslim philosophers described it. Besides, as Rousseau 
stresses that the people’s consent is necessary for the exercise of power, 
al-Tahtāwī affirms that people could and should participate actively in 
the process of government and that they should be educated for this 
purpose. 
Finally, as for the idea of Nation, he was deeply influenced by 
Montesquieu’s thought, as the idea of a geographically limited 
community is central in his work. According to him, States rise and fall 
due to causes that are to be found in the ‘spirit’ of the nation, the love 
for which represents the basis of all the political virtues102. Accordingly, 
love for the country (ḥubb al-waṭan) is the leading factor contributing 
to a civilized community; the citizen has many duties toward his 
country such as unity, submission to law and sacrifice, but he also 
enjoys many rights, above all the right to freedom. Under this 
perspective ḥubb al-waṭan comes to have for al-Tahtāwī the same 
meaning that ‘aṣabiyya had for Ibn Ḫaldūn, a sense of solidarity that 
binds together people living within the same community and that 
constitutes the basis of their social strength. However—and this is his 
original contribution to the debate—his emphasis is not only on the 
mutual duties of the umma but of those who live together in the same 
country. Ḥubb al-waṭan becomes therefore a carrier of territorial 
patriotism in the modern sense and consequently the waṭan takes the 
place of the umma, as the brotherhood between the people transcends 
both religion and the blood ties narrated by Ibn Ḫaldūn. When al-
Tahtāwī refers to his waṭan he defines it as Egyptian, not Arab; 
according to him, Modern Egypt is both a distinct and historically 
continuous reality, the legitimate descendant of the land of the Pharaohs 
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and in this sense it is both part of the Islamic umma and constitutes a 
separate umma itself. 
2.1.2 Ḫayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī (1820-1890) 
In Tunis, the reformer Ḫayr al-Dīn believed, like al-Tahtāwī, 
that the principles of progress and prosperity were freedom and justice, 
and he tried to convince his compatriots that these principles were not 
tied to Christianity but they had to be considered the modern equivalent 
of those found in the spirit of the šarī‘a. In this regard, he insisted on 
the importance of the principle of maṣlaḥa, public interest/good103: the 
interpretation or ruling form to be chosen is the one that better serves 
the public interest/good of the Muslim community. In other words the 
šarī‘a is indeed of divine origin but should not be viewed as a fixed 
code. Ḫayr al-Dīn’s major work was Aqwam al-masālik fī ma‘rifat 
aḥwāl al-mamālik (The Straightest Path in Knowing the States of 
Kingdoms), published in Tunis in 1867 and where—unlike al-Tahtāwī 
whose Parisian diary is often recalled in the book—Ḫayr al-Dīn focused 
on the Islamic umma, not on the nation, meaning that his ideas applied 
to all the Islamic states as Islamic while the uniqueness of each Nation 
was not conceived. Moreover, again unlike al-Tahtāwī, he was aware 
of the colonialist ambitions of the European powers, therefore his view 
of Europe was more critical and less idyllic.  
As for Ḫayr al-Dīn’s personal and public life, he was born in the 
Caucasus and moved to Istanbul at a young age. Later on he was taken 
into the service of Aḥmad, Bey of Tunis, where he received both a 
modern and religious education and learned French. The Bey sent him 
in Paris where he remained for four years, a very significant experience 
                                                          
103 The juristic principle of maṣlaḥa (welfare) or maṣaliḥ al-‘ibād (the welfare of 
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for his formation, as it had been for al-Tahtāwī. Ḫayr al-Dīn was always 
very active politically, his goals being the application of the principle 
of justice through the strengthening of the ministers’ power to limit the 
ruler’s power—an effort that the Bey resented and defeated—and, 
above all, the Porte recognition of the autonomy of Tunis within the 
Ottoman Empire and the hereditary right of the Husaynid family in 
order to counterbalance the French colonialist ambitions in the region.  
He finally reached the latter in 1870 as France had been 
weakened by the war with Germany and, as soon as Tunis was 
proclaimed an autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire, he became 
at first minister in control of interior, finance and foreign affairs and 
then, in 1873, Prime Minister. When his political career in Tunis ended, 
as he lost the support of England, France and Italy—the three States 
which had interest in the region—he moved to Constantinople, 
convinced that the survival of the Empire was necessary for the welfare 
of Islam and in 1878 became grand vizier104. 
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2.1.3 Aḥmad Fāris al-Šidyāq (1804-1887) 
Aḥmad Fāris al-Šidyāq came from a Maronite family but 
converted first to the Protestantism, then to Islam (that is why he added 
Aḥmad to his name, probably after he met Aḥmad Bey of Tunis in 
Paris) and finally is said to have become a Catholic before he died. His 
brother, the historian As‘ad, converted to Protestantism before him and 
as a result was imprisoned and sentenced to death by the Maronite 
Patriarch. Because of this, al-Šidyāq’s social criticism implied a harsh 
attack against the Maronite hierarchy. 
He travelled throughout Europe and beyond as he was sent by 
the American missionaries to Egypt and to Malta (where he worked as 
a translator) and later he went to England and France where he stayed 
for few years and published a set of maqāmāt105 under the original title 
Al-Sāq ʿalā al-sāq fī mā huwa al-Fāryāq (One Leg over Another or The 
Pigeon on the Tree Branch, 1855), in which he recorded his experiences 
like al-Tahtāwī did in his Parisian diary106. After France he moved to 
Constantinople where, in 1860, he founded the first important Arab 
newspaper, al-Ǧawā'ib (The Wonders). His vision of identity, shared 
by all the early pioneers such as Nāṣīf al-Yāziǧī (1800-1871) and al-
Bustānī, was based on the Arabic literary heritage and common Arab 
history. They all stressed the need for a solidarity around this identity 
that could overcome religious diversity while remaining within the 
Ottoman boundaries. He focused mostly on language thus he worked to 
modernize the Arabic literature and the Arabic language through 
translation and creative writing. 
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2.1.4 Buṭrus al-Bustānī (1819-1883) 
Al-Bustāni comes from the same Maronite community of al-
Šidyāq, like him he was educated at the Maronite seminary of ‘Ayn 
Waraqa, converted to Protestantism and started to work for the 
American missionaries as an Arabic teacher and translator. In the 
seminary he was taught Syriac, Latin and Italian and later on, when he 
moved to Beirut in 1840, he studied and learned Hebrew, Aramaic and 
Greek, thus mastering all the languages of the earliest scriptural texts. 
He also knew French and English and was able to translate the Bible 
into Arabic. Through all his works, he contributed to modernize the 
Arabic language aiming at making it capable of expressing the concepts 
of modern thought without betraying itself. Working toward this goal, 
he started an encyclopedia (Dā’irat al-ma‘ārif, The dictionary of 
knowledge; 1876), carried on by his sons after his death and wrote an 
Arabic dictionary in two volumes (Muḥīṭ al-muḥīṭ, The Breadth or 
Diameter of the Ocean; 1870)107. 
He was convinced that the Near East needed to learn from 
modern Europe the importance of a national unity that overcomes 
religious affiliations as, according to him, all who speak Arabic, 
whether Christians or Muslims, are Arabs108. Even though he still felt a 
sense of belonging to the Ottoman Empire and his loyalty to the sultan 
had never been in question, he perceived the smaller territorial unit 
where he lived, Syria, as his waṭan. In fact, the motto of al-Ǧinān (The 
Paradises), the magazine that his family published since 1870 until 
1886 (when it was shut down due to increasing Ottoman censorship) 
was “the love for the country is an act of faith” (ḥubb al-waṭan min al-
‘imān). Moreover, in 1860 he stated: 
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It is for abnā' al-waṭan [the sons of the fatherland] to claim their 
waṭan’s protection of their most precious rights [ḥuqūq], 
namely, their life, honor and property, including freedom 
[ḥurriyya] of their civic [madanī], cultural and religious rights; 
in return, they should devote themselves to the attainment of 
their country's welfare109. 
Al-Ǧinān and the other magazine published by al-Bustāni in 
1860, Nafīr Sūrīa (Appeal to Syria110), were the first organs of Arab 
cultural nationalism. Furthermore, in 1863, convinced that only 
knowledge leads to enlightenment, he founded the National School, al-
madrasa al-waṭaniyya, the first secular school in Syria, based on 
national rather than religious principles. Notably, the principal Arabic 
teacher of the al-Bustāni school was another leading figure in the 
intellectual life of the period, the above mentioned Lebanese scholar 
Nāṣīf al-Yāziǧī, with whom he also founded “the Literary and Scientific 
Society” (ǧam‘īyyat al-adab wa al-‘ulm), the first literary society in the 
Arab world, initially composed only of Europeans and Syrian 
Christians and later superseded by “The Syrian Scientific Society” 
(ǧam‘īyyat al-‘ilmiyya al-sūriyya), which included also Western 
educated Muslims and Druzes111. 
2.1.5 Adīb Isḥāq (1856-1885): the first political theorist of Arab 
nationalism 
Isḥāq was Syrian Christian by origin and received a Jesuit 
education, but moved to Egypt at a very young age where he pursued a 
literary career and produced many publications. Among these was the 
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newspaper Miṣr (Egypt), published at first in Alexandria and then in 
Paris. Tibi (1997) defines him as “the first political theorist of Arab 
nationalism” because of his definition of the Nation which transcended 
literature and that Isḥāq discussed in the treaties collected by his brother 
and known as al-Durar (The Pearls)112. According to him, “there is no 
waṭan without ḥurriyya [freedom], they are identical […] and the waṭan 
cannot exist without rights”113. However, despite the modernity of his 
political thinking for his time, just as al-Bustāni he remained always 
loyal to the Ottoman Empire and never questioned its existence. 
2.1.6 The notion of Muslim world of Ǧamāl al-Dīn al-Afġānī (1838-
1897) 
According to Cemil Aydin (2017) the “Idea of the Muslim 
World” and the Muslim identity which resulted from it, originated from 
both pan-Islamism and Islamophobia, the roots of which lie in the late 
19th century when Muslims themselves, as al-Afġānī states, 
“strategically essentialized a notion of the Muslim world driven by a 
political will114”. Indeed, unlike al-Tahtāwī who regarded Europe only 
as an example to follow and never as a threat or Ḫayr al-Dīn who, 
although more aware of the imperialist European ambitions, was 
convinced that they could be resisted with the help of the liberal Powers 
themselves, al-Afġānī faced a completely different reality. In fact, in 
1881 France had occupied Tunisia and in 1882 England had taken 
power in Egypt: the dangerous nature of the European Powers suddenly 
became very clear. At first, this new awareness seemed to favor the 
Young Ottomans narrative, leading to the deposition of sultan 
Abdülaziz and the promulgation of the 1876 Ottoman constitution, but 
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the constitutional movement had many enemies such as the ‘ulamā’ and 
the new sultan himself, Abdülhamid II who ended it by exiling and then 
sentencing to death its creator, the official Midhat Pasha. Abdülhamid 
II then gradually transformed his image of a benevolent liberal 
monarch, father of all his subjects regardless of their faith into the sultan 
of Sunni Islam, protector of the Pilgrimage to Mecca, “shadow of God 
on earth, appealing to all Muslims to rally around the throne in defense 
of the umma”115. The aim of the Pan-Islamic propaganda initiated by 
Abdülhamid II was securing the support of the Arabs, the largest 
Muslim group of his Empire and resisting European control of the 
African territories through their help. Pan-Islamism in this perspective 
had been the Ideological weapon of the Islamic modernism formulated 
by al-Afġānī. In fact, although his aim was to unite Islam against a 
common enemy, he never wanted the autocracy of the sultan as the 
foundation of that unity: its revolutionary pan-Islamism was composed 
of both a religious and a national sentiment and by a form of European 
radicalism, later on Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī worked to prove that Afġānī’s 
writings never actually formulated a political framework for Pan-
Islamism; al-Afġānī took the European idea of Nation, purified it of its 
secular connotations and declared that all Muslims were a single 
Nation. However, he later “reduced it to a form of consciousness which 
implied the solidarity of all Muslims against colonialism and 
completely dropped the idea of a Pan-Islamic state”116. As for the life 
of this peculiar intellectual of such importance for the Islamic world of 
the late 19th century, some aspects are still obscure: in fact, al-Afġānī 
declared himself to be a descendant of the Prophet of Afghan origins 
while his enemies claimed him to be Persian implying that he was a 
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Shiite. He spent his early youth in India where he received a traditional 
Islamic education and acquired also the knowledge of sciences and 
mathematics of modern Europe117. Then he moved to Afghanistan 
seeking a political career that turned out to be brief. Thus, he went to 
Istanbul and then to Egypt where he met Muḥammad ‘Abduh, stayed 
for eight years and became the guide of a group of young al-Azhar 
students that were to become central for the political history of their 
country—like the leader of the Egyptian nation Sa‘ad Zaḡlūl (1859-
1927)—and that would continue to be influenced by their master’s 
thought. In 1884 al-Afġānī moved to Paris where he and ‘Abduh 
published an Arabic periodical, al-‘Urwa al-’uṯqà (The firmest bond118) 
that had the scope of analyzing the policy of the European countries in 
the Muslim world and stressed Muslim unity119. The magazine invited 
Islamic intellectuals and notables to join its membership and pay a 
subscription fee; many Middle Eastern intellectuals such as the 
eccentric Persian scholar Mīrzā Muḥammad Bāqir Bawānātī (d. 1893), 
the Egyptian Jewish journalist and activist Yaʿqūb Sannūʿ (d. 1912) and 
Qāsim Amīn cooperated in order to support the publication of the 
magazine in Europe and helped al-Afġānī obtain information from 
European newspapers120. 
Al-Afġānī was aware that the success of Europe derived from 
its modern knowledge but according to him that knowledge could not 
be acquired simply by imitation as it implied a different system of social 
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morality. He read Guizot’s Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe (1828; 
translated in Arabic in 1877) and considered Islam more as a 
civilization than a religion: the umma in its earliest times was indeed a 
flourishing civilization founded on the values of reason, unity, religious 
solidarity (ta‘ṣṣub dīnī opposed to taʿaṣṣub ǧinsī, the blood tie was 
overcome by the religious bond) and individual and social 
development: such values and the sense of responsibility that the 
members of the community felt for each other had to be restored. Hirano 
(2009) quotes a meaningful passage of al-Afġānī on this subject: 
Arabs, Turks, Persians, Indians, Egyptians, and Maghribis had 
originally held onto their religious reins so tightly and kept so 
deep a kinship, that when one of their companions was troubled 
by misfortune or their country was being loosened and divided, 
they would all feel great sorrow121. 
Al-Afġānī talked about the Islamic civilization in order to 
address the racist claims of some European intellectuals, such as Ernest 
Renan, who considered Islam incompatible with science and culture. 
To these accusations he replied that Islam was in complete harmony 
with the principles of the scientific reason unlike Christianity that 
confined the direct knowledge of divine truth only to the priesthood. 
Accordingly, he reopened the door of iǧtihād (reasoning) to interpret 
the Qur’an and the words and actions of the Prophet (ḥadīṯ) and to adapt 
Islamic law in order to accommodate the necessity of the times122. For 
al-Afġānī, iǧtihād is indeed an eternal process as the human begins 
would always have to find the interpretation of God’s words which is 
right for their time. 
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2.2 The Arab thinkers’ responses to the European threat 
Al-Afġānī’s standpoint shows how, when the dangerous nature 
of the European Powers became clear (with the French occupation of 
Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881, and the British occupation of 
Egypt in 1882), the Arab perspective toward the West completely 
changed. Besides, as noted before, at the beginning of the 20th century, 
the Ottoman nationality ceased to exist alongside the political unity of 
the Ottoman rule, and new artificial boundaries were drawn in the 
region. Such boundaries were rarely congruent with indigenous social 
formations or economic systems, and cut off many cities (especially in 
the Gulf) from their hinterlands and divided ethnic units (e.g. Kurds) 
among different new states123. Indeed, this generation of reformers lived 
in a very different world compared to the previous one: change could 
not be avoided anymore and thinkers and intellectuals articulated 
different answers. Some (such as Kawākibī, Riḍā and ʿAbd al-Rāziq) 
tried to adapt Islam to the “new”, a process already started by al-Afġānī. 
Certainly, the most representative figure of the religious approach is 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh, whose project of Islamic modernization 
influenced many intellectuals, leading to different outcomes, such as 
the views of Rašīd Riḍā, who took the modernist salafiyya124 movement 
toward conservatism, and Aḥmad Luṭfī Sayyīd who emphasized the 
modernization aspect of ‘Abduh’s project and was eager to give 
increasing importance to secular human experience. In fact, alongside 
the Islamic reformism of al-Afġānī and ‘Abduh, another current of 
thought arose around the turn of the 19th century, a current rooted in the 
European idea of nationhood and that proposed solutions within a 
modern Western institutional frame, represented, along with Sayyīd, by 
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Adīb Isḥāq, Qāsim Amīn, Sāṭi` al-Ḥuṣrī, Mīšīl ‘Aflaq and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn 
(1889-1973): 
Therefore, the present section presents these thinkers according to 
the following chronological systematization125: 
 1879-1904; from the ‘Urābī revolt (1789-1882) against the 
Khedive Tawfīq Pasha (d. 1892) to the Entente Cordiale, a 
series of agreement through which the United Kingdom and 
France mutually recognized their colonial zones of influence. 
 1907-1936; from the official foundation of the national political 
party al-Ḥizb al-Waṭanī led by Muṣṭafā Kāmil Pasha to the 
1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty through which the United Kingdom 
was required to withdraw all its troops from Egypt (except the 
Suez Canal). 
The Ottoman administrative development started with 
the Tanẓīmāt was suspended when the Europeans dismantled 
the Empire, and for many countries of the region the European 
rule in the interwar period was characterized by discontinuity 
and lack of legitimacy. Indeed, the liberal oligarchies in charge 
in the first decades of independence in MENA suffered serious 
legitimacy deficits because of the artificiality of their borders 
quite unrepresentative of the subjects (as pointed out by Binder, 
1999), the presence of a growing supra-state Arab nationalism 
and the Palestine conflict.  
 1940-1960; from the end of the mandate system to the MENA 
region countries’ achievement of independence (1962 Algeria). 
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2.2.1 Islam and modernity: Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) 
Muḥammad ‘Abduh, born in a village of the Egyptian Delta, was 
not a political agitator like his master, especially after the British exiled 
him for supporting the Egyptian nationalist uprising led by the officer 
Aḥmed Urābī (d. 1911) in 1879. During the exile he spent several years 
in Lebanon and then moved to Paris where he published, with al-
Afġānī, the periodical al-‘Urwa al-’uṯqà; when he went back to Egypt 
he was convinced that Islam could only be revitalized through cultural 
rather than political activity126. Like al-Afġānī, he stressed the 
essentiality of iǧtihād insisting on the necessity that only those in 
possession of the necessary knowledge could exercise it and that two 
essential principles had to be employed: 
 The principle of public interest (maṣlaḥa) always accepted by 
the Mālikī school followed by ‘Abduh, and according to which 
the general welfare of mankind at any time needs to lead the 
reasoning and the interpretation of the Book.  
 The principle of talfīq (‘piecing together’) according to which 
in any case a judge could choose the interpretation of the law 
that best meets the needs of the time and the circumstances 
through a comparison and even a synthesis of the four legal 
schools’ perspectives, aiming at the creation of a unified and 
modern system of Islamic law. 
Moreover, he continued the process, started by his predecessors, of 
identifying certain traditional concepts of Islamic thought with the 
dominant ideas of modern Europe; for example, like al-Tahtāwī, he 
considered the šarī‘a the equivalent of the European national law and 
suggested that parliament and šūrà were two slightly different versions 
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of the same notion, being both instruments that allowed the voice of the 
ruled to be heard by the ruler127. 
Furthermore—even though for him the umma was a moral 
community, thus nothing prevented it from dividing into National-
Sates—‘Abduh feared the Arab National awakening as its secular 
nationalism could challenge Islam and its all-embracing system: to him 
national education without religion was simply unthinkable128. He 
accepted and even stressed the need for change but for him that change 
needed to be linked to the principles of Islam as Islam could work as 
the moral basis of a modern and progressive society. On this subject, 
Kassab (2010) wrote: 
‘Abduh claimed that Islam, more than any other religion and 
certainly more than Christianity, was akin to modernity because 
it naturally incorporated reason, justice, equality, and freedom 
in its creed. In fact, he went so far as to claim that modern 
Europe was Muslim in its modernity without realizing it129. 
In 1887, ‘Abduh founded the journal al-Manār (The Minaret) 
with one of his disciples, Rašīd Riḍā who continued to publish it until 
his death in 1935. The journal included articles of many prominent 
Islamic reformers, such as al-Kawākibī and, because of its judicial 
discussions and its news on the Islamic world it became known even in 
Indonesia, India, Syria and North Africa. ‘Abduh is said to have 
received many letters form Indian Muslims and his religious work 
Risāla al-Tawḥīd (Treatise on the oneness of God, 1897) has been 
translated into Urdu and later taught as a religious text in Islamic 
universities and schools in India and Pakistan130. 
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3.2.2 ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (1849-1903) and his critique of 
despotism 
Al-Kawākibī was an orthodox Muslim born in Aleppo from a 
family of Kurdish origin. He received a traditional Arabic and Turkish 
education and worked as an official and journalist gaining the nickname 
of Abū al-ḍu‘afā’ (Father of the Weak) as he was accustomed to to give 
free legal advices to indigent people131. He remained in Aleppo until 
1898, when, as his relations with the Turkish authorities worsened, he 
moved to Cairo and entered the circle of ‘Abduh and Riḍā. He published 
many articles in the review al-Manār and later collected them in two 
volumes: Umm al-qurà (Mother of the villages) and Ṭabā’i‘ al-Istibdād 
(Features of Tyranny).  In the first, twenty-two characters representing 
scholars from as many parts of the Muslim world debate over the reform 
of Islam while assembled in Mecca in occasion of the pilgrimage. 
Notably, the symposium concludes with a digression on the caliphate 
in which Kawākibī questions the Ottoman rule and its capability to lead 
the Islamic community stressing the necessity of a shift of power inside 
the umma, from the Turks to the Arabs (as only the Qurayš, the tribe of 
the Prophet, can rightfully lead it). 
Instead, Ṭabā’i‘ al-Istibdād is an articulate critique of 
despotism; the author argues that despotic rule is destructive to man and 
can only be ended by education and enlightenment while Islam is rooted 
in justice, equality and consultation132. Both books were published 
anonymously in Cairo and were widely known both in Egypt and in 
Syria. 
According to al-Kawākibī, the Arabs were the only legitimate 
representative of Islam and in this sense he can be considered a pioneer 
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of Arab Nationalism although he has always been more an Islamic 
revivalist than a conscious nationalist since he never advocated a total 
separation of the Arab lands from the Ottoman Empire. His aim was to 
stress the Arab specificity within the Empire, as he was convinced that 
the reformist potential of Islamic societies lied in their Arab component, 
especially in the Bedouin characteristics of pride, solidarity and 
freedom alongside their peculiar linguistic, cultural and historical 
ties133. 
2.2.3 The proto feminism of Qāsim Amīn (1865-1908) 
Amīn received a thorough education both in Egypt and in France 
(Montpellier) and became a prominent judge in Cairo: an important 
social and professional position that helped in the spreading of his ideas. 
Although he cannot be defined as a feminist in the current acceptation 
of the term since he never advocated political rights for women, his 
contribution had been crucial to the emancipation of women and the 
debate about their role within the Eastern society. 
He wrote two books that Kassab (2010) placed “among the 
major publications of the first Nahḍa”134: Taḥrīr al-mar’a (The 
Liberation of Women) in 1899 and Al-Mar’a al-ǧadīda (The New 
Women) in 1900. In Taḥrīr al-mar’a, Amīn stressed the importance of 
education as the only means that can improve women’s role within the 
Eastern society: according to him, Islam had always recognized women 
as equal to men and above all, educating women is the right way to 
educate the whole Nation. However, it is with Al-Mar’a al-ǧadīda that 
a real rupture with the past occurred: influenced by the concept of 
evolution as formulated by the English philosopher Herbert Spencer 
(d.1903), Amīn made the science and social thought of the Modern 
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134 Ibid., 51. 
70 
 
West his standards of judgment, abandoning the quest for the right 
interpretation of the Qur’an and the šarī‘a for the great concepts of the 
19th century, such as freedom, progress and civilization. Thus, the 
freedom of women became the basis of all other kinds of freedom: 
“when woman is free, the citizen is free”135. He individuated four stages 
that led to the attainment of full rights for women, placing the Eastern 
countries in the third phase and the European in the fourth one. They 
are the following: The state of nature, when women were free; the 
formation of the family, when women were restrained; the formation of 
civil society, when women were conscious of their rights but could not 
exercise them; and the period of real civilization, when women finally 
reached equality and obtained full rights. Notably, for Amīn Islam 
cannot be taken as a model of perfect civilization because it reached its 
climax and full development before the true science arose. Perfection 
lies in the future, not in any wrongfully idealized past and no religion, 
not even Islam, creates by itself a State or a society, as claimed by 
‘Abduh. Islam and civilization belong to different dimensions and 
civilization deserves to develop its own path. 
2.2.4 Rašīd Riḍā (1865-1935)’s account of Caliphate 
Rašīd Riḍā was born in a Lebanese village where he received a 
traditional education at the local Qur’anic School. Later he had the 
chance to continue his studies in Tripoli, first at the Turkish government 
school and then at the school of Ḥusayn al-Ǧisr (1845-1909), the Sunni 
Muslim theologian who thought him, alongside Islamic sciences and 
Arabic, the new Western sciences and basic French. 
Notably, Riḍā is a key figure of the Modernist-salafiyya 
movement alongside al-Afġānī and ‘Abduh. In this regard, Abdullah 
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Saeed (2013)136 explained how such a movement emerged during the 
19th century in response to the context of the time but he stressed also 
that it was deeply influenced by the ideas of innovators from the 16th 
and the 17th centuries, such as the Indian theologian Šāh Walī Allāh 
(d.1762)137 who carried the legacy of Aḥmad al-Fārūqī al-Sirhindī 
(d.1624), founder of the Sufi order Naqšbandiyya, to which Riḍā 
belonged for a while, extremely impressed as he was by al-Ġazālī’s 
(d.1111) work while deepening his studies of the Islamic classics. 
However, he later abandoned it fearing the spiritual dangers of the 
mystical systems that, according to him, were presenting Islam as a 
passive submission, especially in a time when Islam needed strength to 
fight for its own survival. It was probably because of this experience 
and his increasing suspicions toward Sufism, that in later years he 
approached the Wahhabism—whose tradition was more alive in Syria 
than in Egypt—and especially the teaching of Ibn Taymiyya. 
Muḥammad Ibn al-Wahhāb (d.1792) was indeed very critical toward 
the Sufi practices and his version of Islamic reformism was a movement 
back in time, toward the glorious Islamic past. Moreover, aiming to 
understand the significance of the salafiyya movement and its 
development over time, it is useful to place Riḍā, ‘Abduh and Afġānī 
within the “colonial salafiyya”, the third phase of Abu-Rabi‘’s (2004) 
classification of the movement. The author divided it into four stages: 
the classical salafiyya represented by Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855) and Ibn 
Taymiyya (d.1328); the pre-colonial salafiyya embodied by the 
                                                          
136 Abdullah Saeedm, “Salafiya, Modernism and Revival,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Islam and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 27-41. 
137 Šāh Walī Allāh can truly be called a “modernizer” as he argued that: “The divine 
laws differ due to reasons and beneficial purposes. This is because the religious rituals 
of God were rituals for intended purposes and the quantities in their legislation take 
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religious and political movement of the wahhabiyya, born in response 
to the decline of the Ottoman empire and the increasing strength of 
Shi‘a in Iran; the already mentioned colonial salafiyya of Riḍā, ‘Abduh 
and Afġānī; the post-colonial salafiyya represented by the leading 
member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Sayyīd Quṭb (1906-
1966), and finally the post 1967 salafiyya that include also the main 
Islamic movements of the Arab world such as for example the National 
Salvation Front in Algeria, the Ḥizb al-Amal in Jordan and Ḥizb al-
Nahḍa in Tunisia138. 
It was within this theoretical and theological background that 
Riḍā’s thought developed. According to him, the teaching of Islam 
already included prosperity and modernity if followed properly. In fact, 
Islam shared many principles with the modern civilization such as the 
principle of activity (ǧihād, positive effort). The decay of Islamic 
civilization was therefore imputable to a misleading tenet of Islam: only 
by being truly Islamic the umma could have taken back its deserved 
leading role amongst the other civilizations of the world. Europeans 
replaced religion with nationality but Muslims needed to find unity 
within their religion if they wanted to succeed. In fact, Islam is not only 
a Church, it is a community in many senses, it is of course a religious 
community but it is also cultural, political and above all linguistic since 
Arabic is the universal language of devotion. Moreover, following his 
master ‘Abduh, he gave particular importance to the principles of 
maṣlaḥa (that became even more central as it almost replaced analogy, 
qiyās) and talfīq that according to him should have been applied more 
systematically139.  
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Moreover, for the purpose of the present query, it is essential to 
focus on Riḍā’’s account of caliphate and how it developed in response 
to the challenges of his time, mirroring three precise and peculiar 
historical phases such as the First World War and the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, the emergence of the European threat and the 
deposition of the last caliph. In fact, he presented it at first “as the 
symbol of a constitutionally limited government, then as the symbol of 
an independent Muslim power and finally as the spiritual leader of an 
ideal salafī religious institution, whose main task was to modernize the 
šarī‘a”140. 
When the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire Abdülhamid II was still 
alive, Riḍā’ did not advocate for the establishment of a spiritual 
caliphate but for a religious society under the Sultan-Caliph, a 
“caliphate of necessity” that could reunite all the Muslim countries 
against the common Western enemy. He never considered the Ottomans 
real or ideal caliphs because their ‘aṣabiyya was based on mulk 
(temporal power) and not on religion but he didn’t want to risk the 
collapse of the last temporal power capable of protecting Islam and he 
thought that more autonomy for all the provinces was the only solution 
for its surviving. Thus, before World War I he never advocated the 
formation of an Arab Caliphate, as he was critical toward any form of 
racial nationalism, a European concept that he considered incompatible 
with Muslim interests, as it could undermine the unity of the umma. 
 Eventually, when the First World Conflict broke out, the future 
political independence of Islam became for him the central issue: the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire was then inevitable and the major threat 
was the European control of the Arab-Muslim lands. In 1915, he 
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theorized the “General Organic Law of the Arab Empire”, a thorough 
plan for an Arab (Qurayshite) caliphate supported by the British and 
founded on the separation between religious and temporal powers. 
However, when he realized that the British were not committed to give 
their support, fearing that the caliphate was going to end for good, Riḍā’ 
decided to back the Arab Revolt of Šarīf Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Hāšimī 
(1854-1931) of Mecca in 1916 although he did not consider it a 
movement of political emancipation of the Arabs from the Ottomans (to 
whom he still pledged allegiance and loyalty) but instead a way to 
protect the holy territory from the European control. Nevertheless, he 
later turned against Šarīf Ḥusayn as he made secret agreements with the 
British that put at risk the independence of Syria and Iraq141. 
In 1922, Turkey won the Greco-Turkish War, the Turkish National 
Movement culminated in the formation of a new Grand National 
Assembly led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that, in 1923, declared the 
establishment of a Republic in Turkey. Moreover, in 1922, the last 
Sultan and caliph of the Empire, Mehmed VI (Waḥīd al-Dīn, 1861-
1926), was deposed and exiled by Atatürk, who appointed Abdulmejid 
II (1868-1944) as caliph in Istanbul, moving the center of the State to 
Ankara, a big step toward the secularization. In this phase Riḍā’ 
supported the Turkish National Movement and even their decision of 
deposing the caliph but stressed the emptiness of the newborn spiritual 
caliphate in Ankara. 
It is within this historical and political background that Riḍā’ wrote 
his famous treatise al-Ḫilāfa aw al-Imāma al-‘Uẓmà (The Caliphate or 
                                                          
141 The Ḥusayn-McMahon correspondence is a series of letters exchanged in 
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the Grand Imamate, 1922-23), the culmination of his political and 
religious thought. The treatise is divided in two parts, in the first he 
postulated that the caliphate should be of Qurayshite lineage as the 
Arabs have primacy in the religious sphere and presented the theoretical 
foundations of the caliphate in accordance with the theories of many 
medieval jurists, especially al-Māwardī (d.1058). Besides, he 
individuated three types of caliphate: 
 The ideal caliphate existed under the Rāšidūn and under the 
Omayyad caliph ‘Umar which he called “the fifth of the 
Rāšidūn; 
 The caliphate or imamate of necessity existed under the 
Omayyads and Abbasids that did not have the necessary 
knowledge to exercise iǧtihād; 
 The caliphate of tyranny or conquest to which belonged the 
Ottoman Caliphate. He affirmed that even this type of caliphate 
must be obeyed if there are no valid alternatives but also it must 
be overthrown as soon as it becomes possible (in this sense 
Turkish Nationalists actions are legitimate, even though they 
failed as they substituted one caliphate of conquest with 
another). 
The second part of the treatise focuses on Riḍā’’s suggestions for 
creating a new caliphate and within it he stresses three central themes: 
the desirability of civil government and consultative and democratic 
rule, the need for an Arab spiritual caliphate, and the preservation of a 
Muslim temporal power. He conceived the ḫilāfa as governance by both 
secular and Islamic leaders and presented al-ḥizb al-iṣlāḥ al-islāmī al-
mu‘tadil (The moderate party of Islamic reform) as the only feasible 
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middle way between ‘westernizers’ and exponents of the religious 
institutions142. 
To conclude, Kosugi Yasushi (2006) listed eight essential 
characteristics of Riḍā’’s account of the ḫilāfa (Caliphate): 
1. The ḫilāfa is the only legitimate Islamic polity for the umma; 
2. The ḫilāfa must be reinstituted in a way which is suitable to the 
contemporary times; 
3. Government must be run by the Council of šūrà (consultation), 
composed of ahl al-ḥall wa’l-‘aqd (people of authority), both 
Islamic scholars and secular leaders; 
4. The ḫalīfa (Caliph) will be representing the government, 
therefore he must be a qualified muǧtahid (one who exercises 
independent reasoning [iǧtihād] in the interpretation of Islamic 
law); 
5. The ḫalīfa must be of Qurayš origin (the tribe of Prophet 
Muḥammad) 
6. The Muslims must do whatever they can to establish an Islamic 
government under a calpih; 
7. If it is not possible to establish a true caliphate, an imperfect one 
must still be established and obeyed; 
8. The Arabs and the Turks should have a leading role in the 
achievement of this task. 
 
2.2.5 The “Arab Nation” of Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī (1880-1968) 
Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī was born in Aleppo but received a Turkish 
education in Constantinople. In fact, he spoke Turkish and naturally 
belonged to the Young Turks generation, immersed as he was in the 
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ideas of the French positivism and the European Nationalism. When the 
Empire collapsed he left his post within the Ministry of Education and 
moved to Damascus to join the Arab government of King Fayṣal 
(Fayṣal al-Awwal ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Hāšimī, 1885-1933), son 
of the leader of the Arab Revolt al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Hāšimī, and 
brother of ‘Abd Allāh (d.1951), the future first king of Jordan. Fayṣal’s 
government had been established only the year prior, when the San 
Remo Conference (1920) gave France the mandate for Syria: the French 
won the Franco-Syrian war that had broken out in response to it 
(described by al-Ḥuṣrī in Yawm Maysalūn, Day of Maysalūn, 1945) and 
Fayṣal was expelled from the region. However, within the Cairo 
Conference (March 12 to 30, 1921), the British agreed to appoint Fayṣal 
king of the newly born Kingdom of Iraq and al-Ḥuṣrī followed him, 
giving a precious contribution to the formation of an Arab 
consciousness in the country. Later on, al-Ḥuṣrī went to Beirut and then 
to Cairo, where he worked as an official of the Arab League and started 
to write essays in defense of Arab nationalism143. 
Al-Ḥuṣrī witnessed and documented the beginning of a decisive 
change in Arab nationalism’s political directions and goals: at the end 
of the Second World War in fact, the decolonization process brought 
independent national states to life, whose boundaries were drawn by the 
colonial Powers and that Sulzbach (1962) classified as “administrative 
nations” because of their artificial nature. Regarding this point, Leonard 
Binder (1999) wrote: 
The breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the determination of 
the boundaries of successor states was largely guided by: the 
provincial divisions of the empire; European imperialist 
interests as developed historically; and certain geographical 
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features, such as mountains, deserts, rivers, and, of course, the 
Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Gulf of 
Aqaba. But that breakup was not based on coherent, well-
formulated, nationalist doctrines […] no general principle of 
legitimacy was proffered as a basis for legitimizing or 
rationalizing the division of the region into political entities144. 
This reality fostered the idea of a single “Arab Nation” and al-
Ḥuṣrī started his work from the justification of the very existence of 
such an entity. The French145 and Anglo-American concepts of nation 
were not suitable for his goal as their accounts of nationalism were the 
philosophical counterpart of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions 
successfully carried out in their countries: according to them, the ideas 
of nation and national state could not be separated. Conversely in 
Germany, nationalism was born in reaction to an exogenous challenge, 
with the aim of ending a foreign rule and obtaining independence146, in 
this sense it was a cultural expression detached from its political 
representation: following the German account of Nation, al-Ḥuṣrī could 
affirm that the Arab Nation existed even without a state (dawla) that 
represented it. Therefore, al-Ḥuṣrī read the works of two major German 
philosophers: Johann Gottfried Herder (d.1803) who theorized a 
distinction between nation and state where the nation is sacred and 
eternal while the state is only its administrative apparatus and stressed 
the importance of the national language and thus of the national 
literature, without which a people cannot exist; and Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte (d.1814) who, in his famous book Reden an die deutsche Nation 
(Addresses to the German Nation, 1808), suggested to his compatriots 
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a strategy to overcome the foreign rule and reach a political 
homogeneity: they needed a new national self and above all a complete 
reform of the educational system that should provide a form of national 
education. Moreover, in order to gain an understanding of the artistic 
expression of the German nationalism, al-Ḥuṣrī read the poems of Ernst 
Moriz Arndt (d. 1860), for which people and nation were synonyms. 
Finally, he formulated his own notion of waṭan, rooting it on a more 
endogenous basis as is the notion of ‘aṣabiyya that Ibn Ḫaldūn (d. 1406) 
articulated in the Muqaddima, an introductory volume of his universal 
history. Al-Ḥuṣrī studied Ibn Ḫaldūn’s work extensively, publishing 
two books discussing his thought, in 1943 and 1944147. 
With this theoretical background, al-Ḥuṣrī’s political theory is 
certainly crucial within the Arab Nationalism debate. His main focus 
has always been the unification of all Arabs, thus he is almost 
exclusively concerned with the emergence and the development of the 
concept of nation. According to him, in the 19th century the idea of 
nation superseded the loyalty to king and kingdom as the base of 
national states and thus in Europe begun the age of Nationalism, then 
widened in the 20th century to all the other peoples, when Europeans 
and Americans had to concede them the right to form nations. As 
stressed by Wilson in the aftermath of the Frist World War: every nation 
had then the right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and freedom from 
aggression. Following Herder, al-Ḥuṣrī gave a central role to the 
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language that he considered the soul of the nation while history 
represents its consciousness. The Arab Nation is composed of all those 
who have Arabic as their mother tongue, thus it includes Egypt and 
North Africa (Arab nationalists of his generation saw the Sinai as the 
extreme border of the Arab Nation). In this regard, it was not easy to 
convince Egyptians of their “Arabhood” as their nationalism until the 
Thirties had a Pharaonic or Mediterranean basis (comparable to the 
Phoenician common heritage in Lebanon). Indeed, in later years, major 
figures such as Luṭfī Sayyīd and Ṭāhā Ḥusayn advocated a form of 
purely Egyptian nationalism. Moreover, like Ibn Ḫaldūn, he denied the 
possibility that a religion could be used as basis of social commitment: 
for him the Arabs are not a Muslim nation, they would still be Arabs 
even if they ceased to be Muslims. However, he stressed the success of 
the national religions compared to the universal ones, giving Judaism 
as an example. Finally, education is another crucial point of his agenda 
as national education is a means of spreading loyalty throughout the 
nation and thus strengthening patriotism. 
2.2.6 “Islam and the Principles of governing” (1925). ‘Alī ʿAbd al-
Rāziq (1888-1966) 
In the context of the idea of the caliphate and its development 
over time, it worth discussing ‘Alī ʿAbd al-Rāziq’s account of the 
concept as his views were in total opposition to those of Riḍā’. In fact, 
according to the Egyptian thinker (trained at the Azhar and Oxford), 
Islam did not prescribe any particular form of government, therefore 
Muslims should have the right to decide which form best suits the need 
of their time148. He published a controversial book on the topic in 1925 
(al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Uḥkm, Islam and the Principles of Governing) 
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when the caliphate no longer existed, and even the shadow-caliphate 
instituted by the Turkish National Assembly in 1922 had been abolished 
in 1924. Moreover, in 1926, a group of Egyptian ‘ulamā’ presided over 
by the rector of al-Azhar organized a “Congress of the Caliphate” in 
Cairo which concluded by reaffirming the necessity of a Muslim 
caliphate that must have both spiritual and temporal power: the debate 
about such crucial topic had never been so intense149. 
According to al-Rāziq, the very idea of the caliphate was based 
on a misconception or a misunderstanding of the Prophet’s words, as 
he never specified which form of government his community of 
believers were supposed to follow after his death: in fact he created a 
community, not a State and he considered his mission primarily 
spiritual, and not political150. Under this perspective, Islam becomes a 
religious faith and not a political ideology or a source of legitimacy for 
a state order. Al-Rāziq’s text was harshly criticized, he was banned 
from holding any public office and accused of corrupting Islam with a 
Christian distinction between the spiritual and political spheres. 
Nevertheless, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire his views 
became less threatening and secular nationalism prevailed until the 
Seventies, with the exception of the Muslim Brothers and the Saudi 
political system. However, Tibi (1997) pointed out how, after the 
Seventies, many Islamic movements tried to politicize Islam reasserting 
the universality of the umma as a supra-national entity that should 
override national and ethnic bonds151. 
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150 Kassab, op. cit., 59-61. 
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2.2.7 The “Egyptian Nation” of Aḥmad Luṭfī al-Sayyīd (1872-1963) 
Luṭfī al-Sayyīd attended the school of Law in Cairo in 1889 with 
some of the leading figures of the political life of his country, such as 
Muṣtafā Kāmil, the founder of modern Egyptian nationalism. He later 
distanced himself from Kāmil as he started to criticize his Islamic 
interpretation of nationalism and his Ottomanism. However, he did not 
support the Pan-Arab nationalism of the Siro-Lebanese intellectuals 
either: he always stressed the existence of an “Egyptian Nation”; he 
argued that liberal nationalism suffered because of the lack of a material 
base for the European liberal ideology that the Egyptian bourgeoisie 
failed to provide, opening the way to the Muslim Brothers and other 
supporters of fundamentalism, weakened only by the Pan-Arab 
nationalist Free Officers of President Nasser (Ğamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir 
Ḥusayn, 1918-1970) in 1952152. 
Al-Sayyīd was keen toward the European liberal-democratic 
tradition and advocated for the establishment of a constitutional 
parliamentary democracy in Egypt as only uncivilized communities 
need despotism while a free individual must live in an independent 
nation defined in terms of territory, not of language. He read 
Montesquieu and accepted his principle of the separation of powers but 
was also aware of the thought of Comte, Mille and Spencer. According 
to him, religion is only one of the factors that constitute a society, 
therefore he did not feel the need to defend it or reform it as ‘Abduh 
and al-Afġānī before him153.  
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2.2.8 Ṭāhā Ḥusayn (1889-1973): The spokesman of Egyptian 
nationalism 
Hourani described Ṭāhā Ḥusayn as 
the writer who has given the final statement of the system of 
ideas which underlay social thought and political action in the 
Arab countries for three generations, […] as conscious as he was 
of the need to preserve the Islamic past in the imagination and 
heart, but to become part of the modern culture which had first 
shown itself in western Europe154. 
Indeed, the figure of Ṭāhā Ḥusayn is crucial, although more 
from an historical and literary perspective, and he can be defined as the 
spokesman of Egyptian Nationalism. However, his legacy is 
controversial: many accused him of being excessively Westernized as 
he advocated the principles of liberalism and refused the Pan-Arab 
standpoint, engaging on the matter in a harsh debate with al-Ḥuṣrī in 
the columns of a journal. In other words, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn spoke neither of 
Arab umma, nor of Islamic umma as his focus was the Egyptian nation 
that, according to him, had to be considered part of Europe, as far as 
intellectual and cultural life was concerned155. Regarding the role of the 
Arabic language, Ḥusayn’s position differed from the one of his master 
Luṭfī al-Sayyīd since he considered language to be the basis of a sound 
national life. Moreover, according to him, language overcomes religion, 
therefore Arabic is not in any sense a means to a religious awakening 
or the foundation of a universal Islamic community as it was for the 
Islamic reformers, on the contrary Arabic, as any other language, is just 
one of the bonds that helps keep a nation united156. 
Ṭāhā Ḥusayn’s original perspective toward the issues of nation, 
nationalism and legitimacy is multilayered and deeply influenced by the 
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important personalities of the political-literary scene that the writer had 
the opportunity to meet throughout his life and studies157. In fact, during 
the years spent at al-Azhar Ḥusayn started to question and criticize the 
archaic methods of its time, advocating for a modernization of the 
scholastic programs thanks to the encounter with the professor and šayḫ 
Sayyd al-Marṣafī (1862-1931)158 who, in his Risālat al-kalim al-ṯamān 
(Tract on Eight Words, 1984), defined the umma as a community 
determined not only by faith but also by territory and by language: 
through his teachings the innovations of ‘Abduh acquired for Ṭāhā 
Ḥusayn a literary value as he became aware of the indissoluble bond 
existing between literature and freedom159, an awareness that then led 
him to the following conclusion: 
Arab nationalism owes its existence, its strength and its 
development to Arab literature, modern Arab nationalism owes 
its rebirth, its strength and the great hopes that they support to 
modern Arab literature160. 
Later on, while in Cairo studying at the National Egyptian 
University, Ḥusayn met Arabic professor Carlo Alfonso Nallino (1872-
                                                          
157 Ṭāhā Ḥusayn curriculum studiorum can be divided into three phases that somehow 
exemplify his theoretical development: the first phase is characterized by the 
traditional and Islamic education that he received at the Qur’anic school of his village 
and at al-Azhar University in Cairo; the second phase corresponds with his first 
approach to Western thought at the National Egyptian University; and the third phase 
coincides with the author’s studies at the Sorbonne, in Paris. During the first years of 
formation Ḥusayn had the chance to attend some lessons of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, thus 
acknowledging the šayḫ program of Islamic reformism; he later defined him as “the 
one who gave to Egypt its intellectual freedom” since he always insisted with his 
students on the importance of personal reasoning and freedom of thought. See 
Mahmoudi Abdelrashid, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn’s Education. From the Azhar to the Sorbonne 
(Richmond and Surrey England: Curzon, 1998), 18, 19. 
158 See Isabella Camera D’Afflitto, Letteratura araba contemporanea. Dalla nahḍah 
a oggi (Roma: Carocci, 2007), 162. 
159 As it is clarified in the introduction of his text on the pre-Islamic literature of 1927, 
a revised and modified version of the 1926 volume on pre-Islamic poetry. 
160 Monica Ruocco, L’intellettuale arabo tra impegno e dissenso. Analisi della rivista 
libanese al-Ādāb (1953-1994) (Roma: Jouvence, 2000), 76. 
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1938)161, who taught him the modern methods of historical 
investigation applied to the study of Arabic literature. Such methods 
deeply affected Ḥusayn’s perspective by giving him new tools and keys 
to understand both the tradition and the challenges of his time.  
The literature in fact needs to be studied scientifically as it is 
essential for the progress and achievement of the unity of any nation.  
On this basis Ṭāhā Ḥusayn begun to question the authenticity of 
ancient Islamic poetry, a discussion that then led him to write Fī al-ši‘r 
al-ǧāhilī (On the Pre-Islamic Poetry, 1926) which appeared only one 
year after the controversial work of ʿAbd al-Rāziq (al-Islām wa Uṣūl 
al-Uḥkm, 1925); the book was immediately banned and Ḥusayn was 
accused of apostasy but never convicted, and one year later a modified 
and revised version of the book was published under the title Fī al- ādāb 
al-ǧāhilī (On the Pre-Islamic Literature). Although the theme of this 
text may appear to be far from the focus of this research, it addresses 
the question of legitimacy. In fact, in his book, Ḥusayn  questioned the 
authenticity (and consequently the legitimacy) of the pre-Islamic poetry 
as it was traditionally presented, even in the Qur’an. According to him: 
What we call ‘pre-Islamic’ literature had nothing to do with the 
pre-Islamic period, but was simply fabricated after the coming 
of Islam [when] the Meccan tribe of Qurayš, in order to win the 
struggle for power within the nascent Islamic community, had 
needed authoritative texts to enhance its own prestige, and so it 
forged a literature in its own dialect as a basis of support for its 
political ambitions162. 
 
 
                                                          
161 On the figure of Carlo Alfonso Nallino and his role of mediator between the Italian 
culture and the Arab countries see Andrea Borruso, “L’italianistica nei paesi arabi” in 
La presenza culturale italiana nei paesi arabi: storia e prospettive, (Roma: I.P.O., 
1982), 143-153; Camera D’Afflitto, op. cit., 161. 
162 James Monroe, “Oral Composition in Pre-Islamic Poetry”, Journal of Arabic 
Literature 3, no. 1-53 (1972): 2, 3.  
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Finally, at the Sorbonne University Ḥusayn studied subjects 
entirely new to him such as Greek, Roman and Byzantine history and 
sociology, and he learned about the prevailing current of thought of the 
epoch, the positivism that he will not abandon until the Thirties. 
It is at the end of this long and articulated process of formation 
that Mustaqbal al-ṯaqāfa fī Miṣr (The Future of Culture in Egypt) 
appeared: written in 1936 and published in 1938, probably the book 
through which the author has best exposed his account of the Egyptian 
nation. Notably, Ḥusayn wrote the book after the Anglo-Egyptian 
treaty163 had been signed and in it he described and compared the 
Egyptian and Western cultures highlighting their similarities, and 
presented his ideas on culture and education for the newly independent 
nation164. According to him, the state had the responsibility to ensure 
universal literacy to its people by building a network of schools across 
the country and translating Western modern knowledge into Arabic in 
order to make it available to all. Accordingly, he advocated a universal 
and compulsory primary education, an increase in the number of 
governmental schools, and a change in the content of the programs (that 
should include, alongside Arab language, foreign languages, but only 
after the fifth year, and classical languages, such as Greek and Latin) 
165. 
Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and the other exponents of the liberal school were 
marginalized, alongside the Islamists, when General Nasser and his 
Free Officers took control of Egypt in 1952. 
                                                          
163 The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 was a 20 years treaty signed between the 
United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Egypt that postulated the withdraw of all the 
British troops from Egypt, except those necessary to protect the Suez Canal. 
164 Ṭāhā Ḥusayn had been advisor of the Ministry of Education from 1942 to 1944 
and minister himself from 1950 to 1952. 
165 Kassab, op. cit., 61-54. 
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2.2.9 Mīšīl ‘Aflaq (1910-1989) and the Ba‘aṯ Party 
The Orthodox Christian Mīšīl ‘Aflaq translated al-Ḥuṣrī’s Pan-
Arab ideology into political action by founding, along with the Sunni 
Muslim Ṣalāḥ al-dīn al-Biṯār, the first Arab political party with pan-
Arab goals: the Ba‘aṯ (Resurrection) Party166. Notably, the Ba‘aṯ 
contributed to the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR, 1958-
61) between Syria and the Nasserist Egypt167, one of the last acts of 
(Pan-)Arab Nationalism that finally ended with the 1967 defeat and the 
Camp David Accord. In fact, the states established after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and decolonization acquired over time, in spite of the 
artificiality of their nation-building process, a certain degree of 
autonomy and separate interests; therefore, the claimed Arab belonging 
became less and less powerful compared to the call of the local 
nationalisms168. Mīšīl ‘Aflaq shared with al-Ḥuṣrī the deep appreciation 
and interest in the German Romantic philosophers and their account of 
nation, thus he fought for a umma ‘arabiyya waḥīda ma‘a risāla ḫālida 
(“one Arab Nation, with an eternal message”) and for him: 
Whose language is Arabic and who lives in the Arab land [...] 
belongs to the Arab nation169. 
Notably, he used the term umma when referring to the nation: 
[…] in the Arab context, the partial character of decolonization, 
the Second World War, and the Palestine question combined to 
promote the emergence of a radical nationalism that used some 
Islamic vocabulary but was secular in leadership and intent. 
Nasserism in Egypt (1952–70) and Ba’thism in Iraq and Syria 
                                                          
166 Later ḥizb al-ba‘aṯ al-‘arabī al-ištirākī (The Socialist Arab Resurrection Party) as 
it merged with the Arab Socialist Party of Akram al-Ḫūrānī in 1953. 
167 After the failure of the UAR other (again failed) attempts were made to establish 
Arab unity: between Egypt, Syria and Iraq (1963), between Egypt and Libya (1973), 
and between Syria and Iraq (1979). 
168 Halliday, op. cit., 29. 
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(1968–, 1963–) were the most cogent expressions of this radical 
nationalism. In each case, the goals of independence and of 
building socialism, this latter defined as state control of society 
and economy, were combined with an appeal for Arab unity: the 
term used to denote this Arab community was umma. 
In fact, ‘Aflaq aimed to achieve freedom from the foreign rule 
and unity of all Arabs in a single State, but he also sought a synthesis 
between nationalism and socialism, especially after 1953 when his 
party merged with the Arab Socialist Party of Akram al-Hourani 
(Akram al-Ḥūrānī, 1912-1996); the three complementary and 
inseparable principles of the Ba‘aṯ doctrine were in fact unity, freedom 
and socialism. However, his account of socialism had nothing to do 
with Marxism or the class struggle: he interpreted it as social justice for 
the poor and unprivileged and stood in principle for constitutional 
democracy. Besides, as already noted, ‘Aflaq adopted the Islamic 
account of collectivity, secularizing the umma in terms of a Western 
nation (as Islam is part of the Arab identity as a civilization, not a 
religion) and then added to it a social dimension: his unitary “Arab 
Nation” clearly stood against the individualism of the West170. 
It is important here to briefly retrace the birth and development 
of the Ba‘aṯ as its significance and following outcomes cannot be 
detached from the historical and political context in which it was born. 
The French mandate (1923-1946) had devastating effects for Syria as 
the country suffered under a policy of fragmentation that exacerbated 
pre-existing economic and social problems. Between 1933 and 1936 
many attempts were made in order to find an accord with the French 
but they all failed; many youth organizations emerged from this 
political fermentation and ‘Aflaq was part of one of them, the League 
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of National Union. After the loss of the sanjak of Alexandretta171, a 
faction of the League broke away and ‘Aflaq and his colleague al-Biṯār 
founded a secret organization, the Youth for Arab Resurrection also 
known as al-Ba‘aṯ al-‘arabī. The Ba‘aṯ became an official party only 
in 1946 and in the same year ‘Aflaq and Biṯār got permission to publish 
a newspaper. When the French occupation ended, the scope of the party 
became how to build a political community within the new artificial, 
post-independence borders. In the Fifties, the party radicalized and 
gained influence outside Syria, notably among Iraqi and Jordanian 
officers; meanwhile, the attraction toward Nasser, the Pan-Arab hero 
and champion of nonalignment policy, became too strong to be resisted: 
all political parties in Syria dissolved in favor of a single mass party and 
Egypt and Syria became the United Arab Republic even though for less 
than three years172. During the union period, the Syrian officers in Egypt 
formed an autonomous military committee (al-laǧna al-‘askariyya) led 
by ‘Alawi officers among which the name of Hafez al-Asad (Ḥāfiẓ al-
Asad, 1930-2000)173 stands out. Regarding this, Tibi (1997) affirmed 
that “Arab nationalism as formulated by Aflaq became the ideological 
legitimacy for military dictatorship in the Middle East”174.  
                                                          
171 The sanjak of Alexandretta is currently part of the Republic of Turkey and was the 
bone of contention for Kemalist Turkey, the French Mandate for Syria, and the French 
Republic. In 1937, the sanjak became 'distinct but not separated' from the French 
Mandate of Syria on the diplomatic level and linked to both France and Turkey for 
defense matters. See Marcu Florian, “Why did France abandon the Sanjak of 
Alexandretta?” (PhD diss. University of Reading),  
https://www.academia.edu/7479079/Why_did_France_abandon_the_Sanjak_of_Ale
xandretta 
172 Norma Salem-Babikian, “Michel 'Aflaq: A Biographic Outline,” Arab Studies 
Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1980): 162-179. 
173 Devlin op., cit., 396-1407. 
174 Tibi, op. cit., p. 204. 
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2.3 Pan Arabism’s demise: the “post 1967 generation” of Arab 
thinkers  
Following an ideal time line, this section will now briefly retrace 
the political and historical events that the “post 1967 generation” had to 
face and discuss, to be further analyzed in the last chapter because of 
their centrality in Jordanian history. Between the 5th and the 10th of June 
1967 Israel won the so-called Six Day War against the (Pan-)Arab 
coalition formed by Egypt, Jordan and Iraq and led by General Nasser, 
thus taking over the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, most of the West Bank, 
East of Jerusalem, and Golan Heights. The Arab countries suffered 
great losses: Egypt’s casualties numbered more than 11,000, Jordan 
6,000 and Syria 1,000, compared with 700 for Israel. Moreover, the 
conflict created hundreds of thousands of refugees and brought more 
than one million Palestinians to the occupied territories under Israeli 
rule. A few years later, the Black September (1970)175 meant a 
redefinition of the region’s identity at a national level: the Trans-
Jordanian identity revealed to be intrinsically tribal, Islamic and 
Hashemite, and differentiated itself from the Palestinian one. In 1974 
the Arab League indicated the PLO (The Palestine Liberation 
Organization) as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians 
in occupied lands and in the diaspora, and in 1988 King Ḥusayn (1935-
1999) announced the administrative disengagement of the West Bank 
from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Besides, with the Camp David 
Accords of 1978 and the Egypt-Israeli Peace treaty of 1979, Egypt 
abandoned the leading role it had under Nasser within the (Pan-) Arab 
                                                          
175 Aylūl Al-Aswad is the conflict fought in Jordan between the Jordanian Armed 
Forces (JAF), under the leadership of King Ḥusayn, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), under the leadership of Yāsir `Arafāt (1929-2004). The fedayeen 
(fidā'iyūn) acted as a state within a state disregarding local laws and regulations, and 
they even attempted to assassinate King Ḥusayn twice. 
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scene, initiating the Open Door policy (infitāḥ). Finally, the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 was a great 
victory for the political opposition articulated in Islamic terms creating 
what came to be called “Political Islam”, a project of Islamization of 
modernity rather than modernization of Islam (as it was at the time of 
al-Afġānī and ‘Abduh)176. 
According to the majority of the Arab thinkers, such a defeat 
represented a watershed in Arab popular and intellectual consciousness 
as it meant the end of the Pan-Arab nationalist project (even though 
Arabism was not lost as an identity source177) and the revival of the 
Islamist standpoint as the failure of the political leadership then in 
charge, in providing for the welfare of their people and the threat of 
American neocolonialism made Islamic movements an appealing 
alternative (e.g. the social and political prominence achieved by the 
Muslim Brotherhood178 in Egypt or the victory of the Islamic Salvation 
Front in Algeria whose slogan was Islām huwwa al-ḥāl, “Islam is the 
solution”). However, the Islamists were not the sole opposition group 
that saw an opportunity in the 1967 loss; both the Marxists and the 
liberals welcomed the Palestinian defeat as well: the Marxists 
considered it as a consequence of the incomplete application of 
socialism, while the liberals used it as an occasion to stress the 
                                                          
176 John O. Voll, “Political Islam and the State,” in The Oxford Handbook of Islam 
and Politics, ed. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 57; Campanini (2005), op. cit., 22. 
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regimes would be loath to transgress and Arab leaders knew that the policies they 
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Arabism not Arab nationalism”. Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth 
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178 The Society of Muslim Brothers (Ǧamāʻat al- Iḫwān al-Muslimīn) is a 
transnational Sunni Islamist organization founded in Egypt by the Islamic scholar 
Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949) in 1928. 
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importance of the democratization process in the MENA region far 
from being concluded at that time. In fact, the 1967 defeat and the 
political and identity crisis that followed, embodied the failure of the 
liberation and decolonization movements in the region: in the Forties, 
Fifties and Sixties the Arab states achieved at least formal independence 
from the colonial powers but they were ruled by the old establishment 
of notables and monarchs. Later on, in the Sixties and Seventies that old 
establishment was replaced by secular, revolutionary regimes that, 
although selling themselves as patriotic, turned out to be repressive as 
well. Finally, in the last decades of the 20th century neocolonial and 
neoliberal powers threatened the area until the outbreak of the two Gulf 
Wars in the 1990-91 and 2003179. According to Abu Rabi‘ (2004), the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 represented a Trojan horse for the 
United States that could finally justify their military presence in the 
area, initiating a sort of Pax Americana that no one dared challenge. 
Nevertheless, the 1967 defeat does not have to be seen only as a 
rupture with the past given that, alongside the discussion of ‘new’ 
topics—such as the rise of the military state, the Open Door policy, the 
disintegration of the Soviet System and the acceptance by some Arab 
thinkers of the state of Israel as a regional fact—it also represented a 
continuation of the concepts and ideas that had already been debated 
such as the issue of the Arab unity (and its failure) vis-à-vis regionalism, 
the role of religion within the society (both as religion per se and as a 
philosophy of life) and the decolonization process and its outcomes, as 
in a postcolonial environment as such the search for a cultural self could 
not be separated from the struggle against European colonialism and 
American neocolonialism. In the words of Albert Memmi (1957): 
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The colonized’s self-assertion, born out of protest, continues to 
define itself in relation to it. […] So goes the drama of the man 
who is a product and victim of colonization. He almost never 
succeeds in corresponding with himself. […] He always 
considers the colonizer as a model or as an antithesis. […], 
[thus] the colonization precipitated the awakening of national 
consciousness of the colonized180. 
Anyway, all the above listed issues are interconnected and 
essential aspects that together contributed to change the Arab Regional 
System after 1967 causing the political, cultural, identitarian and social 
challenges that followed. However, the status of religion in society, the 
rise of the Gulf States in the Seventies and the gradual proliferation of 
the capitalist mode of production in the area, all proved to be crucial 
and need to be briefly discussed. 
 As for the role of Islam, Abu Rabi‘ listed four main perspectives 
among contemporary Arab thinkers: 
 The Marxist standpoint that considers religion to be a human 
creation and a tool of legitimation for the ruling élites across 
time; 
 The liberal secular standpoint that considers religion as a 
subjective relationship between men and God; 
 The Islamist position that considers religion to be part of the 
political sphere and not only a collection of ideas and rites; 
 The “statist” position that historically protected “official Islam” 
in order to be legitimized by the ‘ulamā’, thus the state never 
completely disconnected from religion. Nevertheless, even if, as 
Marxists and liberals, the statists seek to prevent Islamists from 
controlling the power and gain governmental positions when 
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they could not get legitimation from their longstanding allies 
often turned to political Islam.  
Moreover, some Arab thinkers affirmed a deep connection between 
the failure of the Arab civil society and the emergence of 
fundamentalism and religious fanaticism in the Eighties and Nineties, 
and that this Islamic revival was connected with the expansion of 
capitalism between the Gulf States and the new role that they gained in 
the Arab world. The “rich weak states” of the Gulf, as defined by 
Anderson (1992)181, entered the global market thanks to the 
internationalization of American capital (Marshall Plan) while 
maintaining a political authoritarianism; in other words, they initiated a 
process of economic modernization lacking its cultural counterpart: 
modernism. The great oil revenues accumulated in the Gulf States over 
time, especially in the Nineties, made it possible to establish a rentier 
financial system of redistribution of the wealth among the masses 
irrimediabily changing their relations with the government; in the 
words of the Egyptian journalist Muhammad Hassanein Hayakal 
(Muḥammad Ḥssanayn Haykal, 1923-2016): “ṯarwa (wealth) had taken 
over from ṯawra (revolution)”182. Besides, such enormous wealth gave 
to Gulf Arabs a false claim of distinctiveness among ‘the other’ Arabs. 
Therefore, they stopped supporting Arab masses in their struggles 
against dictatorships and American imperialism, and this shift in the 
Gulf policy represented one of the major causes of the end of the Arab 
unity narrative and the rise of the regional state in the Arab world, 
alongside the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that gave the US a way to 
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undermine Iraq, the last major bastion of Arab nationalism in the Arab 
World183. Finally, the leading role of the Gulf countries contributed, 
through their economic support, to the establishment of a ‘new’ Islamic 
discourse that the Egyptian philosopher Fouad Zakariyya (Fuʼād 
Zakarīyā, 1927-2010) called Petro-Islam, “a politically-motivated 
discourse aimed to prevent Arabs, and Muslims in general, to enter the 
modern world”184 and that engaged a fight against Arab nationalism 
itself, using Islam as a counterforce against nationalist and progressive 
liberal forces185. 
Finally, the very concepts of legitimacy and legitimation gained a 
new meaning in this peculiar phase. According to Yasmeen Daifallah 
(2012): 
Laroui, Hanafi and al-Jabri’s conceptualizations of “Arab 
consciousness,” the “Arab self” and “Arab reason” […] includes a 
particular understanding of authority, legitimacy, justice, human 
agency, and of how collective human life should be approached and 
organized186. 
In fact, the post-1967 generation of thinkers were looking for ways 
to legitimize modern reforms from within the tradition because they 
were not (apart from al-Jabri and al-Ghannoushi) directly involved in 
politics. In other words, they were making the tradition itself the 
legitimate carrier of any sort of change, be it liberal, Marxist, Islamic-
leftist or Arabist-nationalist. Thus, the concepts of authenticity, 
tradition and heritage became central in the debate. A trend confirmed 
by the two following conferences, both held in the Seventies: The 
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Conference on Authenticity and Renewal in Contemporary Arab 
Culture established by ALECSO (the Arab League Educational, 
Cultural and Scientific Organization), held in Cairo between October 4 
and 11, 1971187 and the conference of Arab intellectuals held in Kuwait 
only six months after the Kippur-Ramadan war and the limited 
Egyptian victory (7-12/04, 1974) with a focus on the “Crisis of 
Civilizational Development in the Arab Homeland” and the relation 
between the past, the present and the future of the Arab people. 
Remarkably, both the conferences debated the notion of heritage 
(turāṯ) and its implications, as rethinking that concept in a “rational and 
socially viable way” could make it “a tool to relaunch Arabism as an 
autonomous civilizational project in the modern world”188. In fact, 
every human group has a cultural heritage that needs to be continuously 
modified in accordance with the circumstances of the time to ensure the 
survival of the identity group. Arab people refused to do so fearing that 
modernity would negate Arab authenticity and thus jeopardizing their 
own survival. To conclude, the Kuwait conference Final Declaration 
stated as follows: 
The problem […] is the role of the Arab past in orienting the 
Arab future [...]. Our look at it has been ahistorical. The heritage 
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is part of us and part of our civilizational formation but it ought 
not to make our future possessed by our past189. 
2.3.1 Sadeq Jalal al-Azm (Ṣādiq Ǧalāl al-‘Aẓm, 1934-2016) 
In a 1997 interview, Sadeq al-Azm described the impact of the 
1967 defeat on Arab intellectuals as follows: 
Naturally, the defeat of June 1967 interrupted all plans and 
revealed the fragility of the modern Arab intellectual 
renaissance on which the Arab liberation movement based its 
hopes. Most of these hopes revolved around the concept of the 
inspired leader, and when the leader [Nasser] fell everything 
crashed with him, leaving nothing behind but emptiness, loss, 
and confusion. I would not be exaggerating when I say that the 
defeat hit us like a lightning bolt190. 
According to al-Azm, the liberation movement failed in really 
challenging the systems of thought, value and belief of Arab society. 
Accordingly, in al-naqd al-ḏātī ba‘d al-hazīma (self-Criticism after the 
Defeat, 1969) he compared the Israeli-Arab War of 1967 to the 
Japanese-Russian War of 1904 stressing the similarities between the 
two conflicts as in both cases a small country had defeated a larger 
nation against all odds. However, while in Russia the defeat led to a 
serious self-examination of the institutions somehow provoking the 
1905 and even the 1917 revolutions, the Arabs had a completely 
different reaction, perhaps more indicative than the defeat itself. In fact, 
they put the blame on everything (God’s punishment, colonialism, 
imperialism, Western support to Zionism and so on) but themselves.  
The very word used in referring to the 1967 defeat, naksa 
(disaster) is very revealing of such an ‘inevitability narrative’. On this 
point, Brakat (1993) wrote: 
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The June 1967 defeat could have ushered in a new stage in Arab 
history if the Arabs had decided to confront the challenge. 
Instead, they chose a course of acceptance of the status quo and 
ultimate resignation191. 
In fact, according to al-Azm, underdevelopment and the lack of 
scientific thinking are the main factors that keep the Arabs in a state of 
defeat and impotence (al-‘aǧz). Their revolution needs to radicalize 
itself, middle ways are not acceptable anymore, as no socialist 
revolution can be successfully undertaken without a scientific approach 
at all levels: military, political, social and cultural; besides, the 
emancipation of women is in itself a crucial goal to achieve. Moreover, 
in the controversial book Naqd al-fikr al-dīnī (Critique of Religious 
Thought, 1970192) for which al-Azm was charged with the crimes of 
apostasy, blasphemy and atheism (and then acquitted), he affirms that 
Islam does conflict with science, using a sharp antinomy: 
religion/tradition versus science/modernity193. 
 
2.3.2 Abdallah Laroui (ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿArawī, 1933-) 
Laroui can be defined as a liberal Marxist. In fact, especially in 
his first writings, he has been deeply influenced by the Marxist theory, 
that he considered to be the most advanced ideological system 
available, and he reworked some central Marxist issues (such as class, 
bourgeoisie, capitalism, political élite, the masses) to use them as tools 
to understand the evolution of the modern Arab world from colonialism 
to Nation-States. The 1967 defeat meant to Laroui the decline of the 
“progressive” standpoint, replaced in the Seventies by the conservative 
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stance embodied by the tribal rentier Gulf States, the new leading élite 
that eventually promoted modernization but, as said, without its 
ideological counterpart, modernism. 
Accordingly, Laroui’s form of legitimizing change starts from 
stressing the necessity of the Arab States’ cultural decolonization from 
the West (that in the MENA region has been both a symbol of universal 
progress and oppressive force), a process undertaken but far from being 
concluded. In fact, the legacy of imperialism is a hard problem to solve 
and often prevented the newly independent countries from gaining their 
own cultural space. Indeed, colonialism, like the 1967 defeat, made 
modern Arabs aware of both their weakness and the West’s political 
and economic power.  
Laroui’s major works are L’idéologie contemporaine (1967), where 
he criticizes the Islamist standpoint of Sayyd Quṭb (1906-1966), and La 
crise des intellectuels arabes (1974). In both texts the author underpins 
that the ‘crisis’ of the Arab intellectual—that mirrors the crisis of the 
whole Arab society—can only be resolved through a historical 
approach194. Arabs must become real contemporaries of their thoughts 
and their realities and they can do so only through a historicist 
contextualization and a critical appropriation of the theories that they 
believe to be useful195: history has indeed both an educational and a 
demystifying function as it allows one to question the Eurocentric and 
misleading interpretations of the Arab-Muslim vicissitudes given over 
time by colonialist perspectives196. In fact, according to the scholar, the 
1967 defeat is nothing but the consequence of the dominance of old 
mental and epistemological structures that must be deconstructed and 
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replaced in order to overcome the political/economic and 
cultural/intellectual backwardness of the contemporary Arab world197.  
Interestingly, the Moroccan scholar identified and criticized three 
trends of thought— religious, liberal and scientific-rational198— that 
dominated the political scene of the Arab World since the beginning of 
Western imperialism and never completely disappeared even with the 
advent of the post-colonial Nation-State. The political approaches that 
he detected had the same aim, meaning to find a solution to the crisis 
faced by the Arab world; however, the first trend seeks it in faith, the 
second in liberal thought (democracy) and the third in scientific 
progress. According to Laroui, they should be substituted with an 
enlightened nationalist philosophy that does not see contradiction 
between Islam and modernity as Islam is the religion of reason and 
modernity is based on reason. 
Finally, as for the role of the State, the author believe it to be the 
sole body able to enhance social development, civil society, and 
citizenry, as pointed out by Habti (2016): 
[In Laroui’s understanding] the state [has] a pivotal role in 
implementing a modernization programme. For the modern state, 
the best way to attain economic success is through carrying the 
banner of public good. However, many current Arab states suffer in 
their legitimacy as the populace is doubtful of its performance199.  
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2.3.3 Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, 1943-2010) 
The Egyptian scholar Abu Zayd left Cairo to Netherlands in 
1995 after been victim of a harsh attack from the Egyptian Islamists200 
that found him “guilty” of wanting to examine the Qur’an as a cultural 
and linguistic product, as Ṭāhā Ḥusayn before him201. In fact, in 
Mafhūm al-naṣṣ: dirāsa fī ʻulūm al-Qurʼān (The Concept of the Text: A 
study in the Sciences of the Quran, 1990) and Naqd al-kitāb al-dīnī (The 
Critique of Religious Discourse, 1992) he stressed the importance of 
sociopolitical factors in the interpretation of the sacred texts and 
attacked the Islamists of “reducing the Islamic religious tradition to a 
monolithic, ahistorical corpus of absolute and homogeneous truths”202. 
Besides, Abu Zyad entered the debate of the time criticizing the 
use of turāṯ (heritage) as the sole source of authority, especially because 
it negates any kind of role to human agency and it is often used as an 
ideological cover to legitimize social and political despotism. 
Moreover, the Egyptian scholar discussed two postulates of the 
Islamist discourse of particular interest for the purposes of this project: 
sovereignty (ḥākimiyya203) and the text (naṣṣ). According to the 
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principle of ḥākimiyya only the rule of God (expressed through the 
words of His book) can legitimately regulate human affairs while the 
notion of naṣṣ was used to clarify ambiguous passages in the sacred 
books, thus imposing the “right” (thus legitimate) interpretation of 
them. Indeed, these two principles combined led to a “totalitarianism of 
the text”. According to Abu Zayd, detaching the word of God from its 
socio-historical and cultural background makes the sacred text an 
abstract metaphysical thing, distorting its original meaning, even 
though contextualizing the statements (tārīḫiyya) does not mean 
limiting their meaning to specific contexts (zamāniyya): on the contrary 
historicity aims to make the sacred messages understandable and 
reasonable to people.  
Finally, Abu Zayd, like his contemporaries, discussed the 
consequences of the 1967 defeat especially under a psychological point 
of view. In fact, in Dawā’ir al-ḫawf: Qir’a fī kitāb al-mar’a (The 
Circles of Fear, A Reading in the Discourse of Women, 2000) he 
stressed how such a defeat and the demise of Pan-Arabism left Arabs 
angry, humiliated and powerless thus pushed them to seek refuge within 
an idealized glorious past.  
2.3.4 Mohammad Arkoun (Muḥammad ’Arkūn, 1928-2010) 
Like Abu Zayd, the Algerian scholar Muhammad Arkoun 
stressed the importance of historicizing the sacred texts by examining 
the human context of revelation and transmission without forgetting its 
historical, cultural, linguistic and gendered contingencies. He detailed 
his standpoint in two books, both written in English, Rethinking Islam 
Today (1985-86) and The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought 
(2001) where he called for a rethinking of the epistemological premises 
of the study of Islam by using modern semiotics, linguistics and 
anthropology. Indeed, his work aimed to develop a new epistemology 
103 
 
for the understanding of religion as a universal dimension of human 
existence and to articulate a theory for the comparative study of 
cultures, especially those with a tradition of revealed religions204: there 
is no perfect time to go back to, God’s words are embedded in history, 
culture and language and cannot be understood outside of those 
coordinates. Quoting Lee (1997): 
If Muslims seek the truth about themselves, they must 
reexamine not simply the truths of revelation but all the 
particular ways in which those truths have been felt, understood, 
elaborated, justified, fashioned into orthodoxy, and experienced 
in context, over time and within geographical space205. 
The Muslims need to exit the realm of the un-thought and 
sometime even the unthinkable, a dimension built over time by 
theology, jurisprudence and religious critique and constituted by all the 
elements considered incompatible with the orthodox traditional 
standpoint, such as secularism, historicity and sexuality206. Finally, 
Arkoun’s message is implicitly political as, in attacking Islamic 
Reason, he also attacks the regimes that rely on it as a basis for the 
legitimacy of their rule.  
2.3.5 Hassan Hanafi (Ḥassan Ḥanafī, 1935-) 
The Egyptian scholar Hassan Hanafi, who had been a Nasser 
supporter and then shifted closer to the Muslim Brotherhood to form 
his ideas of “Islamic Left,” aims to start a human revolution and placed 
his project in continuity with those of al-Afġānī and ‘Abduh. 
He delegitimized the dominant political authority through 
progressive hermeneutics, which take side with the poor and the 
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oppressed against the ruling class and the reach. At this regard, Habti 
(2016) wrote: 
The most interesting aspect of Hanafi ’s theorizing is the extent 
to which the delimitation of the legitimacy of political authority 
through a theory of social revolution depends on the 
hermeneutics of the interpreter set up through a qualitative 
improvement of the traditional Islamic hermeneutics of the 
text207. 
Moreover, according to the author, eurocentrism has to be 
replaced by an Islam-centered world civilization208. In his utopic world, 
a new age of renaissance (nahḍa) and enlightenment (tanwīr) is about 
to begin as the Arab masses need to regain their true identity through a 
new understanding of their own heritage (Hanafi re-reading of turāṯ is 
related to the renewal, tağdīd, of Arab-Islamic thought209) which has to 
be considered a powerful source of strength and authenticity, rather than 
a set of eternal truths and unchallengeable answers210. In other words, 
the East needs to regain possession of its self-consciousness for 
interacting on par with the Western cultural subject211. As he clarified 
in his periodical The Islamic Left (launched in 1981) the political forces 
in power nowadays in the Middle East, both Islamic and secular, are 
unjust and oppressive and use their ideological umbrellas to legitimize 
their true intents. Accordingly, at the international conference “The 
Arab Renaissance: Renewing the Civilizational Message,” organized in 
Amman, on 25-26 April 2018, in the occasion of the 10th anniversary 
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of the Arab Renaissance Foundation for Democracy and Development 
(ARDD) 
Hanafi centralized the role of human change and perpetual 
interpretations of religion and the tradition, and asked the youth 
to rebel whenever their rights and aspirations are not met by the 
ruling class or are threatened by external hegemons; he 
demanded an urgent revival of the humanist spirit in the 
tradition212.  
2.3.6 Muhammad Abed al-Jabri (Muḥammad ‘Abid al-Ǧābirī, 1935-
2010) 
The Moroccan political theorist Mohammad al-Jabri, an activist 
of the Moroccan Left from the Fifties to the Eighties, has been defined 
as an Arab-Muslim Leftist, and accused of being too political. Al-Jabri 
worked to deconstruct and reconstruct Arab Reason by reading it 
through the perspective of the Medieval Andalusian philosophy—
especially that of Ibn Rušd’s (Averroes, d. 1198)—that, by refusing to 
interpret religion with philosophical tools and vice versa, opened the 
way to the independence of science213. Such work on the Arab (and 
Islamic) Reason aimed to reconcile faith with reason, the Arab/Muslim 
intellectual tradition with the modern Western intellectual tradition. In 
fact, al-Jabri strongly defended modern state institutions while never 
losing his faith and admiration for the Arabic tradition.  
According to al-Jabri, a philosophical renaissance is the 
necessary precondition for a renaissance of the modern Arab culture 
and civilization but, unlike Laroui, his way of legitimizing change took 
the past and the significance of the turāṯ into account as, in his opinion, 
they are essential to face the challenges of the contemporary age. This 
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past must be revised, desacralized and reconstructed in an enlightened 
way214. Indeed, al-Jabri denounced the Arab political regimes which, 
over time, lost legitimacy, sacralized their power and made it 
untouchable and unquestionable, in a progressive degeneration of 
political systems from the prophetic mission (da‘wa nabawiyya), to the 
caliphate (ḫilāfa), to the patrimonial power (mulk) 215. 
Finally, as far as the figure of the Arab intellectuals is 
concerned, al-Jabri stressed how the ruiling elites always tried to use 
the (mostly) compliant scholars to legitimate their power, generally on 
religious grounds. This conservative role needs to change toward more 
progressist standpoints216. That is why al-Jabri underlined the 
importance of re-examining the objectives of šarī‘a and tried to give 
special place to the concept of maṣlaḥa (public interest/good). 
2.3.7 Rashid al-Ghannushi (Rāšid al-Ghannūšī, 1941-) 
The thinker and political leader Rashid al-Ghannushi was 
educated in a traditional Muslim community and continued his studies 
in Tunis. However, as he moved to the capital to continue his studies 
Ghannushi entered the debate between modernity and tradition that 
governed the political-cultural scene of the country and faced the 
identity crisis that such a debate generated. A convinced Nasserist and 
romantic (Pan-) Arabist, in the mid-Sixties he turned into a more 
committed ideologue of Arab nationalism following Sāṭi` al-Ḥuṣrī’s 
reasoning. However, while in Damascus for attending a BA in 
philosophy, he started to question the Arabist standpoint considering it 
too indebted to the scientific and cultural aports of the Western 
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modernity. Accordingly, he substituted Islamic readings for Arab 
nationalist ones, thus rediscovering what he defines as the “true Islam”, 
an authentic Islam, free of distortions of any sort. In the Seventies, after 
a year of studies in France, Gannoushi went back to Tunis where he 
founded al-Ğamāʿa al-Islāmiyya (The Islamic Group, outlawed by the 
Tunisian government in 1973) considering himself the rightful inheritor 
of Ḫayr al-Dīn al-Tūnisī and coming close to the teaching of the 
Algerian writer and philosopher Malik Bennabi (Mālik Bin Nabī, 1905–
1973) who faced the backwardness and the weakness of the 
“colonizable” Arab-Muslim world and his relations with the West, for 
knowing better the enemy is the only way to defeat him217. In 1979, al-
Ğamāʿa al-Islāmiyya set up a general conference within which the 
movement adopted a constitution and elected both a leadership council 
(šūrà) and its first president, Gannoushi. However, the Ğamāʿa was 
dissolved in 1980 and replaced in 1981 with the Mouvement de le 
Tendence Islamique (MTI), a movement deeply committed to the 
democratic system and that considered the electoral process the only 
true source of legitimacy. As a member of the MTI, Gannoushi 
experienced prison first from 1981 to 1984 and then again in 1987, 
when he was released by the new President Ben Ali (Zayn al-‘Ābidīn 
bin ‘Alī, b. 1936) who had just replaced Bourguiba (al-Ḥabīb Būrqība, 
1903-2000) ousted by the 1987 coup d'état. Ben Ali initially seemed in 
favor to a multi-party system. Thus, trying to gain official recognition, 
Gannoushi renamed his movement Ḥarakat al-Nahḍa, removing any 
reference to Islam. However, the initial openness of Ben Ali proved to 
be only apparent, in fact, despite Ennahda’ success at the polls in the 
1989 elections (14, 5 % of the national vote and 30% in the big cities) 
all parliamentary seats were assigned to the ruling party 
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(Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique, RCD) candidates. 
Eventually, in the same year Gannoushi fled to London (to come back 
only after 2011) where he could complete and publish his landmark 
work al-ḥurriyyāt al-‘amma fī al-dawla al-islāmiyya (Public Liberties 
in the Islamic State, 1993) where he discusses crucial topics such as 
civil liberties, democracy and human rights within an Islamic 
framework. According to him, an ideal system of governance must 
recognize and protect the human dignity and prevent despotism to take 
root by diminishing and eventually eradicating the gap between the 
ruled and the ruler. Following the teachings of nineteenth and twentieth-
century reformists previously discussed (such as al-Tahtāwī, Ḫayr al-
Dīn al-Tūnisī, al-Afġānī, 'Abduh, al-Kawākibī and Riḍā) he tried to 
integrate Western concepts into the Islamic discourse aiming to achieve 
an authentic Islamic renaissance, but also one able to benefit from the 
positive aspects of the Western modernity218. In fact, according to him, 
“an authentic modernist perspective cannot be merely transferred from 
one culture to another. It must be indigenous, homegrown”219. 
To conclude, according to Abu Rabi’, Gannushi “represents the 
first generation of active Tunisian Islamists who opposed the post-
colonial secular state”220. In fact, according to him colonialism has 
never ended but it only turned into neo-colonialism and globalization 
and kept exploiting the Third World under this new shape. 
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3. The hybrid sovereignty of the Arab Middle East 
The previous historical and conceptual outline of the formation 
of Arab Nation-States raises many questions as far as the concepts of 
sovereignty and legitimacy are involved: did the end of Pan-Arabism 
mean the final consolidation of Westphalian principles in the region? 
Did the emergence of the Western-like sovereignty mean the death of 
Arabism, or did territorial nationalism and (Pan-) Arab nationalism find 
a way to coexist thus generating a relative stability (Barnett, 1996)221? 
Does the invasion of Kuwait show that sovereignty has settled? This 
concluding section tries to answer to these and other questions starting 
from the analysis of Arab sovereignty and its hybrid nature, an approach 
that condemns the Eurocentric perspective according to which the 
Western Nation-State, and more generally liberal democracy (along 
with capitalism), is the final solution as far as the political organization 
of human societies is concerned222. Thus, Arab Middle Eastern states 
are wrongly considered failed, unsuccessful or semi-states only because 
they did not fully Westernize, while they just followed a different 
historical, cultural and economic path which obviously differentiated 
their outcome from the Western one.  
Indeed, the Arab Nation-States have a multilayered character 
derived from the encounter between their traditional forms of loyalty 
and the preexistent local authorities with the Westphalian system and 
its model of statehood. Accordingly, Bacik (2008) talks about “hybrid 
sovereignty” which is neither completely Western nor traditional, being 
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a model that “accepts the coexistence of tribal networks and ethno-
religious loyalties and the modern state format” and where “primordial 
identities and patterns coexist with citizenship within the Western-like 
borders”223. Referring to the many strategies and narratives used over 
time by the Jordanian establishment to preserve and maintain its 
legitimacy, Susser (1999) wrote: 
The Jordanian kings juxtapose images of tradition and 
modernity in artful ways. This is manifest in the laudations they 
gave themselves: Liberal Democratizer, Monarch, Descendant 
of the Prophet224, Secularist, and Sheikh of all Tribal Sheiks225. 
Thus, in the Arab-Muslim context, Western sovereignty is 
realized only in a limited way because, although Arab States originated 
within the European system, the imposition of the new system of rules 
could not be unilateral, but instead involved constant negotiation and 
identity recognitions, leading to the coexistence of multiple levels of 
identity, some of which were never affected by foreign influence.  
Besides, the Arab states “created through colonial processes of 
empowering certain ethnic, national, tribal or religious groups over 
other ones, forced the domination of one identity over the rest of the 
society”226, thus, quoting Kumaraswamy (2006) “the region suffers 
from the inability to recognize, integrate, and reflect its ethno cultural 
diversity”227. 
Notably, when talking about sovereignty, Bacik stresses the 
importance of both the international and the domestic sovereignties, 
                                                          
223 Gökan Bacik, Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 5. 
224 The Banū Hāšim claim to descend from the Arab chieftain Qurayš. 
225 Asher Susser, “The Palestinians in Jordan: Demographic Majority, Political 
Minority,” in Minorities and the State in the Arab World, ed. Ofra Bengio and Gabriel 
Ben-Dor (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 98. 
226 Kennet Christie and Mohammed Masad, State Formation and Identity in the 
Middle East and North Africa (New Yotk: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 24. 
227 P. R. Kumaraswamy, “Who am I?: The identity crisis in the Middle East,” Middle 
East Review of International Affairs 10, no. 1 (March 2006): 63. 
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embodied respectively by the state-state territorial boundaries and the 
state-society social boundaries. International sovereignty indeed 
derives from the recognition of a state by the other component of the 
system (community of states), and can be defined as a protection 
mechanism as it stands on the principle that the sovereignty of a state 
cannot be violated (non-intervention, non-interference principles). 
 Instead, the domestic sovereignty’s significance is often 
neglected, although, according to the author, it says much more about 
the real nature of a state. Indeed, state practices such as citizenship, 
passport and border markers exist to establish social boundaries, to 
legitimate the separation between the state and other social formations. 
The basic, neutral institutions (e.g. taxation, law) of modern statehood 
should avoid preferences (e.g. tribal) and remain always objective, 
accountable, predictable and transparent228. Notably, the strong familiar 
bonds of the Arab societies prevented the creation of impersonal 
bureaucratic relations: the institutional culture is still under the 
influence of traditional forms as people still care about tribal links. 
Therefore, no Arab state, following Bacik’s reasoning, has a full 
domestic Western-like sovereignty: in fact, the perseverance of tribal 
loyalties in the state structure causes the failure of domestic boundaries 
that in turn generate sovereignty crises. Interestingly, such crises 
usually lead to the adoption of substitution mechanisms, meaning that 
the establishment, in order to rescue itself and regain legitimacy, turns 
to certain primordial patterns (such as tribalism or sectarianism), or to 
the use of violence, or even to transnational agendas such as Pan-
Arabism or Pan-Islamism. 
The next sub-sections briefly analyze the tribal and the religious 
components of the Arab Nation-States that, alongside the political 
                                                          
228 Bacik, op. cit., 18, 19. 
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implications of the external revenues, are among the major sources of 
power and legitimacy of the Arab-Muslim regimes. 
3.1 The tribal component 
Tribes played essential roles in the formation of Islamic 
Empires, such as Omayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Ottoman, Safavid etc., 
and they also dominated vast areas of the MENA region that were not 
under any imperial authority (e.g. the Syrian desert, the Arabian 
Peninsula, the Upper Nile and the desert and mountains of North 
Africa). However, in the mid-19th century they began to be incorporated 
into the modern Nation-States but, even if some traditional forms of 
tribal authority have been forcibly broken, they never ceased to exist 
and two apparently incompatible institutions, tribes and states, started 
to coexist while tribal behavior continued to influence the collective 
identity and the decision-making process of the Arab states. Hourani 
(1991) affirmed that tribes owe their solidarity to a “myth of common 
ancestry”, meaning that they have social, cultural, ethnolinguistic and 
territorial bonds, and that they are a fluid entity that formed with the 
state a dialectical symbiosis through which the levels of autonomy and 
subordination of both varied over time. Thus, sometimes tribes united 
with other tribes in chiefdoms (a hybrid political formation between 
tribe and state) to form states whose legitimacy was enhanced also by 
religious ideology; other times they resisted the states by acting as anti-
states, but more often they coexisted and coevolved with state 
formation. In fact, such primordial groups helped the states undergo 
social change and modernization by providing a strong legitimacy 
source, and a symbolic counterbalance that facilitated the process of 
state expansion. The words of Sadik al-Azm are particularly significant 
in this regard. In fact, in self-Criticism after the Defeat (1968) he wrote 
that 
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Because of the lack of social institutions, political organizations, 
and political parties working effectively among the masses, the 
Arab citizen falls, at the time of sudden danger, under the 
spontaneous sway of the tribal, behaving in accordance with its 
norms, and thus feels that his ties with his family or group are 
stronger than his ties to the “land”, and his connection to his 
tribe, daughters and relatives is more significant and important 
than his connection to  the threatened “soil of the fatherland”229. 
As mentioned above, the Gulf region and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan are very noteworthy cases to be analyzed under this 
perspective. Indeed, most of the Gulf region’s royal families (such as 
the ruling family of Kuwait, the al-Ṣabāḥ, in charge since 1700) have 
tribal origins and could not impose their will on rival tribes and clans 
until Britain formalized their respective claims to rule through defense 
treaties in the late nineteenth century, and later helped to put down 
internal resistance; while the Emirate of Transjordan, an area deeply 
divided by tribal and regional affiliations, was offered in 1921 by the 
minister of the British colonies of the time, Winston Churchill to ‘Abd 
Allāh, the son of al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Hāšimī, šarīf and amīr of 
Mecca230. To this point, Betty S. Anderson (2005) stressed how “the 
Hashemites had literally to ‘imagine’ the state because no such entity 
called Jordan existed before the establishment of its boundaries and 
administrative structures in 1921”231. Moreover, the tribes of the area 
were made very powerful during the Ottoman rule, especially in the 
                                                          
229 Sadik Al-Azm, self-Criticism after the Defeat, (Beirut: Dar al-Tali’ah Press, 1968). 
First English Print edition published in 2011 by Saqi Books, London, ch. 2. 
230 The Syrian Arab government of ‘Abdallah’s brother King Fayṣal (Fayṣal al-Awwal 
ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Hāšimī,1885-1933), had been established in 1919 and only 
one year later the San Remo Conference (1920) gave France the mandate of Syria: 
French won the Franco-Syrian war that had broken out in response to it and Fayṣal 
got expelled from the region. However, within the Cairo Conference (March 12 to 30, 
1921), British agreed to appoint Fayṣal king of the newly born Kingdom of Iraq. 
231 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan. The Street and the State (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2005), 2. 
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province of Ajloun: the Ottomans used to pay the Bedouins not to attack 
the Muslims pilgrims passing through, thus they became overly well-
armed and strong over time. Accordingly, ‘Abd Allāh had to court the 
tribes in exchange for their allegiance by offering public employments, 
tax breaks, and payoffs232. Tribalism is indeed central in the 
development of Jordan, quoting Alon (2007): 
Unlike the other countries of the Fertile Crescent, based on 
urban élites and cultures, the Hashemite Kingdom explicitly 
incorporated tribalism into the political order and built on it for 
its own legitimacy and survival from the outset233. 
In other words, Jordan has been built on a form of social contract 
between the tribes and the Hashemite ruling family as the latter 
promised to provide services (electricity, water, transportation) and jobs 
(especially in the army) in exchange for their unreserved support. The 
Jordanian Bedouins’ special legal status was abolished only in 1976234 
but they remained privileged in the army and still have reserved quotas 
in public universities235. To conclude, the words of King ‘Abd Allāh II 
                                                          
232 Ann M. Peters and Pete W. Moore, “Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, 
Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan,” Springer Science - Business Media (2009): 264. 
233 Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan. Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State 
(London and New York: Tauris, 2007), 2. 
234 The law of tribal courts was issued in 1924, later modified in 1936 and abolished 
in 1976. These laws “listed the tribes of Jordan which submitted to its jurisdiction and 
left to the individuals of those tribes the freedom to submit their cases to their 
traditional judges for finding the solution [to cases] according to legal tradition”. Ann 
Furr, and Muwafaq Al-Serhan, “Tribal Customary Law in Jordan,” South Carolina 
Journal of International Law and Business 3, no. 2/3, (2008): 23. 
However, even after 1976 tribe remained an essential element of the political, social 
and cultural structure of Jordanian society, and the regulations of the tribal system are 
still respected as it operates alongside the formal legal system and šariī‘a Law 
especially in collective disputes and in disputes between tribes. WANA (West Asia-
North Africa Institute), “The Status of Legal Empowerment in Jordan: Evidence to 
support the post-2015 development agenda” (2014): 8, 
http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/StatusOfLegalEmpowermentI
nJordan_WANA_2014.pdf 
235 Nadine Méouchy, Norig Neveu and Myriam Ababsa, “The Hashemites and the 
Creation of Transjordan,” in Atlas of Jordan. History, Territories and Society, ed. 
Myriam Ababsa (Ifpo, Institut français du Proche-Orient, 2013): 212-221. 
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(January 2013) exemplify the central role played by the tribes up to the 
present day in legitimating its status of king and its rule over “his larger 
tribe”, Jordan: 
We are all sons and daughters of tribes from various 
backgrounds and origins, whether the Badia236, villages, cities 
or refugee camps. This is the most important source of our 
strength, of our national unity and our society’s security and 
stability. There was never a day when tribe and family were 
reason for chaos, violence or breaking the law, as some who 
have no knowledge of the true definition of tribe and nature of 
tribal society claim. On the contrary, the tribe contributed in a 
major way to the foundation of the modern Jordanian state—a 
state of institutions and law. The tribe has always been and will 
remain a symbol of valor, authentic values, allegiance and the 
safeguard of security, stability and the rule of law. And I, 
Abdullah ibn Al Hussein, take pride in the Jordanian tribes 
because they are my family and my larger tribe237. 
3.2 Religious legitimacy vs. rentierist legitimation 
Schlumberger and Bank (2001/2002) stress the importance of 
the distinction between legitimacy (an attribute of political rule) and 
legitimation (the process of actively creating legitimacy), a distinction 
that proves useful for the purposes of the present study, and above all 
helps better understand the significance and the role of the religious and 
the economic system as guarantors of the Arab states’ apparent stability 
and survival. Indeed, Schlumberger describes rentierism as “a form of 
legitimation as it consists of a continuous process of creating legitimacy 
                                                          
236 Al-bādiyya is a region of semi-arid, steppic rangeland and constitutes 80% of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Hashemite Fund for Development of Jordan 
Badia, “Jordan Badia,” http://www.badiafund.gov.jo/en/node/310 (Accessed 
2018/06/07). 
237 “Speech of His Majesty King Abdullah II at the Graduation of the 26th Class of 
Muta University’s Military Wing,” Amman, 16 June 2013. English translation 
retrieved from: http://jordanembassyus.org/news/speech-his-majesty-king-abdullah-
ii-graduation-ceremony-26th-class-muta-universitys-military (Accessed 2018/05/23). 
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through the implementation of certain policies, as opposed to constant 
already-existing and stable religious legitimacies238”. According to Lisa 
Anderson (1987): 
The legitimacy of the state in the West, with its notions of 
secular patriotism, citizenship, and the various rights of citizens, 
was intimately tied to the taxing powers of the state and the 
popular participation which developed as a consequence239. 
On the contrary, a “rentier state”240 depends on external sources 
of income for its survival and not on domestic taxation, thus it lacks in 
popular participation and does not have a proper civil society: citizens’ 
loyalty is bought by the state, and citizenship becomes a pecuniary 
relation and a source of economic benefit rather than a civil status241. 
Therefore, a rentier state is invulnerable to its citizens, as it does not 
need to justify its actions to the society. 
The most classic examples of rentier states are the oil-rich states 
of the Gulf, which enjoy the revenues of the exportation of such goods. 
However, there are other non-oil-producing countries whose survival 
depends on external sources different from hydrocarbons, such as 
Jordan that is highly dependent on the budgetary support of the Gulf 
State, as well as bilateral and multilateral Western development aid 
(that can be considered “rent equivalents”); accordingly, countries like 
Jordan can be labelled as “rentier states of second order” or “semi-renter 
states”. Peters (2009) clarifies this point as follows: 
                                                          
238 Oliver Schlumberger and Andre Bank, “Succession, Legitimacy, and Regime 
Stability in Jordan,” The Arab Studies Journal 9/10 no. 2/1 (Fall 2001/ Spring 2002): 
70, note 8.  
239 Anderson Betty, op. cit., 15, 16. 
240 The concept of rentier state was first expressed by the economist Hossein Mahdavy 
in 1970 with reference to Pahlavian Iran and was subsequently applied to Arab 
countries by Hazim Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani. See Hussein Mahdavy, “The 
Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier states: The Case of Iran” 
(New York: Croom Helm, 1970). 
241 Bacik, op. cit., 50-52. 
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[…] Jordan extends the set of rentiers beyond oil and gas 
exporters, to include lower-middle income developing countries 
that have relied upon a variety of external rents over time, such 
as development assistance, protocol trade, and security support. 
Limiting the set of cases to pure oil rentiers misses the point that 
even moderate levels of aid or trade in the hands of rulers can 
far exceed the resources available to potential domestic 
challengers242. 
In this regard it is worth mentioning the interesting point of view 
of the journalist and political analyst Mohammad Ayesh, reported by 
the Middle East Eye when talking about the recent protests that occurred 
in the country. According to Ayesh: 
The real problem is the Saudi aid that has stopped in recent 
years; Jordan depends on foreign aid as the main source for the 
economy, thus these protests could be planned messages from 
Jordan to outside countries, especially Saudi Arabia and UAE: 
We have an internal crisis and we need direct aid to save the 
stability of the country243. 
The situation of the “rich weak states” of the Gulf, as defined by 
Benedict Anderson (1992), is quite different. As noted above, they 
entered the global market thanks to the internationalization of American 
capital while maintaining a political authoritarianism. In fact, the 
redistribution of the wealth derived from the oil revenues, led to the 
                                                          
242 Peters and Moore, op., cit., 259. 
243 In fact “a five-year aid package from GCC states to Jordan, worth some $3.6bn, 
ended in January 2017, but no further assistance was offered”. Ahmed Kaamil and 
Mustafa Abu Sneineh, “Jordan's king freezes price hikes as protests continue,” Middle 
East Eye (Friday 1 June 2018), http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/jordanians-
prepare-more-protests-over-oil-and-tax-2135714445; Mohammad Ayesh, “Jordan's 
message to the world: Don't cut our aid,” Middle East Eye (1 June 2018), 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/jordan-s-message-world-don-t-cut-our-aid-
754226402. See also Patrick Neil, “Saudi Arabia and Jordan: Friends in adversity,” 
Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf 
States no. 31 (July 2013), 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/55661/1/__lse.ac.uk_storage_LIBRARY_Secondary_libfile_s
hared_repository_Content_LSE%20Kuwait%20Programme_PARTRICK%20(Jan%
202015%20update).pdf  
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establishment of a rentier financial system and consequently created a 
very obedient class of people with no intent of ever criticizing the ruling 
élite, facilitating a convergence toward neo-patrimonialism.  
To sum up, rentierism is a legitimation process, while religion 
is a legitimacy source and it helped in many states to strengthen the 
loyalty to the ruler by providing dynasties with an ideology able to 
legitimate public institutions (e.g. Waḥabiyya in Saudi Arabia, 
Mahdiyya in Sudan and Sanusiyya244 in Libya). In Jordan, the claimed 
line of descent of the ruling family from the Prophet clan245 provided 
the regime a kind of legitimacy that cannot be contested by its 
opponents. However, according to Schlumberger and Bank 
(2001/2002), religious-traditional legitimacy does not play a crucial 
role in Jordanian politics, it is rather a long-term structural constant, a 
pillar upon which stands the political power of the Hashemites.
  
                                                          
244 See Mahmud Ghāzi, “Emergence of the Sanusiyyah Movement: A Historical 
Perspective,” Islamic Studies 22, no. 3 (1983): 21-43.  
245 Through his daughter Fatima, considered also a descendant of the great-grandfather 
of Muḥammad and progenitor of the Banū Hāšim, Hāšim ibn ʿAbd Manāf (464-497). 
Méouchy, op. cit., 223. 
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II. The tools of research 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to clarify the methodological approach of the 
study and it links the first section, focused on the theoretical and 
terminological issues, with the last one, dedicated to the findings of the 
empirical work. As a recent work edited by Clark and Cavatorta (2018) 
highlights, there are methodological and ethical challenges that need to 
be dealt with when discussing the MENA region, the most obvious of 
which being the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian nature of the Middle 
Eastern regimes, as the dramatic vicissitude of the Italian researcher 
Giulio Regeni reminded us. The very choice of the qualitative over 
quantitative methodology is linked to this criticality and became a trend 
in the field. Many researchers in fact choose a qualitative approach 
because access to the administrative data, such as population census or 
election results, is often restricted or even denied in many countries or 
because the data itself is not reliable1. Nevertheless, the qualitative 
approach needs to face an increasingly important aspect: that of 
“positionality”, which indeed refers to the different “positions” 
occupied by the researcher and the participants, often not part of the 
same cultural and social community and how this affects the research 
outcomes. In fact, “the identities of both researcher and participants 
have the potential to impact [its] process”2.  
Accordingly, as the chosen approach for the present study is 
indeed qualitative, the first section attempts to frame the wide and 
multidisciplinary field of qualitative research by stressing its main 
                                                          
1 Janine A Clark and Francesco Cavatorta, Political Science Research in the Middle 
East and North Africa (New York: Palgrave Mcmillian, 2018), 10, 11. 
2 Brian Bourke, “Positionality: Reflecting on the Research Process,” The Qualitative 
Report 19 (2014): 1. 
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aspects, its strengths and weaknesses, its tools of analysis and its 
peculiarities. 
The second section focuses specifically on the research tools 
that have been used, the semi-structured interview, highlighting its 
components and describing its building process. The questions (both in 
English and in Arabic) and the respondents’ sample are listed, explained 
and justified within the fourth and the fifth sections. Each question 
investigates or aims to examine in depth a different conceptual 
dimension following the theoretical framework presented in the first 
chapter. These dimensions, alongside the ones that came up during the 
empirical work, are only listed in the last section and will be discussed 
in the third chapter alongside the data analysis. Finally, the third section 
discusses advantages and limitations of interviewing in a Middle 
Eastern context; the aim of this section is to understand weather the 
research method of the individual interview needs some adjustments in 
such a complex environment and how it is socially perceived. In this 
regard, recurring dynamics and particularly interesting episodes that 
occurred during the field work proved to be very useful to investigate 
the following significant realms: self and society, time and space, 
language, and gender. 
Notably, Islamic religion is not included because all the 
criticalities faced within the field work were culturally and socially 
rooted. Obviously, Islam plays a crucial role in the self-determination 
of Muslims in the Middle East and everywhere else; it is a substantial 
identity criterion for many and no researcher would ever be able to 
discuss any Middle Eastern issue without being aware of its importance; 
however, within the present study’s empirical work, the differences 
between interviewer and interviewees’ standpoints were not ‘Islam-
related’. For example, on average, both Muslim and Christian subjects 
would have had a worse attitude toward an atheist researcher than 
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toward a believer, regardless of his or her belief; this to say that 
religiosity, rather than affiliation to a specific faith, has to be taken into 
consideration when dealing with such a context. 
1. Qualitative research, framing the methodological path 
Qualitative methods of analysis have been chosen for a variety 
of reasons. In fact, the present research aims to recognize and analyze 
the identity criteria perceived as most significant and distinctive in the 
case countries, Jordan and Kuwait (the choice of which is justified and 
discussed in the next chapter) as they are fundamental to understanding 
the foundation of these states’ legitimacy. In fact, a qualitative approach 
(and the interview method in particular), deals appropriately with the 
subject of this research3. In other words, the appropriateness of 
qualitative research is indissolubly linked to the phenomena to be 
studied as it values the subjective importance of self-experience. 
Quoting Pamela Cawthorne: 
[Qualitative methods] destroy all illusions that the facts ‘speak 
for themselves’ or that the identity and values of the knower are 
irrelevant to the knowledge that she or he produces4. 
Whilst quantitative methods are suitable for capturing “a view 
of the social world as a concrete structure”5, as soon as we assume that 
human beings may contribute to the creation of the social world itself, 
they become less and less satisfactory. 
                                                          
3 Besides, since large samples were not available (because of field access and gender 
issues) accuracy becomes more important. See Meike Watzlawik and Aristi Born, 
Capturing Identity: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods (Lanham: University Press 
of America, 2007), 10-13. 
4 Pamela Cawthorne, “Identity, values and method: taking interview research 
seriously in political economy,” Qualitative Research 1, no. 1 (2001): 86. 
5 Gareth Morgan and Linda Smircich, “The case for qualitative research,” Academy 
of Management. The Academy of Management Review (pre-1986) 5, no. 3 (October 
1980): 499. 
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At this point, a brief overview of the main characteristics of 
qualitative research is necessary, as it sets the conceptual coordinates 
within which to read the empirical data and subsequent findings of the 
present study. 
Literature aimed at defining the qualitative research 
methodology appeared only in the late Sixties. In fact, the first 
systematic contribution to qualitative approach is commonly 
considered The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research by Glaser and Strauss (1967)6. During the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, the term methodology was an 
exclusive prerogative of the experimental method. Moreover, while 
statistics were considered a doctrinal argument that consequently 
required some kind of special training, fieldwork appeared to be 
something that could be learned with practice only. According to Gobo, 
in the Sixties7 qualitative methods were finally legitimated and 
institutionalized in order to contrast the quantitative positions in a more 
systematic way8. In the Eighties, Melucci suggests that the success of 
quality over quantity, and flexibility over standardization in the 
business field had repercussions in sociology. Therefore, a 
methodological literature appears, and it includes the first textbooks on 
                                                          
6 Giampietro Gobo, “The Renaissance of Qualitative Methods,” Forum: Qualitative 
Social Research 6, no. 3, Art. 42 (September 2005): 3. 
7 However, already in the Fifties there were significant publications for the qualitative 
research such as Howard Becker, S. and Blanche Geer, “Participant Observation and 
Interviewing: A Comparison,” in Human Organization: Field Relations and 
Techniques, ed. Richard N. Adams & Jack J. Preiss, 28-31. Kansas City: Community 
Studies Inc., 1960. Raymond L. Gold, “Roles in Sociological Field Observation,” 
Social Forces XXXVI, no. 3 (1958): 217-223; Florence R. Kluckhohn, “The 
Participant-Observer Technique in Small Communities,” The American 
Journal of Sociology XLVI no. 3 (November 1940): 331-343 and Melvin 
Schwartz, “Problems in Participant Observation,” in American Journal of 
Sociology 60 (1955): 343-35. 
8 Gobo (September 2005), op. cit., 5. 
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participant observation, in-depth interviews, discourse and 
conversation analysis, and textual analysis of documents. 
Despite these systematic efforts, it is not easy to define the term 
qualitative research, since it is an all-encompassing category that covers 
a wide range of approaches and methods found within different research 
disciplines9. In fact, a wide variety of categories define themselves as 
“qualitative researchers”10. Each and every one of these subjects have 
different practical problems, theoretical approaches, research traditions 
and of course different audiences to whom the research is addressed. 
Therefore, according to Seale, a “categorization of qualitative practice 
into a series of progressive stages is implausible”11. 
However, some researchers tried to catch the essence of 
qualitative research by attempting to define it or listing its key 
characteristics. In The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (2005), 
Denzin and Lincoln paraphrased Nelson, offering the following 
definition: 
Qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, 
and sometimes counter disciplinary field. It crosscuts 
humanities and the social and physical sciences. […] it is multi 
pragmatic in focus. Its practitioners are sensitive to the value of 
the multimethod approach. They are committed to the 
naturalistic perspective and to the interpretative understanding 
of human experience. At the same time, the field is inherently 
political and shaped by multiple ethics and political positions12. 
                                                          
9 Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis ed., Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers (London: SAGE, 2003), 2. 
10 Including geographers, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, educationists, 
business and management analysts, health care workers, market researchers, 
historians, policy analysts, cultural studies experts, communications and media 
studies scholars, even accountants and many others. Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, 
Jaber Gubrium F. and David Silverman ed., Qualitative Research Practice (London, 
Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE, 2007), 2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Denzin Normann K., Yvonna S. Lincoln ed., The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative 
Research 3rd edition (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE, 2005), 8. 
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Moreover: 
Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the 
observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material 
practices that makes the world visible. These practices turn the 
world into a series of representations including field notes, 
interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos 
to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that 
qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms 
of the meanings people bring to them13. 
John W. Creswell, in the third chapter of Qualitative Inquiry & 
Research Design. Choosing Among Five Approaches (2007), suggests 
his own definition that emphasizes the very process of research: 
Qualitative research begins with assumptions, a worldview, the 
possible use of a theoretical lens, and the study of research 
problems inquiring into the meaning individuals or groups 
ascribe to a social or human problem. To study this problem, 
qualitative researchers use an emerging qualitative approach to 
inquiry, the collection of data in a natural setting sensitive to the 
people and places under study, and data analysis that is inductive 
and establishes patterns or themes. The final written report or 
presentation includes the voices of participants, the reflexivity 
of the researcher, and a complex description and interpretation 
of the problem, and it extends the literature or signals a call for 
action14. 
According to Creswell, the common characteristics of 
qualitative research are: natural settings; the key role of the researcher; 
the use of multiple sources of data; a “bottom-up” or inductive data 
analysis; the central role of the participants’ meaning; the changing 
nature of the research design; a theoretical setting through which 
researchers look at the collected data; the space given to researchers’, 
participants’ and readers’ interpretation of the research itself, and 
                                                          
13 Ibid., 417. 
14 John W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design Choosing among Five 
Approaches 2nd edition (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE, 2007), 37, 38. 
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finally, a holistic approach to the issues that tries to identify the complex 
interactions of factors in any situation. 
In conclusion, Creswell identifies different approaches to 
qualitative inquiries that, while sharing the above listed characteristics, 
differ from each other in focus, types of issues, discipline background, 
unit of analysis, data collection forms and analysis, and general 
structure of the study. The five approaches are: 
Narrative research: it is generally used for capturing the detailed 
stories of life experiences of a single life or the lives of a small number 
of individuals. Types of narrative research include biographical studies, 
autobiographies, oral histories, life history portraits. 
Phenomenology: it describes the meaning of several 
individuals’ lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon, such as 
insomnia, grief or anger. There are two types of phenomenology: 
hermeneutical, that focuses more on the researchers’ interpretations of 
the reality, and psychological, which is configured as a description of 
the collected lived experiences. 
Grounded theory; this kind of study has the intent of generating 
or discovering a theory. There are two types of grounded theory study, 
namely systematic and constructivist. 
Ethnography: it focuses on an entire cultural group. The 
researcher describes and interprets the shared and learned patterns of 
values, behaviors, beliefs, and language of a culture-sharing group; 
Case study: this kind of research is “a qualitative approach in 
which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple 
bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data 
collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, 
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interviews, audiovisual material, documents and written accounts) and 
reports a case description and case-based themes”15. 
Furthermore, in La ricerca qualitativa (2011), Mario Cardano 
pinpoints some key characteristics of the qualitative research, such as 
the close observation of the subject matter of the research and the 
context sensitivity that it requires, while Snape and Spencer, in the first 
chapter of Qualitative Research Practice (2003), list the following main 
aspects: 
[…] the overall research perspective and the importance of the 
participants' frames of reference; the flexible nature of research 
design; the volume and richness of qualitative data; the 
distinctive approaches to analysis and interpretation; and the 
kind of outputs that derive from qualitative research. [...] 
Moreover, certain data collection methods have also been 
identified with qualitative research such as observational 
methods, in-depth interviewing, group discussions, narratives, 
and the analysis of documentary evidence16. 
In other words, the strength of the qualitative approach lies in 
its capability of giving a different thus perhaps deeper and more 
profound representation of social phenomena as “the aim of qualitative 
approaches is to reconstruct the tacit rules, the shared experience and 
the collective knowledge of social actors”.  Although the reliability of 
its instruments and the validity of its results are often criticized, 
according to Cardano, standardization and random trials have their own 
limitations too because they risk denying/overlooking undeniable 
specificities of different phenomena. Besides, as already noted, political 
science research in the MENA region is generally qualitative, as 
researchers in the region tend to face limited access to data, the quality 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 73. 
16 Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis ed., Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers. (London: SAGE, 2003), 16. 
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of which remains a concern. Instead, using qualitative data can bypass 
this problem without losing methodological rigor.  
To conclude, the different accounts of qualitative research 
presented prove qualitative methods to be flexible and subjects-
centered, capable of adapting to different situations17 and more able to 
read contemporary multicultural societies characterized by the presence 
of ethnic and linguistic diversity. “Foreigners” are not a rare 
phenomenon anymore. Quoting Gobo (2005): 
[…] even in small Italian towns we find people from Asia, South 
America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. Many of 
them do not know the Italian language well, are poorly educated, 
suspicious of native researchers, and competent in different 
interactional models and rituals from the Western world18. 
It is within this conceptual framework that the present study is 
placed, aiming to reach a deep and accurate understanding of the 
subjects’ visions and insights. No other tool but the individual interview 
would be in fact appropriate to investigate the inner reality of the 
respondents and understand what the word “identity” means to them. 
2. The individual interview, a social interaction 
As mentioned in the previous section, qualitative research 
encompasses different research techniques and data collection 
approaches such as observations, individual interviews, focus groups, 
analysis of documents (biographies and autobiographies, medical 
charts, private journals, archive materials etc.) and analysis of 
audiovisual material (physical trace evidence, videotapes of 
photographs, e-mails, cellphone messages etc.)19. 
                                                          
17 Gobo (2005), op. cit., 10, 11. 
18 Ibid., 9. 
19 Ibid., figure 7.3, 130. 
128 
 
Within the present study, individual interviews have been 
chosen as the preferable method and the most appropriate to investigate 
the due subject. Rita Bichi in La conduzione delle interviste nella 
ricerca sociale (2011) suggests the following definition of individual 
interview: 
The individual interview is a social interaction between an 
interviewer, who requests it, and an interviewee. It has 
exploratory purposes and it is leaded by an interviewer who uses 
an interrogation scheme20. 
The assumption that the interview is a type of social interaction 
is analyzed in the next paragraph in order to understand whether and 
how the culture, religion, language and the social and behavioral habits 
of the interviewees affect the conduction of the interview or its findings. 
This section has the more technical purpose of highlighting the key 
characteristics of the interview as a research tool and to justify the 
methodological choices that have been made; in fact, the features of the 
interview are an integral part of the scientific knowledge as they define 
the boundaries within which it is produced. 
Although literature presents many classifications of the individual 
interview, Bichi introduces four features that appear to be essential to 
make a proper systematization21: 
1. Standardization 
This feature deals with the homogeneity of the interrogation 
procedures, referring both to their forms and the order in which 
they are placed. The self-administered questionnaire with closed 
answers has the highest level of standardization, since questions 
and possible answers are presented in the same order to all the 
interviewed subjects. 
                                                          
20 Rita Bichi, La conduzione delle interviste nella ricerca sociale (Roma: Carocci, 
2011), p. 15. 
21 Ibid., 20-41. 
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2. Directivity 
This is strictly connected with standardization; as the 
standardization increases, so does the directivity and vice versa. 
This feature reveals itself in the making of the interview; it 
distinguishes procedures with a pre-determined content from 
those procedures in which the interviewer determines the 
content during the interview itself, building it upon the 
respondents’ answers. 
3. Structuring of the interrogation scheme 
This refers to the level of complexity of the interview, to the 
extent of the details used. It is not related to standardization and 
directivity; in fact, there are very complex and detailed 
interviews with low levels of standardization and directivity. 
4. How the interrogation scheme functions during the interview 
This refers to the concepts needed by the researcher in order to 
read his findings. The interview outline includes the necessary 
conceptual categories and it is the skeleton of the final analysis. 
However, in standardized interviews the outline contains all the 
conceptual meanings, making the conceptual system 
empirically detectable, while in less standardized interviews 
where it is possible to add concepts and meanings along the 
way, the outline functions more as an ‘interrogation tool’. 
Following this line of reasoning, it is possible to identify three 
fundamental types of research interviews: structured (or standardized), 
non-directive (or in-depth) and semi-structured. 
2.1 Structured interview 
This is an interaction characterized by high levels of 
standardization, directivity and structuring, generally defined 
questionnaire (the survey’s tool). The interaction between interviewer 
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and interviewee is very limited because their roles are pre-determined. 
The questions have to be asked with the same wording and in the same 
order (even though sometimes randomizations are acceptable, for 
example in exit pools when listing candidates or political parties) to all 
the interviewees in order to get comparable answers and proceed with 
a statistical analysis of the data. It is generally used in studies that 
consider a large number of subjects. According to Addeo - 
Montesperelli (2011) the false assumption behind this approach is that 
all the interviewed subjects, when asked the same question/ given the 
same stimulus, will give the same interpretation, meaning the one of the 
interviewer: every questionnaire’s question is subjected to the 
individual interpretation of the interviewee; in fact he or she may give 
a different meaning to the question and reach conclusions not 
predictable beforehand. Structured interviews can be face-to-face 
(CAPI), telephonic (CATI), and self-administrated (CAWI) and can last 
a maximum of 15 minutes.  
2.2 Non-directive interview 
It is a narration. It does not reflect any predetermined theories 
or ideas and is performed with little or no organization.
  
This kind of 
interview may simply start with one opening question such as ‘Can you 
talk about your childhood?’ and will then progress based, mostly, upon 
the initial response. In the 2008 article “Methods of data collection in 
qualitative research: interviews and focus groups” Gill, Stewart, 
Treasure and Chadwick described it as follows: 
Unstructured [non-directive] interviews are usually very time-
consuming (often lasting several hours) and can be difficult to 
manage, and to participate in, as the lack of predetermined 
interview questions provides little guidance on what to talk 
about (which many participants find confusing and unhelpful). 
Their use is, therefore, generally only considered where 
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significant ‘depth’ is required, or where virtually nothing is 
known about the subject area (or a different perspective of a 
known subject area is required)22. 
The non-directive interview has, in Bichi’s account, high levels 
of standardization and structuring and it is non-directive in the sense 
that the interviewer collects information regarding his study’s topics of 
interest without worrying about the wording or the succession of the 
questions asked. The interviewees are at the center of this technique; 
they are asked to relive their experiences and delve deeper into their 
social identity; even their non-verbal language has to be recorded and 
analyzed; therefore, the interaction in this case is free and in-depth and 
the interview itself is very flexible and open. 
2.3 Semi-structured interview 
Gill et al. (2008) defined it as follows:  
The semi-structured interview consists of several key questions 
that help to define the areas to be explored, but also allows the 
interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea 
or response in more detail. The flexibility of this approach, 
particularly compared to structured interviews, also allows for 
the discovery or elaboration of information that is important to 
participants but may not have previously been thought of as 
pertinent by the research team23. 
In other words, the semi-structured interview consists of a list 
of topics or more simply of open questions. The interviewer has to adapt 
and shape the interview following his subjects’ inputs; therefore, he can 
skip a question if the interviewee anticipated it or he can add one if 
some clarification or a deeper analysis of specific aspects is required. 
                                                          
22 Paul Gill, K. Stewart, E. Treasure and B. Chadwick, “Methods of data collection 
in qualitative research: interviews and focus groups,” BDJ 204 (22 March 2008): 
290. 
23 Ibid., p. 291. 
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Besides, the communicative process is less rigid if compared with the 
structured interview; when/if needed the interviewer can clarify the 
meaning of obscure questions by rephrasing them and he/she can 
choose which topics are worthy of being further analyzed. On the other 
side, the interviewees are free to express their feelings and their 
opinions, hence they lead the interview alongside the interviewer. That 
is why the semi-structured interview cannot be properly defined as 
standardized.  
Moreover, the level of structuring is lower compared with both 
the questionnaire and the non-directive interview, since the outline is 
often rough and never includes answers. The directivity decreases as 
well because there are very few pre-determined concepts and the 
subjects’ answers can, and very often will, add new leads in progress.  
Once these main aspects have been clarified, it is very important 
to highlight the fact that a plurality of approaches can be included under 
the umbrella “unstructured-interviews” (plural is needed) and that they 
vary as standardization and directivity levels vary. In fact, unstructured-
interviews exist and move between the two continua of standardization 
and directivity. Consequently, a proper definition according to Bichi 
would be the following: 
Semi-structured interviews are systematic set of acts of 
questioning that present different degrees of standardization and 
directivity24. 
In conclusion, the semi-structured interview can be regarded as 
the most flexible among the above analyzed techniques because it 
involves different approaches and styles: closed and open questions, 
verbal and non-verbal inputs can and do coexist within it. It is because 
of these features, its fluidity and the dynamism that characterizes its 
                                                          
24 Bichi, op. cit., 57. 
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communicative process, that this type of individual interview has been 
chosen as the proper research tool to use in the peculiar social, cultural, 
linguistic and religious background of the present study, as will become 
clearer in the next section. 
3. Advantages and limitations of interviewing in a Middle Eastern 
context 
The previous sections focused on the chosen methodology, 
aiming to explain the appropriateness of both the qualitative approach 
as the theoretical setting, and the semi-structured interview as the 
research tool used for the empirical work. Whilst those are essential 
premises, this is the core section of the chapter. In fact, it has been 
affirmed that qualitative research methods in general and individual 
interviews in particular have been chosen because of their ability to read 
contemporary multicultural societies characterized by the presence of 
ethnic and linguistic diversity. However, contemporary methodology is 
a product of Western academic culture, therefore it is due at this point 
to retrace its birth and its development through time– obviously giving 
more space to qualitative research–in order to understand first of all 
how it started to be perceived as universal, and second, which are the 
criticalities of the Middle-Eastern context in this regard. Recurrent 
dynamics, episodes which occurred during the field work and abstracts 
of interviews will be used to investigate the following essential realms.  
3.1 Birth of social research methods and their globalization 
In the 17th century, the rise of capitalism alongside the processes 
of urbanization and industrialization triggered the emergence and 
development of empirical social research as an answer to the need of 
understanding society. The place of birth of the new field is actually 
Europe, not United States: 
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[…] many of the techniques which are now considered 
American in origin were developed in Europe and then exported 
from the United States after they had been refined and made 
manageable for use on a mass scale25. 
The aim of the first studies was to gain a deeper knowledge of 
contemporary social problems, such as poverty and moral issues related 
to the living conditions of the working class. The first researchers came 
from different and not only academic backgrounds; at the beginning 
they collected data from informants, assuming that low-income people 
would not be able to describe their own situation, an aspect that reveals 
the bourgeois inner nature of the then newborn field26. Weber himself 
followed this approach in the first place, as shown in his 1981/1982 
study about payment relationships and developments in the social and 
cultural conditions of agricultural work in some German regions: he 
used in fact ‘key informants’ (Generalberichterstatter) to collect the 
data through interviews. Later on, he changed his mind and embraced 
direct interviews regardless of the subjects’ social class27. 
The early social survey in the States was influenced by its 
European counterpart but expanded its use to other areas of interest, 
such as political and opinion polls. America gained the leading role that 
still holds nowadays after the two world wars; the interwar period was 
also crucial because of the central contribution of the Chicago School, 
which is generally considered to be the birthplace of qualitative 
methods. Survey methods had a dominant position since the economic 
depression of the Thirties and were systematized in numerous 
methodological textbooks—such as Social Research (1942), where 
                                                          
25 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Preface. In Empirical Social Research in Germany 1848-1914, 
ed. Oberschall, Anthony (Paris: Mouton &Co., 1965), v-viii. 
26 Marja Alastalo, “The history of social research methods,” in The SAGE handbook 
of social research methods, ed. Pertti Alasuutari, Leonard Bickman and Julia Brannen 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2008), 26-41 
27 Sam Whimster, Understanding Weber (Milton Parl: Taylor & Francis, 2007), 15. 
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Georg Lundberg enlists the necessary steps for conducting an 
appropriate scientific research—while texts on qualitative methods did 
not appear until the Sixties, as mentioned in the first section. 
However, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative 
approaches appears only in the Seventies when they are depicted as 
incompatible and rooted in the opposed epistemological traditions of 
positivism and hermeneutics. This harsh incompatibility between the 
two approaches remained dominant until the Eighties, when mixing 
them finally became a possibility. Nevertheless, in the States, the 
predominance of survey (or positivism or quantitative methods) 
persists, while in Europe at first the qualitative standpoint somehow 
prevailed. 
Giampietro Gobo in his paper “Glocalizing methodology? The 
encounter between local methodologies” (2011) distinguishes three 
phases of the diffusion of social research methods: 
 European domination (1850-1930) until the rise of Nazi-
fascism. 
 European cultural colonization of the US universities (first in 
the 1890s by immigrants, and then in the 1930s by scholars 
escaped from Nazi Europe). 
 Globalization, namely the American cultural and Anglophone 
colonization of Europe that started in the Fifties and spread the 
methodology from the USA to the world28. 
In fact, science and methodology were exported in the aftermath of 
World War II, a period of political, economic and cultural American 
preeminence, alongside other American ‘products’ such as music, 
movies, food, cigarettes etc. Europe had been decentered and the pre-
                                                          
28Giampietro Gobo, “Glocalizing methodology? The encounter between local 
methodologies”, International Journal of Social Research Methodology 14, (2011): 
417-437. 
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existent indigenous research methods of the different countries were 
trumped by the American ones; the former were, in fact, considered 
obsolete when compared with the “modern” American techniques, 
which were regarded, on the contrary, as tools of progress, 
modernization and scientific advancement. 
Pertti Alasuutari (2004) reflects on the concept of globalization 
within qualitative research and methodology, often equated with 
‘Westernization’ or Americanization. Is it true that the global spread of 
US standards gradually homogenized world cultures? Certainly, 
English became the new lingua franca of science and that favored 
English mother-tongue scholars that nowadays hold most of the 
publishing market. However, Alasuutari highlights another reason for 
the Anglo-American dominance in the field of social science: its role of 
center opposed to peripheries, of normality opposed to others, its image 
of special example. It is from the point of view of the center that the 
others must be seen, and the characteristics of the center are considered 
the standards to which we will all align at some point in the future. The 
consequence of this dynamic is what Alasuutari calls “the phenomenon 
of fashions in social thought” 29: when a phenomenon or a theoretical 
paradigm is born in the center, a non-American author is somehow 
obliged to take it into consideration in his studies, implicitly 
perpetuating and reinforcing the dominance of the center and its very 
legitimation as “standards producer”. Alasuutari adds: 
We have to make Anglo-American and other readers believe 
that everything worthwhile takes place in the Anglo-American 
countries, in the center. In order to get our works published in 
the international market, we have to contribute to reproducing 
the center-periphery structure. […] We have to adopt the gaze 
                                                          
29 Pertti Alasuutari, “The globalization of qualitative research,” Qualitative research 
Practice (2004): 598. 
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of the people in the center, looking at ourselves from afar or 
above30. 
Moreover, this dynamic subtends a sort of “evolutionary 
process” within which societies labelled as developing and a-scientific 
gradually change, converging in a single global “culture of modernity” 
represented by the American model. 
Alasuutari et al. classification of the history of qualitative 
research, in the cardinal textbook Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(2000), follows this eight steps evolutionary pattern. Staring from the 
traditional moment (1900-1950) where “the field worker was lionized, 
made into a larger-than-life figure who went into the field and returned 
with stories about strange peoples31”, they then describe a modernist 
phase characterized by the systematization of qualitative methods in 
textbooks. By the third phase, called blurred genres, researchers already 
had different formalized strategies and techniques to use in their studies 
while the researcher had lost his privileged voice. The fourth moment, 
crisis of representation, occurred in the mid-Eighties and represents a 
profound rupture since new issues started to be investigated, such as 
gender, class and race; the researcher needed new models of truth, new 
methods and new forms of representation since issues such as validity, 
objectivity and reliability were questioned. The fifth moment, the post-
modern period, tries to overcome the triple crisis of representation, 
legitimation and praxis by exploring new ways of composing 
ethnography that present the ‘other’ in different perspectives. The last 
moment is the future and is preceded by the post-experimental inquiry 
(1995-2000)—when the boundaries between social sciences and 
humanities started to fade, bringing in different forms of expressing 
lived experience such as literary, poetic, autobiographical and visual 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 599. 
31 Denzin and Lincoln, op. cit., 15. 
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representations—and the tense phase of the methodologically contested 
present (2000-2004). Even if Denzin place his periodization in North 
America and emphasize the overlapping of the eight moments, his 
account still implies a progressive narrative where the present and the 
future are implicitly perceived as better, more developed and “America-
centric”. 
Accordingly, having assumed that the interview is a cultural 
product, Gobo writes that “specific (cultural) skills, tacit knowledge, 
and sociological conditions are required to sustain this particular social 
encounter”32. Here are some unwritten conditions that the interviewees 
should have and that are the parameters of the so-called “interview-
society”:  
 They need to consider it normal or socially acceptable to talk 
with strangers; 
 They need to be able to talk about themselves; 
 They need to be able to talk about feelings and emotions; 
 They need to know how to express themselves properly in 
different contexts; 
 They are supposed to live in a democratic political system with 
a pretty strong civil society so they can feel free to answer 
without restrictions to any question. 
Obviously, those parameters are problematic in non-Western 
societies; for example, Kuwaiti women, and especially Bedouin women 
(badū opposed to ḥaḍarī, sedentary33), showed inadequacy in 
describing themselves, their feelings and their emotions, mostly 
because they are not used to share private information with anyone but 
                                                          
32 Ibid., 424. 
33 About the dichotomal category badū-ḥaḍarī see: John E. Peterson ed., The 
Emergence of the Gulf States: Studies in Modern History, (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2016), 242-246. 
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their family members; they were all extremely shy and restrained during 
the interviews and their attitude represented a difficult obstacle to 
overcome. Moreover, both in Jordan and in Kuwait (although in Jordan 
young generations are keener to talk) it is not socially acceptable to talk 
to strangers, therefore field access represented an issue too. Subjects 
had to be contacted in advance by some sort of guarantor who reassured 
them about the interviewer’s intentions.  
However, those parameters are not problematic only in non-
Western environments. In fact, Gobo underlines the multiculturalist 
nature of the twentieth century Western societies: the growing number 
of immigrants is irremediably changing “our” societies, therefore some 
adjustments have to be made, nowadays more than ever, in order to 
reconcile methodology and reality; mono-cultural research methods do 
not fit multicultural and non-Western societies anymore. 
The struggle that Gobo describes became central in the past years. 
The milestone publication of Tuhiwai Smith’s (1999, 1st edition) 
Decolonizing Methodologies stresses the need to free methodology 
from Western supremacy. Smith defines the word research as 
“inextricably linked to European colonialism and Imperialism” and 
“one of the dirtiest worlds in the indigenous world vocabulary”34 and 
she presents Indigenous methodologies (IMs) and participatory action 
research (PAR) as ways of overthrowing methodological colonialism: 
Indigenous peoples across the world have other stories to tell 
which not only question the assumed nature of those ideals and 
the practices that they generate, but also serve to tell an 
alternative story: the history of Western research through the 
eyes of the colonized. These counter stories are powerful forms 
                                                          
34 Tuhiwai Linda Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous 
Peoples (London: Zed Books, 1999), 1. 
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of resistance which are repeated and shared across diverse 
indigenous communities35. 
This brief overview raises many questions, for example: what 
are the repercussions of this ethnocentrism on methodology and 
research methods? How can a culturally local product (American, 
Canadian or British) possibly claim any sort of universality by setting 
up principles to be applied potentially in all cultures? What are the inner 
limitations of this approach in dealing with “stranger” environments 
perceived as “peripheries”? And finally, narrowing the reasoning to the 
subject of this study, does this approach fit the complex, multi-level 
Arab-Muslim context? An attempt to answer this question is offered 
within the next sections, in terms of self and society, conceptions of 
Time and Space, gender and language. 
3.1.1 self and society 
Denzin, in Global Dimensions of Qualitative Inquiry (2013), 
states that in-depth interviews and surveys are both “rooted in an 
individualist social philosophy derived from the doctrines of 
Christianity, Enlightenment and American utilitarianism”36. Therefore, 
according to Gobo (2011), they are based on “a notion of society as a 
collection of individuals”37. In fact, the person became primary under a 
juridical perspective within the Roman law38, and later with 
Christianity, in opposition to the ancient Greek account that 
subordinated the individual to the cosmos. Saint Augustine gave 
priority to the individuals’ subjectivity, laying the foundations for the 
dichotomy between world as “object” vs. “self” as “subject”.  
                                                          
35 Ibid., 2. 
36 Norman K. Denzin, Global Dimensions of Qualitative Inquiry (New York: Left 
Coast Press, 2013), 49. 
37 Gobo (2011) op. cit., 423. 
38 See Francesco Viola. “Lo statuto giuridico della persona in prospettiva storica”, 
Studi in Memoria di Italo Mancini (1999): 621-641. 
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Following this reasoning, the interview, one of the 
“technologies of the self” according to Foucault, cannot be considered 
merely as tool used to collect data, but it becomes an integral part of 
society, an expression of the historical moment in which it was devised 
(the early twentieth century) that embodies all its contingent cultural 
features. Read under this light, Bichi’s definition of interview as social 
interaction becomes even more significant. How can we manage a 
social interaction, where the questions are an expression of a certain 
society with very specific cultural and philosophical roots, while the 
answers come from a completely different one? 
According to Smith (1999), the individual—considered the 
simplest social unit, the starting point from which all social relations 
are formed—is nothing but a Western system of ideas, a product of 
centuries of philosophical debate. Moreover, quoting Kagitçibasi 
(1997): 
The roots of individualism in the Western world have been 
traced in the history of ideas, in political and economic history, 
in religious history, and in psychosocial history. […] 
Individualism is to a large extent a characteristic of Western 
society39. 
Kagitçibasi mentions Hobbes’ standpoint and the centrality of 
his homo economicus in the 17th century, while from a rationalist 
perspective he stresses Descartes epistemological individualism that 
makes the individual mind the primary source of knowledge (cogito 
ergo sum). On the contrary, in the East, since the 5th century B.C., 
Confucius teaches a form of social morality that supports a collectivist 
worldview and that can be found in other eastern polytheistic religions 
and philosophies (such as Taoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
                                                          
39 John W. Berry, Marshall H. Segall and Cigdem Kagitçibasi ed., 2nd edition, 
Handbook of Cross-cultural Psychology: Social behavior and applications vol. 3 
(London: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), 3, 4. 
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Shintoism) and in the monotheistic religions born in the Middle East: 
Judaism, Islam and Christianity (except that later on, Christianity 
emphasized individual responsibility). Besides, Kagitçibasi focuses on 
the centrality of the family bonds within a collectivistic society. In 
“Autonomy and relatedness in cultural context: Implications for self 
and family” (2005) he states that, whilst nowadays the material 
interdependence between generations is becoming weak, the 
psychological one is not: 
What seems to happen is that with urban lifestyles and 
increasing affluence, material interdependence between 
generations decreases, because elderly parents do not need any 
longer to depend on the economic support of their adult 
offspring. Nevertheless, psychological interdependence, as 
closely-knit selves, continues, because it is ingrained in the 
culture of relatedness (collectivism) and is not incompatible 
with changing lifestyles40. 
Dionigi (2014) moves forward by putting Communitarianism 
together with Islamism when it comes to the relation between the 
community and the individual: 
Communitarianism and Islamism rely on a conception of the 
person whereby his/her ethical principles are defined in 
relationship with the community of which the person is part of. 
Whereas liberalism understands persons as autonomous moral 
agents (and on this basis postulates norms and institutions as 
rights, democracy, and liberal statehood which are concerned 
with the protection of the status of moral agent), 
communitarians and Islamists rely on the idea of community as 
constitutive of the person’s ethical principles41. 
How such a multifaceted and deeply rooted dichotomy can be 
solved when interviewer and interviewee represent its opposed poles? 
                                                          
40 Cigdem Kagitçibasi, “Autonomy and relatedness in cultural context: Implications 
for self and family,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 36 (2005): 406-409. 
41 Filippo Dionigi, “Islamism as Communitarianism: A Comparative Analysis,” in 
The Middle East Today book series (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2014), p. 65. 
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Before answering the question, it is necessary to recognize to which 
extent the very assumption of this dichotomy is correct and in what way 
the recent social developments of our societies worldwide cannot help 
but reshaping it. 
Particularly interesting in this sense is Simondon’s (1989) 
standpoint that argues against the individual/collective dichotomy by 
introducing the concept of “transindividuality”, a relation that is 
simultaneously and mutually constitutive of both the individual and the 
collective. Moreover, according to him, the very process of 
individuation, namely the process of becoming an individual, is 
affective before it is cognitive. Scott (2014) explained Simondon’s 
account of the individual as follows: 
[…] the individual neither comes into existence alone nor ever 
exists alone. The individual is always relative to the milieu 
associated with its existence and can never be defined in 
isolation. Simondon considers the collective as anterior to an 
individual. Individuation is always simultaneously collective 
and psychic: humans are both social and psychological 
beings42.  
Moreover, Westerik in “Immigrants and the socialization of the 
Self” (2011) states that—whilst a distinction between “allocentric” 
(individuals that prefer collectivistic ideals) and “idiocentric” 
individuals (that tend more toward individualistic goals) exists—
“cultures and individuals are not exclusively individualistic or 
collectivistic”43. Westerik mentions a third type of self, the 
“autonomous-related self”, to be added next to the autonomous self, that 
is characteristic of individualistic cultures, and the related self, 
characteristic of the collectivistic cultures. In fact, Westerik’s analysis 
                                                          
42 David Scott, Gilbert Simondon's Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical 
Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 42. 
43 Milou Westerik, “Immigrants and the socialization of the Self”, Social Cosmos 2, 
(2011), 138. 
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takes place within a crucial dimension: that of immigrant communities. 
In general, immigrants come from less-industrialized and more 
collectively oriented countries, whereas the receiving countries usually 
have an individualistic setting. This encounter can have different 
outcomes depending on the kind of relation established between 
migrants and the dominant society. Westerik lists four strategies: 
integration, assimilation, separation and marginalization; if the 
integration strategy turns to be successful and well-planned, more 
individualistic goals and practices prevail and the hybrid autonomous-
related self takes shape. Its characteristics are high relatedness and high 
autonomy, two dimensions that can finally coexist. Within this frame 
of reasoning, integration policies become even more crucial since they 
are the key to preventing the rise of fundamentalisms (especially within 
the Muslim communities), often seen as the only alternative left to a 
community in search of its identity. Integration should be the means 
through which immigrants find themselves able to express their 
communitarian self under a more individualistic light. In fact, the 
second generations’ radicalization is nothing but an identity 
misplacement generated by unsuccessful integration policies that failed 
to meet the needs of an evolving community who is only struggling to 
build a new but still authentic self. 
However, within the field work of the present study, a bridge 
between these two apparently opposite dimensions has been built, 
although not without difficulties. Indigenous middle-eastern societies 
are indeed collectivistic in the sense that, broadly speaking, the good of 
the larger community comes before the good of the individuals. While 
in individualistic communities the establishment of a unique identity is 
central, along with gaining a high self-esteem and reaching self-
maximization (meaning one’s full potential), the leading values of the 
collectivistic middle-eastern communities are respect, obedience and 
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connection to the family. For example, according to Triandis (1989), “it 
is more likely for people from non-Western cultures to possess a 
collective self because their child-rearing practices accentuate the in-
group”44. Regarding this point, it is interesting to notice that the 
majority of the subjects interviewed used the same word to describe 
both personal and wider, more-comprehensive forms of identity: the 
word intimā’, belonging. The sense of belonging is revealed to be 
central: belonging to the family or the wider clan, to the Muslim and/or 
the Arab community, to a specific geographical area, a linguistic family 
or a shared history. These are perceived as overlapping and essential 
bonds that, broadly speaking, seem to both divide and unify “Arabs” by 
including them within this or that identity dimension. The significance 
of this point is confirmed by Abdel-Fattah and Gunter (2003) as 
follows: 
Collectivistic societies […] emphasize loyalty to the group 
(while the group in turn cares for the well-being of the 
individual), emotional dependence on groups and organizations, 
less personal privacy, the belief that group decisions are superior 
to individual decisions, interdependence, an understanding of 
personal identity as knowing one’s place within the group, and 
concern about the needs and interests of others45. 
A collectivistic standpoint is therefore detected, but it has a 
peculiar nature since there is no univocal collectivity to refer to, or 
better, to belong to; there are many forms of collectivity. Being aware 
of this pluralistic self, connected to an all-encompassing sense of 
belonging, has been essential in this study in order to make effective 
                                                          
44 Harry C. Triandis, “The self and Social Behavior in Differing Cultural Contexts,” 
Psychological Review 96, no. 3 (1989): 510. 
45 Darwish E. Abdel-Fattah and Huber L. Gunter, “Individualism vs Collectivism in 
Different Cultures: a cross-cultural study,” Intercultural Education 14, no. 1 (2003): 
48. 
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use of the research tool of choice: the “Western-oriented” individual 
interview. 
Ğamāl, a 40+ years old Jordanian-Palestinian writer, when 
asked about his primary identity source answered as follows: 
Arab identity, yes, is more important than Islamic identity; for 
me and for intellectuals, Arab identity is a universal identity; 
Christians can have the Arab identity, so Muslims, so Hindus, if 
they were Arabs, could have it, so Shiites and Sunnis.  
Moreover, about the high number of Syrian refugees resident in 
Jordan, he said: 
[…] the identity of the Levant countries is unique; the Levant 
countries are Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine, their 
traditions and their culture are very close, therefore, even if 
there was an effect given by the presence of Syrian refugees, it 
would still remain within the same identity circle, because there 
isn’t a true new identity. If the immigrants were Turkish or 
Afghan or Europeans, and they were a lot, identity would begin 
to change, this is the difference between the identity influences. 
Suppose that five million of immigrants arrived in Italy, 
certainly this would affect Italians’ behaviors, because people 
would be in contact with new types of food, new habits, new 
forms of entertainment. Here, the change stays within narrow 
margins. I will give you an example: when the Palestinians 
emigrated to Jordan, the identity in Jordan remained Arab.  
Ğamāl’s account of identity is collectivistic in the sense that he 
identifies himself above all as Arab, therefore he has a sort of pan-Arab 
identity that is shared, according to his reasoning, with the Levantine 
countries46. 
To conclude, particularly revealing in this regard is the 
interviewees’ reaction to the question below, because it confirms the 
existence of the above mentioned “pluralistic self”47. 
                                                          
46 Ğamāl spoke about bilād al-šām, referring to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and 
Palestine. 
47 All the questions are presented in the fifth paragraph of the present chapter, booth 
in Arabic and in English.  
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“Generally speaking, can I ask you what the word ‘identity’ 
means to you? What comes to your mind when you think about 
this concept?” 
Age revealed to be a discriminating factor; subjects between 18 
and 30 years old generally gave more subjective accounts of identity, 
they talked about themselves, their habits and their peculiarities as 
human beings. For example, according to Līnā –– a Palestinian-
Jordanian English literature student and Arabic language teacher — 
identity is what differentiates people from each other, while another girl 
(a volunteer in a school for kids with special needs in Gaza Camp48) 
responded that: identity represents the person. Who I am. That’s my 
identity. On the contrary, elder subjects (40+), such as Ğamāl, gave less 
personal answers, remaining within pan-Arab or pan-Islamic 
dimensions or even stressing the national identity (especially in 
Kuwait). Nayf al-Faḍlī, professor at the Open Arab University in 
Kuwait City answered: identity is nothing but national belonging. We 
do not know anything but Kuwait, this is our identity, it means 
everything to us.  
3.1.2 Conceptions of Time and Space 
As for the conceptualization of the self, accounts about time and 
space embody language, philosophy and science of the culture to which 
they belong and influence considerably the way the world and the 
society are viewed. Smith (1999) wrote: 
Different orientations toward time and space, different 
positioning within time and space, and different systems of 
language for making space and time ‘real’ underpin notions of 
                                                          
48 While Palestinians who moved to Jordan during the British mandate (1920-1948) 
and after Israel foundation received citizenship, those who arrived from Gaza after 
1967 never got it. They live in Jordan with temporary residence permits since more 
than 50 years and their citizenship’s right continues to be denied. Many of them live 
in the so-called “Gaza Camp”, a ghetto town near Amman. 
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past and present, of place and of relationships to the land. Ideas 
of progress are grounded within ideas and orientations toward 
time and space49. 
Every language expresses these dimensions in different ways; 
for example, some indigenous languages make no clear distinction 
between the two, such as the Maori language that has only one word to 
express both. 
Moreover, according to Broditsky (2011), if it is true that people 
generally spatialize time in order to represent it, it is also true that every 
language has different spatial terms. For example, depending on the 
language, people can imagine the future as if it is ahead (English), 
behind (Aymara50) or below of them (Mandarine Chinese)51. 
Interestingly, Broditsky underlines also that the writing 
direction can affect the perception of time. Accordingly, Arabic 
speakers are more likely to arrange time from right to left, following 
their writing direction. 
According to Smith, the West colonized the indigenous 
construct of space by representing its lands in a particular way, 
renaming it and ideologically changing it; therefore, indigenous space 
becomes the “outside”, in “an oppositional relation to the colonial 
center”52. Besides, “Western time” is considered by the New Zealand 
author the imperialistic son of the industrial revolution and the 
Protestant ethic53; likewise, Walter Benjamin’s “homogenous empty 
                                                          
49 Smith (1999), op. cit., 57. 
50 Aymara is an Aymaran language spoken by the Aymara people of the Andes. It is 
one of Native American languages and it has over one million speakers. Aymara, 
along with Spanish, is one of the official languages of Bolivia and parts of Peru. It is 
a minority language in northern Chile. 
51 Lera Boroditsky, “How languages construct time,” in Space, Time and Number in 
the Brain, ed. Stanislas Dehaene and Elizabeth Brannon (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 334. 
52 Smith (1999), op. cit., 55. 
53 Ibid., 52-59. 
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time” (1968) “emerged in reaction to developments such as the 
Enlightenment, natural law, and the French Revolution”54. Indeed, 
Benjamin explains that Western perception of mankind’s historical 
progress depends on a conceptualization of “homogeneous empty 
time”; he criticizes that, within Social Democratic theory, time is 
nothing but a linear progress of events thorough history where no 
moment of time is qualitatively different from another. According to 
Benjamin, modern Nation-States use and used (referring to Nazism) 
this homogenous empty time in order to justify exploitation on a large 
scale: 
Social Democratic theory, and even more its practice, have been 
formed by a conception of progress which did not adhere to 
reality but made dogmatic claims. Progress as pictured in the 
minds of Social Democrats was, first of all, the progress of 
mankind itself (and not just advances in men's ability and 
knowledge). Secondly, it was something boundless, in keeping 
with the infinite perfectibility of mankind. Thirdly, progress was 
regarded as irresistible, something that automatically pursued a 
straight or spiral course. […] The concept of the historical 
progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of its 
progression through a homogeneous, empty time55. 
In opposition to the Western “homogeneous empty time”, 
Benjamin places the “messianic time”, where all events coexist 
eternally and simultaneously in history: 
“In relation to the history of organic life on earth,” writes a 
modern biologist, “the paltry fifty millennia of homo sapiens 
constitute something like two seconds at the close of a twenty-
four-hour day. On this scale, the history of civilized mankind 
would fill one fifth of the last second of the last hour.” The 
present, which, as a model of Messianic time, comprises the 
                                                          
54 Susanne Stadlbauer, “Displaced Islamic Identities: Language, Time, and Space in a 
Post 9/11 America,” Linguistics Graduate Theses & Dissertations 14 (2012): 150-
152. 
55 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations: Essays and Reflections (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1968), 261. 
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entire history of mankind in an enormous abridgment, coincides 
exactly with the stature which the history of mankind has in the 
universe56. 
Susanne Stadlbauer in “Displaced Islamic Identities: Language, 
Time, and Space in a Post 9/11 America” (2012) discusses the recent 
approaches of linguistic anthropologists that utilized Benjamin’s 
dimensions of time to investigate language, nationalism, and identity. 
The homogenous empty time, in fact, as a progression of hours, days, 
months, and years, produces a progressive narrative within which 
people proceed only forward, moving from the past into the future, 
supported by renewable technologies and replaceable products. 
According to this reasoning past and present are two completely 
separate realities. 
Anderson (1991) places the very idea of nation within 
Benjamin’s homogenous empty time: 
The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically 
through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the 
idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community 
moving steadily down (or up) history. An American will never 
meet, or even know the names of more than a handful of his 
fellow-Americans. He has no idea of what they are up to at any 
one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, 
anonymous, simultaneous activity57. 
In plain contrast, messianic time entails that every event has 
existed from the beginning and keeps happening until the present time, 
since 
the here and now is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of 
events, it is simultaneously something which has always been, 
                                                          
56 Ibid., 263. 
57 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, 2nd edition (London: Verso, 1991), 26. 
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and will be fulfilled in the future; and strictly, in the eyes of God, 
it is something eternal, something omnitemporal […]58.  
Stadlbauer (2012) summarizes all these perspectives by 
stressing that “spatiality and temporality, as constructed in discourse, 
are never objective since they interact with a number of social 
categories, such as religion, gender, or ethnicity, which are always 
colored with emotions or ideologies”59. Middle-eastern accounts of 
time and space are indeed indissolubly linked with Arabic language and 
Islamic faith; Muslims’ understandings of these dimensions are often 
perceived as a threat for the progressive narrative conception proper to 
Western contexts. 
In fact, whilst globalization somehow standardized temporality 
and spatiality worldwide, Arab-Muslims still keep chronotopes proper 
to what Agha (2007) calls “biblical time”, as opposed to the 
“evolutionary history”60. When they express themselves in fuṣḥā (the 
literary or classical Arabic) and when they need or want to present 
themselves as Muslims, giving priority to their religious identity, they 
move to Benjamin’s messianic time, where all events occur 
simultaneously and eternally and where improvements are not 
necessarily ahead. Stadlbaur noticed this language-rooted dichotomy in 
her study; in fact, referring to her sample of women of the Muslim 
Student Association (MSA) at the University of Colorado at Boulder 
(questioned about the negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslims 
proliferated since 9/11), she wrote: 
When they talk about their use of spoken varieties of Arabic, 
such as Egyptian Arabic, Sudanese Arabic […] they position 
themselves as a community progressing together through time, 
united by a shared form of communication that enables them to 
                                                          
58 Ibid., 24. 
59 Stadlbauer, op. cit., 10. 
60 Asif Agha, “Recombinant selves in mass mediated spacetime”, Language & 
Communication 27 (2007), 322. 
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demonstrate ethnolinguistic belonging. When they talk about 
their use of Qur’anic Arabic, they imbue the present with 
Muslim ancestors who lived in the time of Prophet Muhammad, 
and with God’s message to prophet Muhammad, eternalized in 
the Qur’an61. 
Within the present study, the majority of the interviews have 
been made in spoken varieties of Arabic, such as Jordanian and 
Palestinian in Jordan, and Kuwaiti, Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, Saudi, 
and Palestinian in Kuwait (as expats from different Arabic countries 
were interviewed). Nevertheless, some university professors, writers 
and intellectuals chose to talk in fuṣḥā, probably for a variety of reasons.  
They certainly thought to be more understandable to a foreign ear by 
avoiding regionalisms and perhaps they wanted to stress their status as 
highly educated individuals, since being fluent in Classical Arabic is 
surely an indicator of a person’s educational background. Ibrahīm 
(40+), Professor at the University of Kuwait, spoke in Classical Arabic 
throughout the entire interview and gave an interesting periodization of 
Kuwait’s history dividing it in “before” and “after” the first Gulf war. 
Professor Ibrahīm emphasized the indescribable happiness that he felt 
at the end of the war but at the same time, he affirmed that nowadays 
he does not recognize his fellow citizens anymore: 
It is like I do not live among Kuwaitis anymore. I feel like this, I 
swear to God. It is like they come from different countries, like 
they are Sudanese, Iranians, Iraqis or Syrians.  
He somehow idealized the past, both his past—meaning his 
childhood, a time when, he believes, people’s actions were moved by 
high moral principles—and his country’s past,when he felt a true 
connection with his fellow-citizens and the social unity of the country 
was not threatened by any form of sectarianism. Actually, many 
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Muslims keep surrendering to the luring call of the idyllic Islamic 
Golden Age, in several forms. This “step back” is at the very least 
incompatible with the Western “the best is yet to come” narrative. 
Indeed, 
According to a famous ḥadīth, the Prophet had said that his 
generation was the best of all, that the one which would come 
after him would be the next best, and after that each succeeding 
generation would be worse62. 
However, as for the conceptualization of the self, awareness has 
been the key to overcome this diversity and conceptually translate the 
questions into the “interviewees’ language”. 
3.1.3 Language 
The first chapter of Albert Hourani’s landmark work, Arabic 
Thought in the Liberal Age (1962) extensively used in the first chapter 
starts as follows: 
More conscious of their language than any people in the world, 
seeing it not only as the greatest of their arts but also as their 
common good, most Arabs, if asked to define what they meant 
by ‘the Arab nation’, would begin by saying that it included all 
those who spoke the Arabic language63. 
The previous sections highlighted how Arabic permeates and 
deeply affects both the perceptions of the self and the conceptions of 
time and space of the Arab community. Language is indeed an essential 
identity criterion that overcomes both ethnic and religious affiliations; 
quoting Barakat (1993) “the great majority of Arabs speak Arabic as 
their mother tongue and thus feel that they belong to the same nation 
regardless of race, religion, tribe, or region 64”. 
                                                          
62 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1962), 8. 
63 Ibid., 1. 
64 Halim Barakat, The Arab World: Society, Culture and State (California: University 
of California Press, 1993), 33.  
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Although not surprisingly the majority of the interviewees of 
this study are Muslims, some Christian subjects have been sampled in 
order to give a more complete picture of the two countries’ societies. 
Christians’ accounts are quite significant when it comes to 
language and nationality. Compared with Muslim subjects, many more 
Christians considered their national identity more important than their 
religious one and all of them stressed their Arab identity and their sense 
of belonging to the “Arab native speakers” community. In fact, the 
majority of Arab countries’ citizens share the same mother language, 
except for some ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Berbers, Armenians, 
and some southern Sudan ethnolinguistic groups. Moreover, native 
Arabic speakers all over the world enjoy a sense of nationhood that, 
according to Barakat, can explain the tendency to consider the existing 
states as artificial Western creations and to count a political unity as 
legitimate only if it coincides with linguistic identity (even though 
nowadays Pan-Arab claims are nothing but ideals). 
Barakat quotes many theoreticians of Arab nationalism, such as 
the Iraqi historian ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Dūrī (1919-2010) and Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī 
who stressed, as he does, the significance of the Arabic language in the 
formation of nationalism and national identity. In fact, Arabic is not a 
simple communication tool, it represents a whole culture by both 
expressing it and embodying it.  
In this regard, the above quoted Līnā when questioned about 
which identity criterion she considered to be the most significant 
between Palestinian origins, Jordanian nationality, belonging to the 
Islamic or the Arab community, and her tribal/familiar affiliations, 
answered as follows: 
[…] Language is very important in our identity. […] Especially 
literary Arabic because it is shared among all the Arab 
countries. And of course it is the Language of Qur’ān. Arabic is 
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a piece of my identity and I am very proud of it because of the 
richness of its vocabulary and its beautiful complexity. No other 
language is comparable. 
On the contrary, Aḥmad, a 32 years old Jordanian engineer with 
Palestinian origins responded: 
I do not consider the language to be very important, to me it is 
just a tool through which human beings can communicate 
between each other. It is important in the workplace, or to share 
news, or even in art and poetry. Every language in this regard 
is beautiful and unique but to me no language has value outside 
its use. 
However, Suleiman (2003) also stresses the association between 
language and national identity: 
[..] language mirrors the soul of the nation and, as such, is the 
most effective way of apprehending the spirit of the community. 
[…] [Language] connects the individual in social time and 
social space to follow nationals who, he or she will never hear 
of, meet or know65. 
The focus is not on the communicative or instrumental function 
of language, but on its symbolic one, in both its verbal and written 
manifestations (Arabic writing plays a significant role as a boundary 
marker). Moreover, Suleiman offers different accounts of the 
correlation between language and national identity. Whilst the German 
Romantic tradition considers it to be one of “the most important 
instrument of making humankind human”, other scholars, such as 
Edwards and Deutsch, believe that language plays a central role in 
national identity formation only when it is helped by other factors such 
as territory, common culture, shared memories etcetera; in fact, 
sometimes it is easier to understand familiar concepts expressed in a 
foreign language than to interpret new ones in our mother tongue.  
                                                          
65 Yasir Suleiman, The Arabic Language and National Identity: A Study in Ideology 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 27-30. 
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However, broadly speaking, this study would have been 
impossible if making the interviews in Arabic was not an option. Given 
the deep correlation between Arab-Muslim identity and Arabic 
language, it is not possible to investigate the one without the other; 
Arabic was indeed both the tool and scope of the interviews as no Arab 
would be able to define himself but using his true and only “language 
of the self”. Interestingly, a minority of the interviewees chose to speak 
in Italian— this was the case for some Jordanian Christian priests, who 
in doing so affirmed the central role of their religious identity —or  in 
English, especially in Kuwait, where younger people wanted to give a 
sort of ‘international’ (meaning American) image of themselves to the 
Western interviewer. On these occasions, Arabic proved once more to 
be crucial in the self-construction of Arab respondents; in fact, by 
deciding not to answer in Arabic, these subjects were not simply opting 
to express themselves in a different way: they were defining themselves 
by its absence. 
3.1.4 Gender  
The individual interview has been defined in the second 
paragraph as a social interaction and certainly, gender is a distinctive 
factor when it comes to social processes. The question is whether the 
difficulty of overcoming Middle Eastern women’s mistrust during an 
interview stems from their Muslim faith (even though other religions 
are present in the Middle East), their identity as Middle Eastern or their 
condition of being women. The answer is probably a combination of 
these factors. However, being a woman proved to be the most 
significant aspect in the majority of cases, therefore the gender issue 
cannot be left aside. 
Indeed, Ann Oakley (2003) discusses the struggle of 
interviewing women and stresses how the interviewer-interviewee 
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relationship mirrors and rationalizes social inequality at women’s 
expense. The author laments that too often sociologists fail to report 
fundamental issues related to their interviews such as “social/personal 
characteristics of those doing the interview; interviewees’ feelings 
about being interviewed and about the interview; interviewer’s feelings 
about the interviewees; quality of the interviewer-interviewees 
interaction; attempts by interviewees to use interviewers as sources of 
information; the extension of interviewer-interviewee encounters into 
more broadly-based social relationships”66. According to Oakley the 
level of awareness of these interviewing characteristics mirrors the level 
of researchers’ embeddedness within a research protocol that rests on a 
masculine model of sociology and society. 
In fact, methodology textbooks generally refer to the 
interviewer as male, reinforcing the assumption that only a male 
researcher can truly conduct a “proper” interview thanks to gender-
related inner qualities such as rationality and objectivity. On the 
contrary, the very definition of “improper” interview, or more precisely, 
the aspects that make an interview poor and inadequate are feminine 
characteristics; subjectivity, involvement and sensibility are therefore 
opposed to objectivity, detachment and hierarchy and this dichotomy 
reflects the psychology of “subordinate and dominant social groups” 
proper of “feminine and masculine psychology in patriarchal 
societies”67. 
On the male hegemony of global science’s fundamental 
assumptions, Haraway (1988) wrote: 
Natural, social, and human sciences […] have been about a 
search for translation, convertibility, mobility of meanings, and 
                                                          
66 Ann Oakley, “Interviewing women: a contradiction in terms,” in Turning Points in 
Qualitative Research: Tying knots in a handkerchief, ed. Yvonna S. Lincoln and 
Norman K. Denzin (Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2003), p. 243. 
67 Ibid., 250. 
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universality – which I call reductionism only when one language 
(guess whose?) must be enforced as the standard for all the 
translations and conversions. What money does in exchange 
orders of capitalism, reductionism does in the powerful mental 
orders of global sciences68. 
This dynamic appears to be wrong for two interconnected 
reasons. First, it puts the interviewees in a subordinate position while 
the interviewer has the dominant and leading role of getting 
information, and second it fails to be a true social interaction as it never 
assumes the women’s perspective. Moreover, artificially eliminating 
the sentimental and emotional aspects from our society in order to 
‘masculinize’ it, has proven to be a mistake, especially in social science 
methodology.  
[…] it becomes clear that, in most cases, the goal of finding out 
about people through interviewing is best achieved when the 
relationship of interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchical 
and when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her own 
personal identity in the relationship69. 
Within the field work of the present study, being a female 
interviewer has been both an advantage and a disadvantage. A 
disadvantage because of obvious practical reasons: a woman alone, who 
aims to ask questions to strangers and record their answers is not well 
viewed or accepted in this context; after all the Middle-Eastern society 
lacks those signature characteristics of an “interview-society” that were 
discussed at the beginning of this section. However, being a woman was 
also an advantage in making the interviews more effective; in fact, male 
interviewees were generally more comfortable and prone to open up as 
they considered a female researcher inoffensive, while female 
interviewees felt a sense of reciprocity with the interviewer, which 
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69 Oakley, op. cit., 252. 
159 
 
obviously made their interaction more honest and valuable. To sum up, 
gender has been discussed because, while patriarchy-related difficulties 
are obviously not the exclusive prerogative of the Middle Eastern 
context and being fully aware of the evident limitations and probably 
risks (for example male interviewees could have abusive behaviors) that 
a female researcher could have to face within the field work, it is 
interesting to stress that gender can be also a gift in such a setting. For 
example, a female researcher can have access to society constituencies 
from which men are forbidden such as Saudi woman that otherwise 
would need their guardian’s (maḥram) consent to meet a male 
researcher. Besides, this is especially true for non-Arab female scholars 
because of their status as “outsiders”, meaning that they are not 
expected to comply with the societal norms and practices70. 
4. Justifying the sampling procedures 
Stephen J. Gentles et al. (2015) defines sampling in qualitative 
research as “the selection of specific data sources from which data are 
collected to address the research objectives”71. 
In qualitative research, the sample is not intended to be 
statistically representative: the selection is made following the 
characteristics of the population to be studied in order to include all the 
relevant features that can improve the understanding of the research 
subject. Qualitative samples are usually well suited for small-scale, in-
depth studies and involve a low number of subjects. Again, the aim of 
qualitative research is not to determine statistically significant 
discriminatory variables but to give a detailed account of phenomena. 
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71 Stephen Gentles J., Cathy Charles, Jenny Ploeg, and Ann K. McKibbon, “Sampling 
in Qualitative Research: Insights from an Overview of the Methods Literature,” The 
Qualitative Report 20, no. 11, Article 4 (2015): 1775. 
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Ritchie and Lewis, in Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for 
Social Science Students and Researchers (2003)72, list four sampling 
techniques for qualitative research: 
1. criterion based, purposive or purposeful sampling; 
2. theoretical sampling; 
3. opportunistic sample (a very flexible approach that changes as 
the field work context changes); 
4. convenience sample (it lacks any clear sampling strategy: the 
researcher chooses the sample according to its ease of access). 
The first two strategies share some key characteristics, which are 
fundamental to qualitative sampling: they both rely on the use of 
prescribed selection criteria; they use small-scale samples and they have 
the possibility to supplement a sample or even add one, as in the case 
of theoretical samples. However, within the “criterion based sampling” 
the decisions about selection criteria are made in the early design stages 
of the research, while the “theoretical sampling” is an iterative process 
within which researchers start from a sample, then analyze the data and 
then proceed in selecting a further sample in order to improve the 
consistency of their findings.  
The present study follows the “purposive sampling” method that 
Patton (2015) described as follows: 
The logic and power of purposeful sampling lie in selecting 
information-rich cases for in depth study. Information-rich cases 
are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of 
central importance to the purpose of the inquiry. […] Studying 
                                                          
72 Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis ed., Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers. (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE, 
2003), chapter 4. 
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information-rich cases yields insights and in-depth 
understanding73. 
Forty subjects were selected for each country. In Kuwait, in 
order to give a proper and complete representation of the country’s 
population, both Kuwaiti citizens and Arab expats74—residing in the 
country since birth or that lived in it for a significant period of time—
were interviewed. In Jordan the most relevant identity related issue is 
the self-representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origins, as opposed 
to the “purely Jordanians” or “Jordanians Jordanians”, as the East Bank 
natives often call themselves. Accordingly, both categories were 
included in the sample. Most of the interviews are originally in Arabic, 
always quoted in the text in the English translation. 
The selection criteria that have been used are: 
 gender 
 age (18-40/40+) 
 profession (the distinctive criterion is students vs. workers, as 
access to the job market affects to some extent people’s self-
perception) 
 level of education (high: university degree or higher/low: up to 
secondary school) 
 religion (Islam/Christianity) 
 country of origin 
                                                          
73 Michael Q. Patton, Qualitative research & evaluation methods: Integrating theory 
and practice 4th edition (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2015), p. 264. 
74 Expatriates are about 70% of Kuwait population, including 1.1 million Arab 
expatriates and 1.4 million Asian expatriates. The Kuwait government rarely grants 
citizenship to foreigners to maintain status quo. The largest expat communities in the 
country are Indians and Egyptians. Within the present study, given that aim of the 
inquiry is understanding the identity criteria within the Arab-Muslim context, only 
Arab expats were taken into consideration. Precisely from Syria, Lebanon, 
Palestine/Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. 
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Every sample member was chosen to both represent and symbolize 
features of relevance to the investigation and it was selected on the basis 
of known socio-demographic characteristics75.  
In the charts below, the two case study samples are systematized 
according to the selection criteria that have been used. Names and/or 
surnames are reported only when the subjects explicitly agreed not to 
remain anonymous. Finally, particular relevance was given to the 
interviews’ language chosen by the interviewees, for the reasons 
explained in the previous section.  
                                                          
75 See Gentles J., et al., op. cit. and Martin N. Marshall, “Sampling for qualitative 
research,” Family Practice 13, no. 6 (1996): 522-525. 
 
KUWAIT 
Citizens 
Gender Age1 Profession Education2 Religion Origin Name Language 
of the 
interview 
F 18/40 Freelance High Muslim (Syrian) 
Kuwaiti 
nationality 
Fā’iza Arabic 
M 18/40 Employee 
Ministry of 
Defense 
Low Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic 
M 18/40 Soldier Low Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic 
F 18/40 Employee 
Hospital 
Low Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic 
F 18/40 Employee 
Ministry of 
Interior 
Low Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic 
F 18/40 Employee 
Ministry of 
Justice 
Low Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic 
F 18/40 Employee Low Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic 
M 18/40 University 
Student 
High Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic 
M 40+ University 
Professor 
High Muslim Kuwaiti Nayf Arabic 
M 40+ University 
Professor 
High Muslim Kuwaiti Ibrahīm Arabic 
F 40+ Employee High Muslim Kuwaiti _ Arabic/ 
English 
F 18/40 Dentist High Muslim Kuwaiti _ English 
F 18/40 University 
Student 
High Muslim Kuwaiti Mahā English 
M 40+ University 
Professor 
High Muslim Kuwaiti _ English 
F 18/40 English 
Teacher 
High Muslim Kuwaiti Sārā English 
F 18/40 Employee 
Bank 
High Muslim Kuwaiti Faṭima English 
M 40+ University 
Professor 
High Muslim Kuwaiti _ English 
F 18/40 Unemployed High Muslim Kuwaiti Šayma  English 
                                                          
1 The median age in Kuwait is currently 29 years: 25.32% of Kuwait's population is under the age of 15; 15.21% are 
between the age of 15 and 24; 52.32% are between 25 and 54; 4.82% are between 55 and 64 and just 2.33% of the 
population is 65 and older. http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kuwait-population/ 
2 It is important to mention that almost all the male interviewees over 40 have a high level of education. This cultural bias 
could not be avoided because of field access issues.  
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F 18/40 University 
Student 
High Muslim Kuwaiti _ English 
F 18/40 University 
Student 
High Muslim Stateless _ Arabic 
 
Expats 
Gender Age Profession Education Religion Origin Name Language 
of the 
interview 
F 40+ Housewife Low Muslim Syria Nağāḥ Arabic 
M 18/40 Employee 
Hospital 
High Muslim Lebanon ‘Azīz Arabic 
M 40+ Math 
Teacher 
Secondary 
School 
High Muslim Syria Anas Arabic 
M 18/40 Employee 
touristic field 
High Muslim Palestinian 
Jordanian 
Nūr Arabic 
F 18/40 Nurse Low Muslim Saudi Arabia _ Arabic 
M 18/40 Employee Low Muslim Syria _ Arabic 
M 18/40 Architect High Muslim Egypt _ Arabic 
F 18/40 Employee Low Muslim Egypt _ Arabic 
M 18/40 Engineer High Christian Egypt _ English 
F 40+ Secretary Low Christian Lebanon Mīrnā English 
M 18/40 Unoccupied Low Muslim Lebanon _ English 
M 18/40 Unoccupied Low Muslim Palestine _ English 
F 18/40 University 
Student 
High Muslim Egypt Sārā English 
F 18/40 Employee 
Bank 
High Christian Syria Sylvie English 
M 18/40 IT High Muslim Syria 
(Circassian) 
_ English 
F 18/40 University 
Student 
Employee 
High Muslim Palestine/ 
Jordan 
Suhā  English 
M 40+ Business 
Man 
High Christian Lebanon Tūfīq English 
M 18/40 Employee Low Muslim Sudan Walīd English 
F 18/40 English 
Teacher 
High Muslim Saudi Arabia _ English 
F 18/40 University 
Student 
High Muslim Saudi Arabia Šahīd English 
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Men: 18 
Women: 22 
Kuwaiti citizens+1 stateless person3: 20 (13 women, 7 men) High Educated 14+Low Educated 6 
Expats: 20 (9 women, 11 men) High Educated 12+ Low Educated 8 
Syria Lebanon Palestine/Jordan Egypt Saudi Arabia Sudan 
5 4 3 4 3 1 
 
Muslims: 364 
Christians: 4 (all expats) 
High Educated: 26 
Low Educated: 14 
  
                                                          
3 The bidūn ğinsiyya, literally ‘without citizenship’, are the stateless people of Kuwait making up about 30% of the 
population. It is very hard to get access to a bidūn, interview him or her and especially record the interview because they 
are understandably distrustful, given their social and political status, which will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
4 Most people in Kuwait are Muslim, although there are about 450,000 expatriate Christians, 600,000 Hindus, and 100,000 
Buddhists. About 70% of the Muslims in Kuwait are Sunni while 30% are Shi‘a. 
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JORDAN 
Gender Age Profession Education Religion Origin Name Language 
of the 
interview 
M 40+ Writer/ 
Intellectual 
High Muslim Palestinian Ğamāl Arabic 
M 18/ 
40 
Employee High Muslim Jordanian/ 
Circassian 
‘Alī Kašt Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Arabic 
Teacher 
High Muslim Palestinian Imān Arabic 
M 40+ Teacher/ 
Intellectual 
High Muslim Palestinian Ilyās Arabic 
M 18/ 
40 
Engineer  High Muslim Palestinian Aḥmad Arabic 
(skype) 
M 40+ Arabic 
Teacher 
High Muslim Palestinian Aḥmad Arabic 
M 40+ Civil Engineer High Christian Jordanian 
(Salt) 
_ Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Arabic 
Teacher 
High Muslim Palestinian Līna Arabic 
M 40+ Worker Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Teacher 
(center for 
disabled 
people) 
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Secretary 
(Language 
Center) 
High Muslim Palestinian Farāḥ Arabic 
F 40+ Volunteer 
(center for 
disabled 
people)  
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 40+ Physiotherapist Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 40+ Teacher 
(center for 
disabled 
people) 
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Volunteer 
(center for 
disabled 
people) 
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 40+ Volunteer 
(center for 
disabled 
people) 
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
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F 40+ Nurse (center 
for disabled 
people) 
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Teacher 
(center for 
disabled 
people) 
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Administration 
(center for 
disabled 
people) 
Low Muslim Palestinian 
(Gaza) 
_ Arabic 
M 40+ Janitor 
(Cervantes) 
Low Muslim Jordanian Ayman Arabic 
M 18/ 
40 
Arabic 
Teacher 
High Muslim Jordanian Ḫaled Arabic 
F 18/ 
40 
Arabic 
Teacher 
High Muslim Palestinian ‘Abīr Arabic 
F 18/40 Student High Muslim Palestinian Rūlā Arabic 
M 18/40 Employee High Muslim Palestinian Muḥammad Arabic 
F 18/40 Student High Muslim Palestinian Dūḥa Arabic 
F 18/40 Accountant/ 
secretary Terra 
Santa 
High Christian Jordanian Rāša Arabic 
F 18/40 Accountant/ 
secretary Terra 
Santa 
High Christian Jordanian _ Arabic 
F 18/40 Teacher Terra 
Santa 
High Christian Jordanian _ Arabic 
F 18/40 Spanish 
Teacher 
High - Jordanian/ 
Spanish 
Almūdīna Arabic 
M 40+ Economist High Christian Jordanian Dr. Qāqīš English 
M 18/40 Arabic 
Teacher 
High Christian Jordanian Aḥmad English 
M 18/40 Freelance High Christian Jordanian Sulaymān English 
F 18/40 Arabic 
Teacher 
High Muslim Jordanian/ 
Philippian 
_ English 
M 18/40 Arabic 
Teacher 
Employee at 
AICS 
High Muslim Palestinian Nāṣir Italian 
M 40+ Hotel 
receptionist 
University 
student 
Low Muslim Palestinian Tamīm English 
F 18/40 Medicine 
student 
High Muslim Palestinian Farāḥ 
 
English 
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M 18/40 Student High Muslim Palestinian Ḥakīm  English 
M 40+ Priest High Christian Jordanian Bassām Italian 
M 40+ Priest High Christian Jordanian Firāz Italian 
M 40+ University 
Professor 
High Muslim Palestinian Nāṣir  English 
M 18/40 Spanish/Arabic 
Teacher at 
Cervantes 
High Muslim Jordanian Ismāʻīl Italian 
 
Men: 20   
Women: 21   
Jordanians of Palestinian origin: 28 (17 women, 11 men)5 
“Purely Jordanians”: 13 (4 women, 9 men) 
Muslims6: 31 (17 women, 14 men) 
Christians: 10 (4 women, 6 men) 
High Educated: 29 (12 women, 17 men) 
Low Educated: 12 (9 women, 3 men)
 
  
                                                          
5 Population of Jordan: 9.456 million (2016); population of the city of Amman: 4,007,526; according to the 2008 Minority 
Rights Group, about 3 million people residing in Jordan have Palestinian origin and are overwhelmingly concentrated in 
northern and central Jordan, specifically in the Amman Governorate, Zarqa Governorate and Irbid Governorate. 
6 The majority of Jordanians are Muslim, about 92% are Sunni Muslim, and 1% are Shi‘a or Sufi. Cities in the south of 
Jordan have the highest percentage of Muslims. Christians, living mostly in Amman or the Jordan Valley, make up 6% of 
the total, with 1% representing other religions. The majority of Christians are Greek Orthodox, and the rest are divided 
among Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics (Melkites) and few Protestants and Armenians. Their status as a minority is 
guaranteed by law. As explained by Aruri “They are entitled to 9 out of the 60 seats in the House of Representatives […] 
thus they occupy 15 % of the seats. Whereas the Muslim Arabs are currently represented in the House of Representatives 
according to a ratio of one seat for every 36,800 inhabitants, the Christians have one seat for each 12,222 inhabitants. The 
system of communal representation does not only inflate the electoral strength of the minorities, but it also guarantees them 
seats in districts where they may have few or no inhabitants”. Naseer H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development 
(1921-1965) (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhojf, 1972), 40, 41. 
See also www.jordanembassyus.org/page/culture-and-religion 
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5. Questions of the interviews 
Notably, each question investigates a different conceptual 
dimension following the theoretical framework presented in the first 
chapter. These dimensions are used, in the third chapter, to analyze and 
compare the two chosen countries through the interviews’ findings. 
Since the inquiry aims to understand on which identity criteria 
the State legitimacy of Jordan and Kuwait is founded, the conceptual 
dimensions to be discussed mostly coincide with these criteria, also 
serving the purpose of identifying the most relevant between them, both 
in Jordan and in Kuwait, so that a comparison can be made. Following 
this line of reasoning, the last question of the interview is revealed to 
be the most important, since it includes all the dimensions, while all the 
other questions have the purpose of analyzing each issue in depth from 
different perspectives. 
As stated above the detected dimensions, specifically “national 
belonging”, “Islamic identity”, “Arabhood” and “Hybridity, tribal 
affiliations and clientelism” will be detailed in the last chapter alongside 
the data analysis. 
KUWAIT 
(English) 
Kuwaiti citizens 
1. To start, I would like to know something about you, where are you 
from, where did you go to school, what is your current occupation etc. 
2. You said that you are Kuwaiti. Can you explain me better what being 
Kuwaiti represents to you? Are you proud to be Kuwaiti? 
3. Generally speaking, can I ask you what the word “identity” means to 
you? What comes to your mind when you think about this concept?  
4. In which circumstances did you first think about your identity? Is the 
national identity relevant to you? 
5. What can you tell me about the State you live in? Are you interested 
in the history of Kuwait? For example, could you tell me in which year 
it gained its independence? 
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6. Do you think that the Syrian crisis effected Kuwait? How? 
7. I will give you some identity criteria, can you order them from the 
most relevant to the least relevant according to your perception and then 
justify your decision? 
 Religion 
 National Belonging 
 ‘Arabhood’ - Language  
 Family  
 
 
Expats 
1. To start, I would like to know something about you, where are you 
from, where did you go to school, what is your current occupation etc. 
2. For how long you and your family lived in Kuwait? 
3. How do you feel about this country? Are you happy to live here? 
4. Generally speaking, can I ask you what the word “identity” means to 
you? What comes to your mind when you think about this concept?  
5. In which circumstances did you first think about your identity? Is the 
national identity relevant to you? 
6. What can you tell me about the State you live in? Are you interested 
in the history of Kuwait? For example, could you tell me in which year 
it gained its independence? 
7. Do you think that the Syrian crisis effected Kuwait? How? 
8. I will give you some identity criteria, can you order them from the 
most relevant to the least relevant according to your perception and then 
justify your decision? 
 Religion 
 National Belonging 
 ‘Arabhood’ - Language  
 Family  
 
(Arabic) 
 
نويتيوكلا نونطاوملا 
 ـ ، تنأ نيأ نم .كنع ائيش فرعأ نأ ديرأ تحمس ول ،ءدبلاب
اذام ، تسرد  اذام و نيأ 
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  تفعل الآن و الخ 
) هل يمكن ان توضح من أين أنت1ـ قلت أنك كويتي (َسؤال 
 لي أفضل ماذا يمثل لك هذا؟ هل أنت فخور أن تكون كويتي؟
ـ وبصفة عامة، يمكن أن أطلب منك ما معنى كلمة "هوية" 
لك؟ ماذا  يتبادر إلى ذهنك عندما تفكر في هذا  بالنسبة
 المفهوم؟ 
ـ كم كان عمرك عندما فكرت لأول مرة بهويتك؟  هل تشعر 
 أن الهوية الوطنية مهمة؟
ـ ماذا يمكنك ان تقول لي عن الدولة التي تعيش فيها؟ هل 
درست تاريخ الكويت؟ فمثلا، هل تعرف في أي سنة الكويت 
    حصلت على الاستقلال؟
 ـ هل تعتقد أن الأزمة السورية أثرت على كويت؟ كيف؟
ـ سأعطيك بعض معايير الهوية، لو سمحت, نظمها من الأكثر 
 أهمية إلى الأقل أهمية بالنسبة لك و وضح اختيارك:
 الدين 
 المواطنة )الشعور بالانتماء الوطني(
 عروبة - اللغة
 الأسرة 
 
 الأجانب
يئا عنك. من أين أنت ، ـ بالبدء، لو سمحت أريد أن أعرف ش
 أين و ماذا  درست ، ماذا
  تفعل الآن و الخ 
  ـ منذ متى أنت وعائلتك تعيشون في الكويت؟ 
 ـ هل أنت سعيدة هنا؟
ـ وبصفة عامة، يمكن أن أطلب منك ما معنى كلمة "هوية" 
بالنسبة لك؟ ماذا  يتبادر إلى ذهنك عندما تفكر في هذا 
 المفهوم؟ 
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فكرت لأول مرة بهويتك؟  هل تشعر  ـ كم كان عمرك عندما
 أن الهوية الوطنية مهمة؟
ـ ماذا يمكنك ان تقول لي عن الدولة التي تعيش فيها؟ هل أنت 
مهتم بتاريخ الكويت؟ هل درست تاريخ الكويت؟ فمثلا، هل 
 تعرف في أي سنة الكويت حصلت على الاستقلال؟
  ؟ـ هل تعتقد أن الأزمة السورية أثرت على الكويت؟ كيف
ـ سأعطيك بعض معايير الهوية، لو سمحت, نظمها من الأكثر 
 أهمية إلى الأقل أهمية بالنسبة لك و وضح اختيارك:
 الدين  
 المواطنة )الشعور بالانتماء الوطني(
 عروبة - اللغة
 الأسرة 
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JORDAN 
(English) 
1. To start, please introduce yourself. I would like to know something 
about you and your family, where are you from, where did you go to 
school etc. 
2. You said that you are____ (referred to Q1 “where are you from”). 
Can you explain me better why do you feel to be ____ and what this 
represents to you? 
3. Generally speaking, can I ask you what the word “identity” means to 
you? What comes to your mind when you think about this concept? 
4. In which circumstances did you first think about your identity? 
5. Talking about Jordan in particular, do you think that the personal 
lives of the citizens can be in some way influenced by their identity (e.g. 
access to education, work, health services etc.)? If yes in which way 
according to you? Can you tell me an episode you witnessed? 
6. What can you tell me about the State you live in? Are you interested 
in its history and foundation? Do you know the historical and political 
process that made it as it is nowadays? 
7. Do you think that the Syrian crisis affected in any way the self-
perception of the Jordanian citizens? 
8. What do you think about the expression “purely Jordanian”? What 
does it mean to you? 
9. I will give you some identity criteria, can you order them from the 
most relevant to the least relevant according to your perception and then 
justify your decision? 
 Religion 
 National Belonging 
 ‘Arabhood’ - Language  
 Family  
 Palestinian origins 
 
 
(Arabic) 
 
 ائيش فرعأ نأ ديرأ .كسفن نع فرع,تحمس ول ،ءدبلاب ـ
خلا و تسرد  اذام و نيأ ، تنأ نيأ نم .كتلئاع نعو كنع 
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) هل يمكن ان توضح من أين أنت1ـ قلت أنك ــــــــ (َسؤال 
لي أفضل لماذا تشعرأن أنك تكون ـــــــــــ و ماذا يمثل لك 
 هذا؟
كلمة "هوية"  ـ وبصفة عامة، يمكن أن أطلب منك ما معنى
بالنسبة لك؟ ماذا  يتبادر إلى ذهنك عندما تفكر في هذا 
 المفهوم؟
 ـ في أي ظرف من الظروف فكرت لأول مرة بهويتك؟  
ـ في الأردن بشكل خاص، هل تعتقد أن هوية المواطنين تأثر 
على حياتهم الشخصية (مثلا الوصول إلى التعليم والعمل 
نت الإجابة نعم بأي والخدمات الصحية وغيرها)؟ إذا كا
 طريقة؟ ؟ هل يمكن أن تخبرني عن تجربة شهدتها؟
ـ ماذا يمكنك ان تقول لي عن الدولة التي تعيش فيها؟ هل أنت 
مهتم بتاريخها نشأتها؟ هل تعرف ,تاريخيا وسياسيا, كيف 
 أصبح الأردن كما هو في الوقت الحاضر؟
اتي ـ هل تعتقد أن الأزمة السورية أثرت على التصور الذ
 للمواطنين الأردنين؟
"؟ ماذا يعني ذلك بالنسبة حقيقيما رأيك في تعريف "أردوني 
 لك؟
ـ سأعطيك بعض معايير الهوية، لو سمحت, نظمها من الأكثر 
 أهمية إلى الأقل أهمية بالنسبة لك و وضح اختيارك:
 الدين 
 المواطنة )الشعور بالانتماء الوطني(
 عروبة - اللغة
 الأسرة 
ينيأصل فلسط
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III. Jordan and Kuwait: Two rentier states with tribal 
roots 
Introduction 
Between 1974 and 1990, over 30 countries in southern Europe, 
Latin America, some parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa made 
transitions to democracy, nearly doubling the number of democratic 
governments in the world. As for the MENA region, Roel Meijer and 
Nils Butenschøn (2017) perfectly summarized the alternation of 
optimistic and pessimistic views regarding this over time: in the Fifties 
the military regimes were considered a modernizing force able to build 
modern states where a new middle class would develop; however, 
already in the Seventies Michael Hudson (1977) stressed the lack of 
legitimacy of the ruling regimes of the time while in the Nineties the 
blame was on the weakness of the civil society, considered an essential 
element in the path toward democracy1. Yet, Samuel Huntington in The 
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991) 
claimed that the third wave of democratization might become a 
dominant feature of Middle Eastern and North African politics in the 
Nineties. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the first Gulf 
war, researchers and experts expecting the democratization of the area 
have continually been disappointed, witnessing on the contrary the re-
emergence and strengthening of pre-state primordial loyalties that 
actually undermine the stability of the state itself: 
In the MENA region citizens have almost no influence on the 
state, and in the rare cases they do it is through patronage, 
clientelism, and informal relations, all of which undermine or 
severely damage the notion of citizenship2. 
                                                          
1 Roel Mejer and Nils Butenschøn, The Crisis of Citizenship in the Arab World 
(London: Brill, 2017), Introduction. 
2 Ibid., 3. 
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Even after the so-called Arab Spring, with the exception of 
Tunisia, no regime-change led to the installation of a lasting democratic 
system. Clearly, the reason behind this apparent failure is not some 
cultural, inner resistance of the Middle East to democratization but, 
according to Hinnebusch3, is the resultant of three structural factors, all 
somehow related to the state-building process historically and 
theoretically analyzed in the first chapter: the “artificial” nature of the 
states, the weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie, and the lack of state-
building resources.  
Aiming to understand which identity sources underpin the 
legitimacy of the Arab-Muslim states and how these criteria affect the 
very functioning of the modern institutions, this last chapter discusses 
the two cases of Jordan and Kuwait, by analyzing the findings of the 
empirical work4. Obviously, Jordan and Kuwait are not representative 
of the whole MENA region where each and every country has his own 
political path, historical background, colonial history and peculiar 
social composition; however, being both artificial colonial creations in 
the eternal quest for domestic and international legitimacy, Jordan and 
Kuwait have a particularly interesting (national) identity history, 
worthy of being further analyzed, and particularly useful when dealing 
with the notions of legitimacy, sovereignty and citizenship. 
Accordingly, the chapter starts by highlighting the many aspects 
that these two apparently distant realities share. Then, the state and 
nation building process of each one will be briefly retraced especially 
focusing on the citizenship status and on the political representation and 
                                                          
3 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Prospects for democratisation in the Middle East,” in 
Democratisation in the Middle East. Dilemmas and Perspectives, Birgitte Rahbek ed. 
(Lancaster: Aarhus University Press, 2005), 34-42. 
4 Meaning the 80 open semi-structured interviews made in Amman and in Kuwait 
City between October 2016 and July 2017 and whose methodology and criticalities 
have been explained in the previous dedicated section. 
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participation of all the constituencies of these complex societies, as it is 
necessary in order to contextualize and better understand the empirical 
data. Notably, some constituencies appeared to be crucial. First of all, 
it is not possible to discuss the Jordanian reality without taking into 
account the status of the Jordanians of Palestinian origin (that often call 
themselves “Palestinian Jordanians” as opposed to “Jordanians-
Jordanians” or “purely Jordanians”). In fact, even though they are at 
least half of the country’s population, this Sunni Arab people are yet a 
political minority. Then, the neglected case of the Circassian ethnic 
minority and transnational diaspora proved to be noteworthy as its 
privileged relationship with the ruling élite and its tribally influenced 
identity are very revealing of the inner contradictions of the 
multifaceted Jordanian society. As for Kuwait, the bidūn (the stateless 
persons) and the expatriates are a very clear sample of the citizenry 
crisis suffered by the Emirate as their living conditions and their legal 
status clearly reveals the limits of the country’s sovereignty. Finally, 
the findings of the interviews will be analyzed according to the 
following conceptual dimensions: “national belonging”, “Islamic 
identity”, “Arabhood” and “hybridity, tribal affiliations and 
clientelism”. 
1. Two apparently distant realities 
An analysis of the present-day outcomes of the Jordanian and 
Kuwaiti state and nation building processes proved to be very 
productive for the present study purposes precisely because of the two 
countries’ many shared characteristics:  
a) They are Muslim-majority constitutional hereditary monarchies 
with a designated prime minister. Their ruling families, the Āl 
Ṣabāḥ in Kuwait and the Hashemites in Jordan, have retained 
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near-absolute political authority while timidly granting some 
political participation over time. 
b) They are small artificial states, surrounded by large, aggressive 
neighbors, thus equally sensitive to regional shifts and external 
threats. Nevertheless, they have been quite politically stable 
and, despite the weakness of their institutions, survived the 
“Arab Spring” turmoil. In fact, Yom in the aftermath of the 
revolts (2012) wrote: 
[…] the eight Arab monarchies stand firm. Saudi Arabia 
and Oman saw only isolated protests, while in Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) virtually no dissent 
mobilized. In Jordan and Morocco, youth-driven 
oppositionists filled some streets but failed to rouse the 
masses. In Kuwait, popular protest stemmed from long-
running tensions between parliamentary factions and the 
ruling family rather than any new political demands. […] 
In short, the scorecard of the Arab Spring neatly divides 
by regime type. Monarchies fared far better than 
republics5. 
It is worth mentioning that Jordan recently (Amman, 
May 31, 2018) witnessed a new wave of protests against the tax 
policies and the new price hikes on fuel, electricity and bread. 
In response to the riots, the King decided to freeze the inflation 
for the moment and, on June 4, accepted the resignation of the 
Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki (Hāni Al-Mulqī, b.1951) and 
asked to Omar al-Razzaz (‘Umar al-Razzāz, b. 1961) to replace 
him. 
c) They both experienced the British occupation. 
The state of Kuwait, previously an autonomous region 
belonging to the province of Baṣra (Iraq), had been a British 
                                                          
5 Sean Yom L., Gregory Gause III F., “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang 
On,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 4 (October 2012): 74, 75. 
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protectorate from 1899 to 1961, while the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan was not even a political entity of any form before 
1921, when the British protectorate of Transjordan was 
established. In fact, no national movement emerged before or 
during World War I calling for the establishment of a nation in 
the region. Its northern inhabitants had the Syrian town of 
Damascus as their political center, while the south had the Hijaz. 
The importance of the land was mainly given by its location as 
a rout for the pilgrimage to Mecca. In fact, it was called, 
depending on the pilgrims’ starting point, mašārif al-Šām 
(approaches to Syria) or mašārif al-Hiǧāz (approaches to the 
Hijaz). Transjordan reached independence from Great Britain in 
1946. 
d) They are characterized by a deeply-rooted tribal structure. 
Kuwait, like all the Gulf States, is ruled by a tribal family whose 
legitimacy is based on force, blood relationship, protection and 
the redistribution of the oil wealth. In Jordan, tribes have been 
essential in the state-formation process and built a form of 
partnership or even symbiosis with the (originally foreign) 
government6. 
e) Their rentier economic system has an enormous influence on 
both government policy and citizens’ political identity. In fact, 
thanks to external revenues, the governments of rentier states 
can finance public expenditure and provide the community with 
services without resorting to taxation. While it is easy to 
understand the Kuwaiti revenues, the case of Jordan is more 
complex. In fact, as already discussed in the first chapter, 
                                                          
6 Gökhan Bacik, Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, 
Jordan, and Iraq (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 149. 
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Jordan, whose foreign policy has been described as driven by a 
quest for “budget security”, can be classified as a “rentier state 
of second order” or “semi-renter state” as a large share of the 
state’s budget is drawn from fiscal sources outside the kingdom 
and not from taxing the domestic production7. 
f) The two countries have intense regional interactions. Quoting 
Moore (2004): 
Of all the Arab states, no other is tied to Kuwait’s travails 
quite like the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In addition 
to foreign aid from the West, Jordan is a major recipient 
of development aid from Kuwait. […] Some of the 
massive oil revenues received by the Kuwaiti state are 
channeled back to Jordan through remittance income and 
development aid8. 
Thus Kuwait assumed over time an incredible 
significance in Jordan’s quest for state budgetary security. This 
financial aid relationship began after the Khartoum Arab 
League summit that followed the 1967 war and was improved 
or extended in the successive summits held in Rabat in 1974 and 
in Baghdad in 1979. As for the private sector, Jordan soon 
became one of most important export markets for the Emirate, 
second only to Iraq9. 
Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Jordanians (mainly 
of Palestinian origin) have worked in Kuwait since the 1950s 
but in the aftermath of Kuwait’s liberation from Iraq were 
forced to return to Jordan, in response to the alignment of the 
                                                          
7 Russell E. Lucas, Institutions and The Politics of Survival in Jordan Domestic 
Responses to External Challenges, 1988–2001 (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2005), 5, 6. 
8 Pete W. Moore, Doing Business in the Middle East. Politics and Economic Crisis in 
Jordan and Kuwait (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1, 9. 
9 Laurie A. Brand, Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance 
Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 122, 123. 
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Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat (Yāsir ‘Arafāt, 1929-2004) and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with Saddam 
Hussein (Ṣaddām Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-Mağīd al-Tikrītī, 1937-
2006). The flux was so significant as to be called “the 
Palestinians’ third exodus”10. Notably, according to Brand 
(1995) such a group, numbering around 200,000 units, did not 
adjust easily to living in the kingdom. In fact, many lacked of 
any sense of belonging to the country and even doubted its very 
existence as a sovereign state. Besides, their obviously strong 
“Palestinian-ness” was mixed with other elements of separate 
identities (such as for example the hatred of Saddam Hussein) 
that inevitably separated them from the other Palestinian 
citizens11. Moreover, their arrival “exacerbated what was 
already a serious unemployment problem, strained state 
services, and drove up food and housing price [leading toward] 
a gradual development of a much broader sense of 
Transjordanian-ness reminiscent of the ‘East Banker first’ surge 
in the wake of Black September”12. The political relation 
between the Kuwaiti and the Palestinian leadership improved in 
2004 thanks to the official apology of Mahmud Abbas 
(Maḥmūd ʿAbbās, b. 1935) but the Palestinian embassy in 
Kuwait was re-opened only in 2012. The Palestinians resident 
in the Emirate are now estimated to be around 80.000 compared 
to the 400,000 before the 1990-1991 war. 
                                                          
10 See Yann Le Troquer, Rozenn Hommery al-Oudat, “From Kuwait to Jordan: The 
Palestinians' Third Exodus,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 37-
51. 
11 Laurie A. Brand, “Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 24, no. 4, (summer, 1995): 49, 50. 
12 Ibid., 56. 
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g) They both have internal conflicts: Sunni/Shi‘a, 
Muslims/Christians, West Bank/East Bank, sedentary 
people/Bedouins, tribal affiliation, citizenship status and history 
are divisive elements in their societies. 
h) All the above listed factors make them two exemplary cases of 
hybrid states in Gökhan Bacik’s definition (2008), being both a 
mixture of modern institutions and traditional affiliations held 
together by a rentier economic system.  
2. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
This section retraces the birth of the Jordanian state thus 
clarifying why Jordan needed and still needs to legitimize its own 
existence by creating new myths of origin and historical narratives able 
to justify the unfamiliar entity of the Nation-State to its “citizens”. In 
fact, not only is Jordan the Arab country that hosts the greatest number 
of Palestinian refugees13, one of the largest and longest-lasting refugee 
populations in the world14 but, the high numbers of Iraqi and Syrian 
asylum seekers that entered the country after the 2003 and 2011 crises15 
                                                          
13 According to the 2008 Minority Rights Group report, about 3 million people 
residing in Jordan have Palestinian origin and are overwhelmingly concentrated in 
northern and central Jordan, specifically in the Amman Governorate, Zarqa 
Governorate and Irbid Governorate. Eric, Witte “Middle East,” Minority Rights 
Group Report (2008),   https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/old-site-
downloads/download-470-Middle-East.pdf  
14 Ilana Feldman, “The Humanitarian Condition: Palestinian Refugees and the Politics 
of Living,” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, 
and Development 3, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 155. 
15 The Syrians in Jordan according to UNHCR are 661,859 (2018) while the Iraqis 
61.000 (2017). UNHCR, “Syria Regional Refugee Response” (Last updated 12 Nov 
2018), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36 UNHCR, “Jordan: 
UNHCR Operational Update” (January 2017), 
http://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-unhcr-operational-update-january-2017  
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changed once again the already complex composition of its society16. 
In fact, by January 2017, the number of registered Syrian refugees in 
Jordan exceeded 650,000, around 10% of Jordan’s native resident 
population. While around 20% of Syrian refugees in Jordan currently 
live in designated camps, the rest have settled in cities and rural areas 
across the country. The refugee influx has placed growing pressure on 
Jordan’s infrastructure and resources; however, the “refugee as burden” 
narrative is mainly a governmental fabrication aimed at creating a 
convenient “other” to fear and fight; in fact, the Jordanian rentier 
economy depends on the revenues generated by human mobility, being 
the money sent by the Jordanian expatriates or, as in this case, the 
International community aid given to support the accommodation of 
refugees. Notably, some interviewees do not comply with this 
governmental discourse: 
I: Ok. I have one last question. What do you think about the 
Syrian crisis... all these Syrian refugees coming to Jordan? How 
do you think it has affected the country? 
Q: For me, it affected the country positively. First of all, when 
the people came to the north, everybody worked. They rented 
houses. Money increased. People in northern Jordan have 
money for the first time. Economic results, positive economic 
results. The markets are working, you know, very well17. 
Anyhow, the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis on the Jordanian 
labor market indeed touched a variety of aspects including the rising of 
child labor and an expansion of the informal labor market18. More than 
                                                          
16 See Bani Salameh, Mohammed Torki and Khalid Issa El-Edwan, “The identity 
crisis in Jordan: historical pathways and contemporary debates,” Nationalities Papers 
44, no. 6 (2016): 985-1002. 
17 Dr. Hanna Qāqīš, 40+ years old, Economist, Christian, Jordanian of Palestinian 
origin. Language of the interview: English. 
18 While according to the ILO Decent Work Country Profile for Jordan 2007, back 
then only 1.6 per cent of all children aged 5-16 worked, the recent influx of refugees 
from Syria has exacerbated the situation in terms of the magnitude and the complexity 
of the issue. Nowadays the number of child laborers has roughly doubled to more than 
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60% of Syrian children between 15 and 17 years old are out of school 
as confirmed by the following interviews’ excerpts19: 
A: How old are you? 
B: I am 14 
A: 14 years’ old… When did you leave the school? 
B: 4 years ago 
A: Why? 
A: Because of the war… I studied until the 5th grade and I 
couldn’t continue because of the circumstances. Later we came 
to Jordan and I never started… 
B: How many are you at home? 
A: We are 8 sisters and with my parents we are 10 
B: 10 people… who works? 
A: Two of my sisters and me. 
B: Where do you work? 
A: We are housekeepers. 
*** 
[13 years old] B: I am a housekeeper. 
A: How many hours do you work per day? 
B: Since 7 am to 7 pm 
A: Ok, and when you go to these houses, aren’t you afraid? 
Don’t you feel uncomfortable?  
A: Of course. I have been harassed and abused. I am afraid for 
myself. I have to work all day and my employers never let me 
rest, not even 1 hour. 
 
*** 
                                                          
69,000 since 2007, with around 44,000 engaged in hazardous work, according to the 
latest National Child Labor Survey released on August 2016.  International Labour 
Organization, “ILO Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan” (2016), 
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/syrian-refugee-crisis/jordan/lang--
en/index.htm  
19 The interviews (originally in Arabic, here in the English translation) have been 
made to Syrian working girls and boys resident in the Southern governorate of Aqaba, 
and are part of a report about Child Labor realized by the author during an internship 
at the Amman office of the Italian NGO AVSI (October 2016-June 2017). Names are 
not mentioned, A stands for the interviewer while B for the interviewee. 
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[13 years old] My name is B and I sell roses at the seaside. My 
friends sell with me and we often go back home with not even 
one or two dinars. 
Notably, in response to these challenges, King ‘Abd Allāh II (1962) 
launched different initiatives to enforce civic education and national 
identity such as the following national campaigns, both part of national 
and civic education curriculum in schools.  
 al-Urdun Awwalan (“Jordan First”), launched in 2002 and 
officially promoted as an “instrument of modernization”. The 
campaign addressed political reform and social development 
while giving priority to national concerns over  regional ones20; 
  “Amman Message” launched in 2004. 
And the school reform project ERfKe (The Education Reform for 
Knowledge Economy) in 2003, a two-phase project (2003-2007; 2007-
2013) that focused on the country’s labor market challenges but was 
also “an example of a nation-building project meant to align Jordan with 
a Western model21”. Moreover, the Ministry of Education lists among 
its education policy principles “emphasizing the importance of political 
education in the educational system, and enhancing the principle of 
participation, justice and democracy and their practices22”. In this 
regard, the following interview’s excerpt is particularly significant: 
[…] Because they taught us in the school... about the flag, they 
taught us about Jordan, they taught us about the King... they 
taught us that the King was like our father. Wherever we are, 
                                                          
20 Musa Majd, Amman: Gulf Capital, Identity, and Contemporary Megaprojects 
(London: Routledge, 2017): 86-88. 
21 Patricia Kubow and Lana Kreishan, “Citizenship in a Hybrid State: Civic 
Curriculum in Jordan’s Education Reform for Knowledge Economy Era,” in Middle 
Eastern & African Journal of Educational Research 13 (2014): 8. 
22 Website of the Jordanian Ministry of Education 
http://www.moe.gov.jo/en/node/19404 
186 
 
he's our father. So from 7 years [since we are 7 years’ old], we 
are taught that Jordan is our country23. 
Regarding such immigration influxes, El-Abed (2014) raised a 
very interesting point when talking about the labelling process operated 
by the government, a political act of inclusion or exclusion of the new 
constituencies of the society. Indeed, the migrants had very different 
faiths, some have been made citizens, some have been called 
“refugees”24 or “displaced”, others “asylum seekers” and many even 
“guests”25 according to the “guest hood” narrative proper of the Islamic, 
(Pan-) Arab and Bedouin identity. By labelling, the state built a space 
of competitions between the categories it created; such a strategy 
allowed it to manage security concerns while maintaining control over 
the population and the territory. Indeed, Bacik (2008) defines Jordan as 
a hybrid state, since in it “the modern and the traditional coexist behind 
the formal appearance of statehood”26. In other words, Jordan appears 
to be an artificial creation where Westphalian principles and local 
traditions are strongly and indissolubly fused. 
The modern Jordan indeed has exogenous origins, being the 
result of Ottoman, British and Hashemite policies. As for the Ottoman 
role, particularly relevant is the already mentioned Vilayet Law of 1864. 
A part of the Tanẓīmāt process of reform (1839-1876), the law provided 
a standard framework for provincial administration, dividing the empire 
into provinces ruled by a governor, thus starting a process of territorial 
definition and creating the earliest forms of modern and central 
                                                          
23 Dr. Hanna Qāqīš, 40+ years old, Economist, Christian, Jordanian of Palestinian 
origin. Language of the interview: English. 
24 However, Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its Law of Residence and Foreign Affairs Number 24 of 1973 does 
not provide any clear definition of the term refugee. 
25 Oroub El-Abed, “The discourse of Guesthood: Forced Migrants in Jordan,” in 
Managing Muslim Mobilities ed. Anita Fabos, and Riina Osotalo (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 82. 
26 Bacik op. cit., 9. 
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statehood in the Arab lands. Transjordan was not one of those new 
provinces; in fact, what then became the Emirate was made up of the 
southern part of the Vilayet of Syria (the Balqā’ district) and the 
northern part of the Hijaz Vilayet whilst the territory of the Mandatory 
Palestine formerly constituted the Sanjak of Jerusalem and the southern 
part of the Beirut Vilayet.  
Later on, as the Ottoman Empire was about to collapse, the 
interest of the Great Powers in the region increased and the Pan-Islamist 
narrative of Abdülhamid II inspired by al-Afġānī’s Islamic reformism, 
gave way to the Pan-Arab ideology of the late 19th century championed 
by al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Hāšimī and based on Sāṭi` al-Ḥuṣrī’s (Pan-
Arab) notion of waṭan. The šarīf and amīr of Mecca27 sought 
independence from the ruling Ottoman Turks aiming to create a single 
unified Arab state from Aleppo in Syria to Aden in Yemen and in order 
to reach his goal asked for British support in exchange for Arab 
assistance in opposing the Ottoman Empire (Ḥusayn/McMahon 
correspondence, 1915/1916). As for the British, they actually gave 
military support to the Great Arab Revolt28 but this deal was later 
contradicted by the incompatible terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
concluded between Britain and France in May 1916, and the Balfour 
                                                          
27 The Hashemite family occupied the role of šarīf of Mecca and Medina since the 
10th century until 1924, although not continuously (the Hashemite leaders of the 
Emirate of Mecca in this period total less than a hundred). Among the šarīf ‘s duties 
were organizing the ḥağğ (annual pilgrimage) and guaranteeing safe passage to the 
pilgrims and ensuring the supplies of the holy cities. Nadine Méouchy, Norig Neveu 
and Myriam Ababsa, “The Hashemites and the Creation of Transjordan,” in Atlas of 
Jordan. History, Territories and Society Myriam Ababsa ed. (Ifpo, Institut français 
du Proche-Orient, 2013), 213. 
28 Notably, the significance of the Great Arab Revolt of 1916 is symbolized even in 
the Kingdom’s flag. In fact, the black, white and green bands represent the Abbasid, 
Ummayyad and Fatimid (909–1171) dynasties while the red triangle on the left side 
joining the three bands represents the Hashemites. Finally, in the center of the trangle 
there is a seven-pointed Islamic star that represents the unity of Arab peoples in Jordan 
(http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/jo_anthem.html). 
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Declaration of 1917. Then, in 1921, the minister of the British colonies 
of the time, Winston Churchill, decided to offer the Emirate of 
Transjordan to the son of Ḥusayn, ‘Abd Allāh29. The decision was 
motivated by many factors. Indeed, at that time, the officers of the failed 
Syrian government of ‘Abd Allāh’s brother, Fayṣal, sought refuge from 
French attacks in Transjordan; they arrived in Amman aiming to 
establish a (Pan-) Arab government thus rejecting the very existence of 
a Transjordanian nation (still considered a province of the Great Syria); 
meanwhile, the Transjordanians were starting to articulate their own 
identity. Thus, questions such as nationhood and boundaries began to 
be discussed; the arrival of an Arab prince was perceived as a feasible 
solution. Notably, ‘Abd Allāh’s message was at first pan-Arab and anti-
imperialist: his claimed goal was to retake Syria on behalf of the Arabs. 
It was within this context that Churchill asked him to form his own 
government in Amman (at first for a six month trial period; ‘Abd 
Allāh’s position became permanent in 1923 when Transjordan became 
an independent state under the British rule); in exchange for British 
economic support the prince agreed to prevent attacks against the 
French from his territory and, most importantly, he accepted the British 
policy in Palestine30. Accordingly, Britain marked the Palestine 
mandate alongside the Jordan-River until the Gulf of Aqaba and then 
gave the eastern part, named Transjordan, to ‘Abd Allāh31 who became 
                                                          
29 The Syrian Arab government of ‘Abd Allāh’s brother King Fayṣal (Fayṣal al-
Awwal ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Hāšimī,1885-1933), had been established in 1919 
and only one year later the San Remo Conference (1920) gave France the mandate of 
Syria: French won the Franco-Syrian war that had broken out in response to it and 
Fayṣal got expelled from the region. However, within the Cairo Conference (March 
12 to 30, 1921), British agreed to appoint Fayṣal king of the newly born Kingdom of 
Iraq. 
30 Betty S. Anderson, Nationalist Voices in Jordan: The Street and the State (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 2005), 37, 38. 
31 Bacik, op. cit., chs. 2 “Genesis of the Western Model in Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq” 
and 4 “Jordan: The Competition of Different Constituencies”. 
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the leader of both a Nation-State and a pan-Arab entity and this 
dichotomy characterized the Hashemite rule over Jordan throughout the 
whole 20th century. He relied on symbolic acts to straighten his position 
within Transjordan, such as for example a ritual procession from his 
palace through the city center to attend the Friday prayers. Furthermore, 
“laying new roads, erecting government buildings and telephone and 
telegraph poles […] was the visual manifestation of a central 
government which was slowly but steadily consolidating itself32”. But 
in the meantime, the King established the first organized military force 
in the country naming it the “Arab Legion” and never abandoned his 
transnational narrative even after the Revolution of 1923 that broke out 
under the slogan “Transjordan is for Transjordanians” advocating the 
expulsion of all the foreigners from the country, as the majority of the 
governmental, bureaucratic and military posts at the time were indeed 
filled by Syrian, Palestinian, Iraqi and Hijazi immigrants. In addition, 
over the years he incorporated the tribes33 into the state system through 
schooling and land reforms policies, thus making them a basic pillar of 
the Hashemite monarchy as they gradually transferred their group 
loyalty to the Nation-State. Notably, even though sedentary groups 
outnumbered the Bedouins, the latter were politically favoured since 
the very foundation of the Kingdom whose national character is 
associated with the tipically Bedouin virtues of honour, frugality and 
                                                          
32 Joab B. Eilon and Yoav Alon, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the 
Modern State (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 81. 
33 The main tribes present in Transjordan at the time of its creation were: the Ṣaḫr in 
the North ––in conflict with the al-Bištāwī of the Jordan Valley––, al-‘Adwān also in 
the Jordan Valley and al-Ḥuwayṭāt that dominated the region from Karak to Aqaba 
(divided into four branches). Besides there were other smaller tribes (allied against 
the powerful Ṣaḫr) such as al-Ruwala in the periphery of Damascus, the Ḫālid, the 
Ḥassān and the Sirḥān. The British modified their hierarchies and alliances by 
abolishing the ḫuwa (the protection tax that the tribes enforced on sedentary 
populations and that Circassians refused to pay) and by classifying the tribes into 
nomadic and semi-nomadic categories. Méouchy, op. cit., 217. 
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courage through what Massad (2001) defined as a process of “cultural 
tribalization”34.  
The first Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1928 recognized ‘Abd 
Allāh as the head of state with hereditary rights while after the second, 
held on 25 May 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan 
(renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949) was proclaimed 
independent and ‘Abd Allāh was crowned king in Amman under the 
name of ‘Abd Allāh I35. With the end of the 1948 war and the 
unification of the two banks in 1950, the Jordanian national identity 
became a combination of two elements (not yet two identities): Trans-
Jordanian and Palestinian. However, in the mid-Sixties, Palestinians 
started to gain some sort of political awareness and after the emergence 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian identity 
gained distinctiveness and social divisions began. Moreover, the 1967 
defeat meant the demise of the Pan-Arab ideology which in turn lead to 
the emergence of a narrower Jordanian national identity, different from 
the Arab and the Palestinian ones. Finally, the conflict exploded in 
1970: Black September re-defined the country’s national identity and 
the Trans-Jordanian identity was revealed to be intrinsically tribal, 
Islamic and Hashemite. In 1974 the Arab League indicated the PLO as 
the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians in occupied lands 
and in the diaspora and in 1988 King Ḥusayn announced the 
administrative disengagement of the West Bank (fakk al-irtibāṭ). 
The next sub-section will retrace the intertwined history of 
Palestine and (Trans)Jordan starting from the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
and the mandate era to the Jordanian disengagement of the West Bank, 
                                                          
34 Massad, op. cit., 67. 
35 ‘Abd Allāh I’s son Ṭalāl reigned only one year as he was forced to abdicate by the 
Parliament due to mental illness in 1952 and succeeded by his son Ḥusayn. Ḥusayn 
remained in power until his death in 1999 and was in turn succeeded by his son ‘Abd 
Allāh II, now in power. 
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with the aim of detailing the Palestinian role in the nation-building 
process of Jordan and how it still threatens the citizenry and national 
identity of the Levantine country.  
2.1 Jordanians of Palestinian origin 
Indeed, the agreement concluded in 1916 between Sir Mark 
Sykes and Georges Picot called for the partition of the area into three 
zones: The Blue zone in the north (that included Cilicia and the coast 
from Alexandretta to Acre) was assigned to the French; the Red zone 
(present-day Iraq, the Negev region and the southern part of 
Transjordan) in the south to the British and Brown zone in the center 
(essentially covering the areas immediately surrounding Jerusalem, 
Nazareth, and Bethlehem) was left under an international 
administration (a tripartite condominium of France, Britain, and Russia) 
that would guarantee free access to the holy places. 
However, it was with the 1920 conference of San Remo that the 
future of the area was defined: Syria has been given to France, while 
Britain gained the mandatory power over Mesopotamia and Palestine 
mostly respecting the frontiers of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, with the 
important exception that the proposed international Brown Zone was 
made an integral part of the mandatory award to Britain. Then, the 
mandate was amended to divide Palestine from Transjordan (which 
nonetheless remained technically part of the mandate)36 thus excluding 
the latter from all the clauses concerning the establishment of a Jewish 
                                                          
36 The revised Article 25 stated: “In the territories lying between the Jordan and the 
eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be 
entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or 
withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider 
inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the 
administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions”. 
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national home37. In fact, article 25 of the Palestinian Mandate was 
implemented in 1922 via the Transjordan memorandum, which 
established a separate “Administration of Transjordan” under the 
general supervision of Great Britain. Anyhow, after the British left, the 
mandate was divided into three geopolitical entities: Israel, the West 
Bank annexed to Jordan and the Gaza Strip controlled by Egypt 
(according to the 1949 Rhodes Armistice and until 196738). However, 
as stressed by Feldman (2008), “from the Egyptian perspective, Gaza 
was always Palestinian and its future lay as part of a Palestinian state 
[…] thus Palestinian sovereignty […] remained latent, awaiting the 
moment when it could be actualized”39. This policy helped Egypt in 
maintaining and legitimizing its rule over Gaza, as the nation he 
presented itself as only a caretaker of the Palestinian space, while 
Jordan chose the more “aggressive” standpoint of annexation. 
After the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the first 
Arab-Israeli war that followed, on April 24, 1950 the Jordan House of 
Deputies and House of Notables adopted a resolution40 declaring 
Complete unity between the two sides of the Jordan [river] and 
their union in one state […] at whose head reigns King Abdullah 
Ibn al Hussain, on a basis of constitutional representative 
government and equality of the rights and duties of all citizens41. 
                                                          
37 Martin Sicker, Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate 
(Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), 116-167. 
38 “Egypt, unlike Jordan, succeeded in persuading the Israelis, already in 1967, that 
for them the Gaza Strip was a liability and would never form part of Egypt. So a 
million and half Palestinians remained an “Israeli” problem and responsibility— 
although geographically the Strip is located on the margins of the state of Israel, 
psychologically it was still in 2006 very much in its midst”. Noam Chomsky, Ilan 
Pappe and Frank Barat. Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel's War against the 
Palestinians (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2010), 84. 
39 Ilana Feldman, “Waiting for Palestine: refracted citizenship and latent sovereignty 
in Gaza,” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 5 (2008): 453. 
40 Ilan Pappé, The Modern Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2010), 34. 
41 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, “The Constituent Assembly. First Knesset 
1949-1951. Annexation of the West Bank by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Sitting 135 - 3 May 1950,” http://www.jcpa.org/art/knesset6.htm  
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The unification tripled Jordan’s population as nearly 500,000 
Palestinians became citizens42, meaning that they were given a 
“national number”, a civil registration number recorded on national 
identity cards and family registration books. However, after the 
assassination of ‘Abd Allāh in 1951, the Citizenship Code was amended 
(in 1954) and a four-year residency in the country became a prerequisite 
for naturalization, a process that became tougher and tougher over the 
years mainly because of the pressures exerted on the government by the 
tribal groups, afraid of losing their privileges (a standpoint not shared 
by the Islamists, according to whom Palestinians and Jordanians should 
have the same rights as they are part of the same umma). Additionally, 
the term Palestine was replaced with “West Bank” and the Jordanian 
dinār became the only valid currency of the country. In fact, king 
Ḥusayn abandoned the Pan-Arab discourse of his predecessor looking 
for a Jordanian nationalism that could give stability to his state. 
Moreover, after the 1967 defeat, a new flux of refugees fled to 
Jordan (about 350,000) and the PLO made of the East Bank its 
“headquarters”; the Fedayeen (fidāʾiyyīn, Palestinian militants of 
nationalist orientation) begun to run their operations from the refugee 
camps in Jordan basically developing a state within a state with the 
support of Jordanians critical of the Hashemites and their policies. This 
represented an exemplary domestic-sovereignty crisis to which king 
Ḥusayn responded—after the guerrillas hijacked several Israeli and 
American airplanes—by declaring martial law and appointing a loyal 
Bedouin soldier as commander-in-Chief of the army. In 1970, with the 
support of Israel and the United States, and thanks to the tribal 
legitimation, Jordan managed to expel the PLO (recognized as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people within the 1974 Arab 
                                                          
42 Eilon and Alon, op. cit., 152. 
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summit of Rabat) forces from the country while the Fedayeen were 
forced to recognize Jordanian sovereignty43. Then, in 1983 the 
Hashemite government introduced color-coded travel cards (green for 
the WB residents and yellow for those who have moved to the EB44) 
for Jordanians of Palestinian origin with the stated aim of shortening 
their travel procedures to and from the West Bank under Israeli 
occupation; however, the system essentially generated three classes of 
citizenship by differentiating East and West Bank Jordanians, in turn 
sub divided into two groups. Finally, the situation of those form Gaza 
is the most critical. In fact, they reflect a dual-minority status, that is, as 
Palestinians vs. Jordanians and also as Gazans vs. the Palestinians 
themselves. Also, they represent an anomaly being doubly displaced 
refugees, forced to move after the 194845 conflict and then again after 
the 1967 defeat. In 1948 they were issued Egyptian travel documents as 
Egypt was in charge of the military and administrative rule in Gaza at 
the time46. After 1967 some fled to Lebanon, some to Jordan. The latter 
                                                          
43 Bacik, op. cit., 142-157. 
44 After 1988, “those Palestinians holding green cards no longer held a valid Jordanian 
national number and since 1992 the Jordanian government has only issued national 
numbers to those of Jordanian nationality. These people were granted temporary 
passports from the Jordanian authorities, renewable every two years and later 
extended to five years in 1995 (RRT 2009). For those green card West Bankers who 
no longer held a Jordanian national number, their status became equal to blue card 
holding ex-Gazan 'displaced persons.' Those who held yellow cards maintained their 
Jordanian citizenship”. Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development (ARDD)-
Legal Aid, “Mapping the Legal Obstacles Palestinians Face in Jordan” (March 2015), 
https://ardd-jo.org/sites/default/files/resource-
files/mapping_the_legal_obstacles_palestinians_face_in_jordan_en.pdf  
45 The 1948 naḥba displaced about 750,000 Palestinians that fled both to neighboring 
countries such as Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, and to the parts of Mandate Palestine 
that later became the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Ilana Feldman, “The Challenge 
of Categories: UNRWA and the Definition of a ‘Palestine Refugee’,” Journal of 
Refugee Studies 25, no. 3, (2012): 390. 
46 “Under the existing Jordanian system, anyone who was born in Gaza or whose father 
was born in Gaza is given a blue card to use when travelling. This necessitates a 
special security clearance prior to entering Jordan. This security clearance is required 
even if the person in question is transiting to another country via Jordan; it takes weeks 
or even months to be processed and is often denied without a clear reason”. Samar 
Batrawi, “The noose tightens: Jordan adds to the suffering of Gaza's Palestinians,” 
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(between 118,000 and 150,000), prevented from going to Egypt 
because of the Israeli attacks on the Sinai—with the exception of few 
influential families—never gained citizenship47. Instead, they were 
initially issued temporary travel documents to replace the Egyptian 
ones, then a one-year temporary “passport” the validity of which was 
later extended to three years. Finally, since the Eighties this passport, 
that is in fact only a residency permit, needs to be renewed every 2 
years48 and has value as an international travel document only if the 
receiving state allows the entry of temporary passport holders49.  
Moreover, Gazans are not allowed to register with professional 
unions or to establish their own offices, firms or clinics, thus the 
available jobs for them are either in the private sector after getting the 
approval of the state or the informal sector; as for the education they are 
included in the 5% quota reserved for Arab foreigners, thus it is not easy 
for them to enroll in university, their only option left being UNRWA 
aid (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
                                                          
Middle East Eye (28 May 2016), https://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/jordan-
adding-suffering-palestinians-gaza-58472352  
47 In the present-day Jordan there are several categories of citizenship that vary 
depending on the origin of the citizens: Jordanian - East Banker (Permanent residency 
in Jordan. Five-year passport with National Number); Jordanian - Palestinian of 1948 
(Permanent residency in Jordan. Five-year passport with National Number); Jordanian 
- Palestinian of 1967 (Permanent residency in Jordan. Five-year passport with 
National Number. Yellow Card - family reunification); Jordanian - Palestinian of 
1967 (Permanent residency in the West Bank. Five-year passport without National 
Number. Green Card); Jordanian - Palestinian from Jerusalem (Permanent residency 
in Jerusalem. Five-year passport without National Number. Green Card); Palestinians 
of Gaza (Permanent residency in Jordan. Two-year temporary passport in case of 
family reunification. Blue Card); Palestinian of the West Bank or Gaza Strip 
(Permanent residency in West Bank or Gaza Strip. Palestinian Authority passport [LP] 
Permission to enter). 
48 Recently the Palestinians from Gaza have been requested to pay a fee of 200 
Jordanian dinars (almost 300 dollars) instead of 25 as it was in the past in order to 
renew their temporary documents. Muhammad ‘Aish, “The Gazans’ sufferance in 
Jordan,” Al Quds al-Arabi (February 21, 2017), http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=677541  
49 See Oroub al-Abed, “Immobile Palestinians: ongoing plight of Gazans in Jordan”. 
Forced Migration Review no. 26 (august 2006), https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-
palestinian-territory/forced-migration-review-no-26-palestinian-displacement-case  
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Refugees in the Near East whose funds have been recently cut by the 
Trump administration50), if they are eligible as the agency’s mandate is 
limited to those who “lost both their homes and means of livelihood”51.  
Besides, as the women in Jordan cannot pass on their citizenship 
to their children, the daughters and the sons of Jordanian female 
nationals and Gazans remain stateless52. Nowadays and already for 
three or even four generations many of them live in two refugee camps 
run by UNRWA, the Gaza Camp in the Jerash district and the Mārkā 
Camp (known as Ḥiṭṭīn) in the eponymous district. I had the possibility 
to access to the Gaza Camp and collect interesting testimonies. The 
majority of the people that I interviewed came to Jordan in their 
childhood and never left the camp but all maintained a fierce Palestinian 
identity and hope to one day return to their true homeland. Indeed, a 41 
year old woman said: 
I am born in al-‘Arīš [the Egyptian governorate of North Sinai 
which borders Palestine], I came here when I was 40 days old. I 
am a refugee. I have been raised here in the camp, I got married 
and I remained in the camp. I never went out. I studied here but 
I could not look for a governmental job because I do not have a 
national number. 
While a 61 years old woman who teaches to disabled children 
in the camp stressed the double displacement endured by her family: 
My family is from Bi’r al-saba‘ [the largest city in the Negev 
desert]. They emigrated in Gaza in 1948 and then in Jordan in 
                                                          
50 See for example Peter Beaumont and Oliver Holmes, “US confirms end to funding 
for UN Palestinian refugees,” The Guardian (Friday 31 Aug 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/trump-to-cut-all-us-funding-for-
uns-main-palestinian-refugee-programme 
51 See Ilana Feldman, “Difficult Distinctions: Refugee Law, Humanitarian Practice, 
and Political Identification in Gaza,” Cultural Anthropology 22, no. 1, (2007): 129-
169. 
52 See West Asia-North Africa Institute (WANA), “Women And The Law In Jordan: 
Islam as a Path to Reform” (October 2016), http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/amman/12930.pdf  
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1967. I was born in Gaza but I don’t know anything about it, we 
came here when I was 4 years old, the camp at first had tents, 
then containers then finally real houses like now. […]  
Finally, the following words express very well the strength of 
the Palestinian identity within the community: 
I was born in 1966, my family emigrated in 1967. So of course I 
did not see Palestine and I have never lived in it. But I love 
Palestine, Palestine is my country. Palestine is everything to me. 
I would never give up on my nationality or on my country and I 
know that one day we will go back. We are here in Jordan only 
as guests. 
However, continuing along an ideal time line, in the Eighties, 
because of king Ḥusayn’s new “nationalist” discourse, many Jordanians 
of Palestinian origin lost their jobs in the public sector and in the media, 
while the Jordanian Jordanians started to dominate the bureaucracy and 
the army. Later on, due to the latest events and after the 1987 Intifada, 
King Ḥusayn acknowledged that the Palestinian people had voluntarily 
elected the PLO as their representative, abandoning his old narrative 
according to which the very existence of the organization was to be 
considered an Arab imposition over the Palestinian people. “From this 
premise”, he affirmed in Radio Amman on May 3, 1988, that Jordan 
could “not carry any more burdens”. Eight years after stating that “[…] 
Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan” (1981), the king formalized 
the disengagement suddenly nullifying the Jordanian citizenship of an 
estimated 1.5 million Palestinian-Jordanians which resided in the West 
Bank at that time and making them stateless people under Israeli 
occupation. Over time such withdrawals of nationality occurred again; 
in fact, the Jordanian officials stated that, in order to maintain the 
Jordanian nationality, Jordanians of Palestinian origin must renew their 
Israeli residency permit, for it grants their right to return to the West 
Bank. Accordingly, those who could not renew the permit or even those 
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who hold an open-ended residency permit that does not need to be 
renewed had their nationality withdrawn with serious consequences for 
their lives (education, healthcare, driving licenses, job market access 
etc.)53.  
In conclusion, quoting Susser: 
Jordan still has vital interests in Palestine. But ever since King 
Hussein’s decision to disengage from the West Bank in 1988, 
the Jordanians have been on the horns of a dilemma. Jordan’s 
quandary is how to remain involved and influential in 
Palestinian affairs without assuming responsibility for the 
destiny of the Palestinians, and without tying Jordan to Palestine 
too closely for the comfort of the East Bank élite, forever on 
guard against an erosion of their dominance by a Palestinian 
majority54. 
2.2 The Jordanian Circassians 
In Jordan, where the Hashemite ruling group is itself a (foreign) 
“minority” despite its control of the state apparatus, an analysis of the 
peculiar Circassian ethnic minority and (transnational) diaspora proves 
to be very interesting as it helps to better understand the complex 
Jordanian society from a different perspective. Accordingly, this 
section aims to highlight the development of its identity formation by 
retracing the key steps of the Circassian settlement in present-day 
Jordan. The discussion will be enriched by some insightful excerpts 
from three interviews made to two Jordanian Circassians and one 
Syrian Circassian resident in Kuwait City. 
                                                          
53 Human Rights Watch, “Stateless Again. Palestinian-Origin Jordanians Deprived of 
their Nationality” (February 1, 2010), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/01/stateless-again/palestinian-origin-
jordanians-deprived-their-nationality 
54 Asher Susser, “Jordan: Preserving Domestic Order in a Setting of Regional 
Turmoil”, Middle East Brief 27 (March 2008): p. 3. 
199 
 
Indeed, the very nature of diaspora communities poses a more 
serious challenge to host societies than do other minorities as they 
implicitly test the limits of pluralism of the country in which they live. 
In fact, when dealing with them the host country has to decide whether 
to forbid all cultural and organizational expressions of diaspora 
sentiment for the sake of the Nation-State’s survival or encourage such 
expressions as politically innocuous manifestations of a sub political 
identity55. 
Interestingly, the Jordanian Circassians enjoy a relative 
autonomy and have been able to maintain and preserve over time their 
distinct ethnic identity within the host country due to both historical and 
political reasons. Nevertheless, nowadays many accuse the Jordanian 
government of trying to erase other identities, above all the Palestinian 
one, through for example the educational initiatives launched by the 
king in the recent years and mentioned above. The hybrid nature of the 
Jordanian monarchy and its tribal component are topical in this regard.  
In fact, the co-existence of traditional and European-like 
loyalties and the lack of domestic sovereignty which is intertwined with 
the significance of the familiar (tribal) bonds of the Jordanian society 
that still prevent the creation of impersonal bureaucratic relations, 
contributed to shaping both the Jordanian and in turn the Jordanian 
Circassian identities. Indeed the latter articulated its own self alongside 
the main steps of the state-building and nation-building process 
experienced by the newborn Jordanian state, meaning the end of the 
Ottoman rule, the British mandate, the Pan-Arabism triumph and its 
demise, and the disengagement of the West Bank. 
                                                          
55 William Safran, “Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return,” 
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 97. 
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In the mid-19th century, when the Ottomans seemed to reassert 
direct control in the northern part of the present-day Jordan, they 
encouraged the Circassians, blindly loyal to their Sunni masters, to 
settle in the area, especially to help contain the Bedouins56 that 
unsurprisingly did not receive them in a friendly manner because the 
Circassian refugee community, according to the 1858 Refugee Code, 
was exempt from paying taxes to the Empire. Moreover, they refused 
to pay the ḫuwa57, the protection payment requested by the Bedouins. 
However, the ability in war—especially as horsemen—the technical 
skills in the agricultural sector, the resilient devotion to Sunni Islam, 
and the indestructible loyalty to the Sublime Porte, made the 
Circassians the perfect buffer zone between the settled areas in 
Palestine and the desert tribes. The Ottomans wanted them to straighten 
the people’s faith and give their contribution to developing the country; 
in time, they also received the task to guard the Hijaz railroad, arrived 
in Transjordan in 190558. The first Circassian group settled in Amman 
between February and August 187859 and, by the early 1920s, when the 
capital (or what might be better referred to as the first administrative 
center) of Transjordan was still al-Salt, Amman was described as a 
“Circassian village” or “Circassian town”60.  
                                                          
56 Peter Gubser, Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
(Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1991), 63. 
57 See Fidelity and William Lancaster, People, Land and Water in the Arab Middle 
East: Environments and Landscapes in the Bilad ash-Sham (New York: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 76, 213, 300, 345-347. 
58 In 1905 Mizra Wasfi Pasha, the head of their community, asked Istanbul the 
permission to form a volunteer cavalry unit, as the Circassians were willing “to offer 
their lives in sacrifice to the homeland”: The Volunteer Circassian Cavalry of over 
1200 soldiers actively defended the Hijaz Railway and fought against the Arabs in the 
1916 Revolt. Eugene Rogan, The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle 
East (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 367. 
59 Ibid., 70. Interestingly, my interviewees dated the first settlement much earlier, in 
1864. 
60 Abu Nour Assab, “Narratives of Ethnicity and Nationalism. A Case Study of 
Circassians in Jordan,” PhD Diss. University of Warwick, 2010-2011), 29-31. 
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During World War I the Circassians remained loyal to the 
Ottoman Empire, therefore, after the war their position became very 
insecure for two reasons: first, the British preferred to deal with the 
Arab tribes; second, Nationalism in the Arab lands after the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire took the form of pan-Arabism rather than pan-
Islamism, so non-Arabs of Transjordan founded themselves in danger 
of being excluded from the public and political spheres61. 
This is the background of the arrival of amīr ‘Abd Allāh in 
Ma‘ān (south of Amman) in 1920. As already mentioned, Prince ‘Abd 
Allāh initially came with the intention of raising an army and marching 
on Damascus to restore his brother Fayṣal to the throne of Syria, and 
the governor of the city of Salt immediately informed him that the Arab 
tribes were against any political purpose from his side. Therefore, 
Circassians became a natural ally of the king to-be: they were a stable 
minority, with a long tradition of successes against the local tribes and 
they owned a large portion of land in Amman and the surrounding area.  
Moreover, from the Circassian point of view, ‘Abd Allāh was 
an ideal champion: Sunni-Muslim, descendant of the Prophet, and in 
need of a local military force. He never forgot the loyalty and the 
allegiance plied by Circassians at an uncertain time for him and his 
family, therefore it is at this time that the privileged status of the 
Circassian minority started. Quoting Weightman (1961)62: 
Of all the ethnic minorities in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
none occupies a higher position of social importance nor wields 
such tremendous political and economic power than does a 
related group of people known in English as Circassians and in 
Arabic as the Sharakisa. 
                                                          
61 Walter Richmond, The Circassian Genocide (New Brunswick, New Jersey, and 
London: Rutgers University Press, 2015), 123-125. 
62 Geroge H. Weighman, “The Circassians,” in Readings in Arab Middle Eastern 
Societies and Cultures ed. Abdulla M. Lutfiyya, Charles W. Churchill (The Hague: 
Mouton & Co. N. V. Publishers, 1970), 92.  
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Indeed, ‘Abd Allāh accepted their proposal of establishing a 
personal bodyguard for the prince, composed of Circassians in their 
traditional dress (black wool hats, red capes and leather boots; 16 
decorative rifle cartridges on the chests: traditionally one held honey 
for sustenance and another held poison to allow suicide if captured, or 
to place in a slot in their sword). The Royal Bodyguard still exists even 
if today it is a strictly ceremonial unit composed by 14 members (out of 
40). Each and every member has been chosen from the various 
Circassian tribes in Jordan by Ġāzi Bilāl Qalā‘, head of the Royal 
Circassian Guards, now retired. In order to officially become royal 
guards, the candidates must attend an eight-month training that includes 
self-defense, security, palace protocol, and basic military techniques63. 
Regarding the Royal guards Dr. ‘Azmī64 added that they must 
be Circassians “from mother and father”. Moreover, speaking of  the 
present king he said: 
He speaks Circassian, he knows how to dance [like a] 
Circassian […]. We have a special relation. 
‘Alī65 described the birth of the privileged relation between the 
Circassian minority and the ruling family with emotional words: 
Prince ‘Abd Allāh I arrived in the area called ǧabal l-quṣūr [the 
castles’ mountain], where today there is Raġadān Palace [the 
Royal palace, from the Arabic word raġad, a comfortable life]. 
He announced his arrival to the Arab tribes with a missive, 
informing them that he wanted to give support to the Arab 
                                                          
63 “Rare look at the world of Jordan royals’ Circassian guards,” Al-Arabiya 
(1/29/2016), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/variety/2016/01/29/Rare-look-at-the-
world-of-Jordan-royals-Circassian-guards.html  
64 Open, semi-structured interview made in June, 2017 in Amman. Gender: male; age: 
40; level of education: high (PhD); religion: Islam; language of the interview: English. 
Dr. ‘Azmī is the former President of the Circassian Charity Association.  
65 Open, semi-structured interview made in June, 2017 in Amman. Gender: male; age: 
35; level of education: high (PhD); religion: Islam; language of the interview: Arabic 
(here in the English translation). ‘Alī Kašt is a young scholar and author of the book 
The Internal Conflict in the Northern Circassian Caucasus: Study and Analysis 
(2009). 
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Revolution in Syria against the French, and in Palestine against 
the British. However, his arrival was received with protests. 
[…] All the tribes refused his authority and decided to team up 
in order to defeat him. When he reached Amman, Circassians 
felt the duty to protect him, since he is a descendant of Prophet 
Mohammad. They surrounded his campsite with stunning 
Circassian horses… it was in that exact place that he later built 
the Royal Palace. In order to give recognition to Circassians for 
that generous gesture, the Hashemite family decided that the 
Royal Guard must be formed by Circassians. 
Following an ideal timeline, when Prince ‘Abd Allāh finally 
took the power internationally supported by the British, in 1928 the 
promulgation of several laws positively affected the Circassian and the 
Christian communities. In fact, until 1928 Transjordan was governed 
without constitution and both the British and the amīr were eager to 
give some sort of legitimacy to the new born state; accordingly, they 
concluded the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty on February, 20 1928. Part 
III of the 1928 Transjordan Organic Law dealt with the legislature and 
contained a special section regarding the proportional representation of 
the Christian and Circassian minorities. They were both 
overrepresented: one seat was reserved to a Circassian for every 5,000 
inhabitants, while the rest of the population got one seat for every 
27,00066. Dr. ‘Azmī added: 
[…] the Circassians and the Christians in Jordan have quotes 
in the Parliament. Because of our regulation, there must be a 
representative for ethnic and religious [minorities] in Jordan 
within the Parliament... so [since] the Circassians have peculiar 
language and origins... they have to be represented; we have 3 
representatives in the People House, and the Christians… I 
think they have 12 seats there67. 
                                                          
66 Jacob M. Landau, Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Middle East 
(London: Routledge, 1972), chapter 6. 
67 Christians have actually 3 seats, same as Circassians. In the House of 
Representatives, 115 members are elected from 23 electoral districts using open list 
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If in the Thirties the primary role of the Circassians in 
Transjordan was in the military, later their principal career was 
agriculture and by the early Forties, they gained the reputation of a 
wealthy class of landlords68. In the Seventies, the process of 
assimilation of the Circassians within the local community reached its 
apex and, as stressed by Rannut (2009) they needed to make strong 
efforts to preserve their language, customs and traditions: 
The Circassian language in Jordan has no official or even 
recognized status, it is just a tolerated language which is not 
promoted by the government. […] Currently there is one private 
school and two kindergartens in Amman where Circassian is 
taught as a subject. The Circassian language is an optional extra 
and not included in the curriculum, it is neither graded nor 
assessed. This even in the only Circassian school in Jordan69. 
‘Alī confirmed the little regard given to the Circassian language 
even by the teachers of Amīr Hamza, the sole Circassian school of the 
country: 
I attended Amīr Hamza primary school […]. There they did 
teach me Circassian language but not… How can I tell you, not 
as an official language, they did not focus on it very much, it 
was like an extra subject. They taught me how to read and write 
in Circassian but they were teaching you only if you were really 
willing to learn, without insisting too much. 
Moreover, the number of intermarriages increased and some 
Circassians men have taken Arab women as wives. Despite this fact, 
and their contributions to the wellness of the nation (for example, the 
Mufti family, a notable Circassian clan, helped to establish the 
                                                          
proportional representation. 15 seats are reserved for women and 9 seats are reserved 
for Christians, Chechens, and Circassians. Election Guide, “Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan”, http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2965/ 
68 Bruce Douglas Mackey, “Circassians in Jordan” (PhD Diss., Naval Postgraduate 
School of California, 1979), 39-70. 
69 Ulle Rannut, “Circassian language maintenance in Jordan,” Journal of Multilingual 
and Multicultural Development 30, no. 4 (2009): 308. 
205 
 
Jordanian National Bank) they are still perceived as outsiders by part of 
the Jordanian population70. 
Dr. ‘Azmī stressed throughout the whole interview the role of 
Circassians in the development of Amman from both the cultural and 
the economic point of view: 
When we came to Jordan, Amman was nearly empty, we started 
to build Amman, and we gave life back to the city. […] One of 
the Prime Ministers in Jordan was a Circassian71, and was the 
Senate president for a few years. The first judge in Jordan, was 
a Circassian... we have also the first heart surgeon, a woman, 
she's a Circassian Jordanian. 
In conclusion, the Circassian identity built itself through the 
Caucasian war and the exodus to the Ottoman Empire, and took 
different shapes depending on the region of the Empire where each 
community settled, on its relations with the central power and its 
peculiarities. In Jordan, the hybrid nature of the regime alongside the 
privileged position enjoyed by the minority and their utter loyalty to the 
ruling family, somehow prevented the formation of a genuine 
Circassian national movement. Even though the Circassian minority 
generally speaking falls within Nina Glick Schiller’s (2004) category 
of Long-Distance Nationalism – “a set of identity claims and practices 
that connect people living in various geographic locations to a specific 
territory that they see as their ancestral home”72–, the Jordanian 
Circassians perceive themselves to be both Circassian and Jordanian 
and, albeit they stress the importance of maintaining and preserving 
                                                          
70 Richmond, op. cit., 126. 
71 Sa’īd al-Muftī served as the Prime Minister of Jordan for 3 times since April, 14 
1950 to the first of July 1956. 
72 Nina Glick Schiller, “Long-Distance Nationalism,” in Encyclopedia of Diasporas: 
Immigrant and Refugee Cultures around the World, ed. Melvin Ember, Carol R. 
Ember and Ian Skoggard (New Haven: HRAF Yale University & Springer, 2004), 
570. 
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their linguistic and cultural roots and continue to  consider the Caucasus 
their true motherland, they never question the legitimacy of their king.  
Circassians in the Middle East asked themselves many questions in the 
course of the time, questions mostly left unanswered but revealing of 
this people’s self-struggle: why did they leave the Caucasus, were they 
pushed out by the Russians or pulled in by the Ottomans? Are they 
primarily Circassians or Muslims, and how does this affect their 
relationship with Arabs and Turks? Does intermarriage lead to the 
disappearance of community or to the consolidation of alliances? How 
can they have political influence through participation while preserving 
their cultural integrity? 
According to Dr. ‘Azmī, the fate of the Circassians was decided 
mostly by Ottomans: 
[…] the Turks convinced the Circassians to fight for them 
against the Russians, so that the Russians were busy with that 
fight, and Turks could take the Balkan area. […] At the end of 
the war, when the Circassians lost, the Turks went to the Qafqās 
[Caucasus] […] and told them: if you want to stay alive and 
protect your religion [Islam], follow us; so the Circassians went 
with the Turks to the Middle East and other parts where the 
Turks would use them as trained soldiers for their fights in that 
time. The majority went to Turkey, the second majority went to 
Syria and Palestine, because the civilization was there. The 
minority came to Jordan and settled here. 
While ‘Alī, stressed the importance of a ‘nationalistic 
education’, thus implicitly emphasizing the significance of the 
Homeland Myth as it “solidifies ethnic consciousness and solidarity 
when religion can no longer do so”73: 
Circassians grow up as refugees. Where is their identity? Will 
they become true Circassians? Nowadays a Circassian State 
doesn’t even exist and Circassian people lack national 
                                                          
73 Safran op. cit., 91. 
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awareness. […] Circassians born here [in Jordan] need a 
“nationalistic education”. If I will have a son, I must explain 
him that, yes, he is born in Jordan but his homeland is the 
Caucasus. […] The national identity criterion is better than the 
religious one because there is difference between Muslims, 
Christians, Sunna, Shi’a, but the nationalistic umbrella unifies 
everyone. Following the “original” ethnicity. 
Moreover, while in Turkey Circassian identity takes the form of 
minority politics, in Jordan it presents itself as tribalism embodied by 
the establishmtnt in 1980 of a Cricassian-Chechen Tribal Council74. 
Regarding this, ‘Alī said: 
The tribal structure is still predominant in the Middle Eastern 
States. Sectarianism is prevailing, no one truly belongs to a 
Nation State in the proper sense of the term. […]. If, God 
forbids, I get in trouble here in Jordan, if I fight with someone 
for example, my cousin, all my relatives, even the entire 
Circassian community has to come to protect me. That is the 
meaning of clan. 
Finally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a 
decisive moment in the Circassian history as the motherland, until that 
time only a place to yearn for, suddenly became a reality. The 
community adopted a new form of nationhood freed from the 
boundaries of the Nation-State, entering the “new matrix of transglobal 
network nation” highlighted by Laguerre (2009), a dimension that 
suggests the “de-territorialization” of the nation as its borders expand 
beyond the state’s territorial jurisdiction75. Within such a dimension the 
Circassians share a sort of “racialized” identity exemplified in their 
recurrent use of metaphors of blood as only blood ties can legitimize 
                                                          
74 Shami Seteney, “Displacement, Historical Memory and Identity: Circassians in 
Jordan,” Population Displacement and Resettlement 1, (1994): 625. 
75 Michel S. Laguerre, “The Transglobal Network Nation: Diaspora, Homeland and 
Hostland,” in Transnationalism Diasporas and the advent of a new (dis)order ed. 
Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzhak Sternberg with Judit Bokser Liwerant and Yosef 
Gorny (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2009), 196-210. 
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their transnational bonds. Relevant to this point are the words of 
Aḥmad, a 34 years’ old Syrian-Circassian born in Kuwait76, who 
decided not to marry ever in his life since there are no Syrian-Circassian 
women of his age in Kuwait: 
I'm single cause I'm šarkasī, and you wanna get people like me. 
[…] It's like keeping ourselves from being extinguished. Most of 
the šarkass are like this, some people say they're racist, because 
you're not allowing anyone outside [the community] to come 
inside... but for me because my family left Russia more than 200 
years ago, so we have now pure Circassian blood, I won’t give 
this blood away, ok? 
However, the long-dreamed journey “back” had been for many 
everything but easy: for example, Circassians in the Caucasus see 
themselves as dark (they are the “dark Southerners”) and are described 
as such by the Russians, while Circassians in the Middle East are seen 
by Turks and Arabs as blonde and beautiful (a vestige of their historical 
relationship to Ottoman courts and harems). Therefore, Circassian 
visitors from the Middle East perceive a physical difference between 
them, and the dark locals. This difference is not accepted as a 
reasonable diversity within a common biologically-imagined ethnicity 
but as an opposition. Consequently, the Caucasus somehow lost its 
symbolic value as the place where one could finally reunite with the 
                                                          
76 Open, semi-structured interview made in March, 2017 in Kuwait City. Gender: 
male; age: 34; level of education: high (Master degree); religion: Islam; language of 
the interview: English. Aḥmad represents a minority within a minority being Syrian 
and Circassian but born and resident in a non-inclusive rentier state such as Kuwait. 
The Circassian community of the Emirate consists only of few families and does not 
get any official recognition from the government that instead of acknowledging its 
existence marginalizes it. Compared with the Circassian-Jordanian community it is 
much more closed and less inclined to integrate with the natives. Inter-racial marriages 
are not socially accepted and, paraphrasing Aḥmad words, safeguarding the “purity” 
of Circassian blood is a priority. In fact, the social and legal marginalization 
experienced by all the expats in the Gulf region, reinforced the sub-identities, thus 
Aḥmad defined himself as Circassian (while many Jordanian Circassians put these 
two identity sources, national and ethnic, at the same level) and picked his family as 
the community to which he primarily perceive to belong. 
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inner self, revealing an alienating face and an unknown nature. The 
question that is now posed to the newly formed diaspora is not only 
how, but also where one can be truly Circassian. Seteney Shami (1998), 
director-General at the Arab Council for the Social Sciences, explained 
this “territorial” issue and its implications as follows: 
It is not only the mobility of people beyond national boundaries 
that transforms identity but the problematization of the nature of 
boundaries and borders that creates the possibility for, and may 
impose, a condition of post-nationality. This condition is 
marked by the production of ‘diasporic public spheres’ and ‘non 
territorial principles of solidarity’. […] Territoriality can no 
longer be regarded as the prime regulator of the international 
order. The resultant […] is a transition from territory to space 
[...]77.  
In conclusion, Circassians had many faces over time: they are 
dark Southerners in the Caucasus and fair blond men in the Middle East; 
they were members of an ancient chief-less community used to living 
at the margins of central powers; they have been pagans, then 
Christians, then mystics and finally Orthodox Muslims. They have been 
described as savage Easterners by Russians, and used as champions of 
the Sunni Islam and skilled warriors by Ottomans. They were minorities 
imprisoned in the states born after the dissolution of the Ottoman 
Empire and became self-conscious transnational diasporas after the 
collapse of Soviet communism. After four centuries they still recognize 
themselves as Circassians but they do not have a State to consider their 
own, therefore their community became their motherland and in this 
sense their identity shifted from ‘territoriality’ to ‘space’. Will they be 
able to preserve their identity now that it gained this peculiar 
transnational dimension? And, above all, will they be able to define 
themselves in concert and not in opposition with ‘the other’, breaking 
                                                          
77 Seteney, op. cit., 642. 
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the chains of the power-centric domination that controlled their history 
until today? 
3. The State of Kuwait 
In the 17th century, present-day Kuwait was known as “Qurain” 
(from qarn, high hill). However, between 1672 and 1680, a šayḫ of the 
banī ḫālid (the tribe that ruled eastern Arabia at the time) built a kūt 
(fort) in the area, henceforth called Kuwait, literally “small fort”. 
The Gulf Emirate has been ruled for almost two hundred and 
fifty years by the Āl Ṣabāḥ, one of the families of the ‘Utūb tribal 
confederation—along with the al-Ḫalīfa (that then became the ruling 
family of Bahrein) and the al-Ğalāhma—that arrived in the area around 
1710 coming from the region of Najd, in the North East of the Arabian 
Peninsula78. 
Quoting al-Hajeri (2015): 
Kuwaiti identity, from the early beginnings, has always been 
structurally complex, based on two components: The first 
component is represented by the Bedouin tribes who settled in 
Kuwait; the second component is represented by the small 
groups and individuals who were already living in ‘Al-Kut’ or 
those who came and settled after the arrival of the tribes. These 
two components constituted the community of the Emirate79. 
Before the British colonization, Kuwait was a marginal and 
autonomous kaza (sub-district) of the Basra vilayet under the Ottoman 
rule, thus it was considered an integral part of Iraq as it provided its 
natural access to the Persian Gulf. In 1871, Midhat Pasha (d.1883) in 
order to bring Kuwait closer to the Ottoman administration, named 
                                                          
78 Michael S. Casey, The History of Kuwait (Westport, Connecticut, London: 
Greenwood Press, 2007), 18-19. 
79 Abdullah M. Al-Hajeri, “The ‘Bedoun’: Kuwaitis without an Identity,” Middle 
Eastern Studies 51, no.1 (2015): 17. 
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‘Abd Allāh Āl Ṣabāḥ as kaymakam (district administrator), formed an 
army to support his rule and established a new administrative model. 
However, when the 5th Emir Muḥammad was murdered by his 
brother Mubārak80 who in turn managed to win the loyalty of many 
tribal rulers, the British took advantage of the turmoil that followed and 
of the tension that threatened Ottoman-Kuwaiti relations and started to 
sign a series of diplomatic agreements with the local leaders to the point 
that the entire area along the Gulf (from Oman to Bahrain) became 
known as the “trucial coast81”; the trucial system became the path 
toward the Westernization of the region as it introduced many new 
regulations, transformed the country into a new Western-like political 
structure and entered it into the emerging world capitalist system of 
production82. However, in 1899 the British colonel Meade signed an 
agreement with Mubārak that obliged him and his successors to reject 
the representatives of any “Power or Government” without the prior 
approval of the British government. The aim of Mubārak was to assure 
and preserve Kuwaiti independence and sovereignty but the agreement 
essentially gave Britain complete control over the country’s foreign 
policy. Besides, the British wanted to take control of the Persian Gulf 
so as to stop the Turkish-German plan to build a railway line – the so-
called Baghdad line – linking Istanbul to Basra, the ideal counterpart to 
the Suez Canal83. 
Later on, within the 1920 San Remo conference Britain was 
awarded the mandate over Iraq (and consequently Kuwait): borders had 
to be finally drawn in order to incorporate Kuwait into the British 
                                                          
80 Mubarāk (“the Great”) has been considered the father of modern Kuwait as he 
established new schools to educate administrative personnel and created the basis for 
the earliest centralized state administration. 
81 Ibid., 40. 
82 Bacik, op. cit., 65. 
83 Reinhard Schulze, Il mondo islamico nel XX secolo. Politica e società civile 
(Torino: Feltrinelli, 1998), 38-40. 
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international system. Notably, even though in 1914 the British political 
agent in the Gulf sent a letter to šayḫ Mubārak stating that the Crown 
recognized Kuwait as “an independent government under British 
protection” and confirmed the šayḫ political authority over 80 km from 
Kuwait City, at the 1922 ‘Uqayr conference (called upon by Sir Percy 
Cox, the British High Commissioner for Iraq at the time)84 Saudi Arabia 
got two thirds of the land claimed by Kuwait, also ending the Kuwait-
Najd war that had broken out in 1919 between Ibn Sa‘ūd and šayḫ 
Mubārak85. For the same reason, the decision was made to establish a 
Neutral Zone between Najd and Kuwait, undone in 1965 with the 
“Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia Agreement to Partition the Neutral Zone”: only 
then the borders between the two countries were clearly defined. 
 Nonetheless, such interference deeply affected the country’s 
identity, as the tribal pre-national spatial imaginaries never ceased to 
coexist with the territorial ideas. Indeed, as Beaugrand (2017) wrote: 
[There are] discrepancies […] between the state-imposed 
territorial bounding and the resilient sociological identities and 
symbolic practices of people in Kuwait, that predates it and are 
embodied in the persistent, re-activated and reshaped dichotomy 
between town dwellers (hadhar) and Bedouins (badû). […] In 
Kuwait, the imposition of border did not reflect a pre-existing 
difference, only superimposed on existing identities; a new 
state-centered narrativity created a set of ‘others’, which had not 
previously existed, among the category of Bedouins86. 
Interestingly, the Birtish Arabist Harry St. John Bridger Philby 
in his Sau‘di Arabia (1955) stressed that even Ibn Saʿūd himself, 
preferred a flexible tribal boundary to the British ideal of a fixed 
                                                          
84 Claire Beaugrand, “Borders and Spatial Imaginaries in the Kuwaiti Identity,” 
Geopolitics (2017): 4. 
85 See Anthony B. Toth, “Tribes and Tribulations: Bedouin Losses in the Saudi and 
Iraqi Struggles over Kuwait's Frontiers, 1921-1943,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 32, no. 2 (November 2005): 146-159. 
86 Ibid., 6. 
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frontier, given that the former would surely be a better fit for the 
featureless Arab desert and the habits of its inhabitants. In fact, before 
the establishment of such borders the rulers of the Arabian Peninsula 
used the seasonal migrations of the Bedouins to define their spheres of 
political domain and the very formation of Kuwait in the late 17th/ early 
18th century was due to these kind of demographic fluxes. In fact, at 
first the border meant very little for the Bedouin population who 
physically continued to cross it. 
To sum up, the delimitation of the borders alongside the rise of 
a Western-like centralized rule had a disruptive impact in the country; 
it even challenged the crucial relationship between the clans—afraid to 
lose their historical status—and the ruling family, a relationship that 
Bacik defined “the historical social contract of Kuwait”87. 
Besides, in the same period the merchants underwent a profound 
economic crisis: in the 18th century they were almost all dependent on 
the pearl market and its profits but with the global depression of the 
1920s and the marketing of cultured pearls by the Japanese the situation 
changed dramatically: Kuwait’s pearl-based economy collapsed 
making the country poor almost overnight. 
However, within a few years, a very well-known discovery 
would force another social, economic, political and cultural 
“revolution” on Kuwait: the siphoning in 1936, of the first oil well by a 
jointly held British and American petroleum company in the Burgan oil 
field88 that transformed the little Emirate from a poor, tribal-power 
based entity into a wealthy, globalized Nation-State again very 
rapidly89. 
                                                          
87 Bacik, op. cit., 69. 
88 Casey, op. cit., 48. 
89 In 1960, Kuwait will be one of the original members of the Oil Producing and 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) along with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela. 
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Notably, the Kuwaiti leaders have been both prudent and clever 
since the very beginning: being well aware that oil is not an eternal 
resource and that as a very tiny state surrounded by powerful 
counterparts, Kuwait would have been in the perpetual need of military 
support, they started both to invest some surplus in overseas markets 
and to economically support—through the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development (KFAED)—some friendly nations and entities, 
mostly Arab countries (Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization); a diplomatic strategy that proved to be 
essential to the country’s survival during the 1980s and that contributed 
to building its legitimacy as a sovereign state.  
By 1951, oil revenues (soon increased as Kuwait started to build 
its own refineries), until that time officially property of the Āl Ṣabāḥ 
family, started to be divided between the rulers and the people. More 
importantly, half of all future profits were destined to public projects, 
improvements, and government services. Kuwait had become a rentier 
state, with all that that entails. Indeed, as already stressed, in a country 
where the state does not impose taxes, the government is not forced to 
pay the political price of taxation. Moreover, revenues offer further 
means to authoritarian regimes for keeping power and limiting political 
mobilization. For these reasons, the production model of a rentier 
economy usually weakens the democratic process in oil-producing 
countries. In fact, because of the oil revenues, citizenship in Kuwait is 
tied to, or better, is embodied by the state subsidies90. Besides, through 
the distribution of the oil wealth, the ruling family had been able to free 
himself from the yoke of the merchants. By dressing up their traditional 
hierarchy as a new administrative structure and through the 
                                                          
90 The benefits given to Kuwaitis by the State are many and include 30.000 KD loan, 
4.000 KD for marrying a Kuwaiti woman, 35 KD/month rent allowance and many 
others (1 Kuwaiti dinār being equal to 2.88 euro). 
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centralization of the state, the Āl Ṣabāḥ diminished the very role of the 
merchant class, and the traditional contract that had bonded them for 
decades ended. In fact, the rulers did not need the merchants’ financial 
and political support anymore thus the latter renounced their political 
claims in exchange for a conspicuous share of the oil revenues. 
Still, despite the new oil-founded welfare system with its new 
schools, roads and hospitals, the rulers could not completely overturn 
the pre-existing structure: certain tribal and political dynamics along 
with old beliefs and practices stayed the same91, citizenship and tribal 
bonds came to coexist while personal relationships remained 
fundamental in the bureaucratic apparatus. This hybridization of the 
state happened at all levels. For example Baaklini (1982), referring to 
the Emirate constitutional order wrote that 
[The Kuwaiti state] was linked to the Arab-Islamic heritage at 
the conceptual level. […] In referring to the process whereby the 
crown prince is confirmed by the legislature, the constitution 
used the Arab word mubaya, acclamation. […] This concept and 
others were intended to make the Kuwaiti feel that his 
constitution and the practices it instituted have their origin in 
Islamic history and practices and were not the mere importation 
of Western practices92. 
Moreover, the outcomes of a study by Dashti et al. (2015)93 on 
the influence of sectarian and tribal discourse in newspapers readers’ 
online comments in the country gives a better understanding on how 
deeply the tribal factor is rooted in Kuwaiti society and how it 
undermines the cohesion of the country itself. The study—conducted 
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on 715 subjects—analyses strands of sectarian and tribal discourse in 
newspaper readers’ online comments and came to the conclusion that 
all minorities, the Shiites, the lower ranked social groups and the 
Bedouins (badū94) are identified as disloyal to Kuwait, backward and 
uncivilized by the “original Kuwaitis”. This fragmented society is the 
result of the citizenship regulations of the country. In fact, in 1948 
members of families that inhabited Kuwait since 1899 and children 
born in Kuwait to non-Kuwaitis were defined as citizens while Arabs 
or Muslims living in the region for minimum ten years could apply for 
citizenship. However, as the 1957 census revealed that the foreigners 
present in the country already constituted  45% of the population95, the 
Nationality Law of 1959 removed the options of citizenship by birth 
and long-term residency and shaped the Emirate’s identity by 
considering first class nationals the only settled population (al-
muwaṭṭinūn fī al-kuwayt), thus linking citizenry to a narrow urban 
understanding of the territory. “Original Kuwaiti” were the ḥaḍar, 
“those who could prove [and obviously tribesman who were not 
permanently settled in the area could not], their uninterrupted presence 
in the territory of the Emirate since 192096, yet this refers to the town 
itself (and oases) since the ‘national’ territory was ironically not yet 
bounded”97, hence Kuwait is often referred to as a mere city-state98. 
                                                          
94 Ḥaḍar are the settled people while Badū are those who lived a nomadic life. 
However, these terms are used by some in everyday language nowadays to mean 
respectively ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’. See Anh Nga Longva, “Nationalism in Pre-
Modern Guise: The Discourse on Hadhar and Bedu in Kuwait,” International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 38 (2006): 171-187.  
95 Farah Al-Nakib, “Revisiting ḥaḍar and badū in Kuwait: Citizenship, housing and 
the construction of a dichotomy,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 46 
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96 Notably, on October 10, 1920 the Iḫwān of Ibn Sa‘ūd attacked the village of Jahra. 
After the battle the Kuwaitis built a wall (sūr) to safeguard the town; this wall later 
became “the socio-spatial boundary for original Kuwaiti identity” (Al-Nakib, p. 12); 
often the ḥaḍar define themselves as ahl al-sūr, the people of the wall. 
97 Beaugrand (2017), op. cit, 11. 
98 Casey, op. cit., 2. 
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Between 1959 and 1965, three Committees were asked to grant 
nationality according to such parameters that fail to embrace the whole 
territory of the internationally recognized state: the desert began to be 
perceived as a far, undefined reality and then became a ghetto for 
expatriates and stateless people. Nowadays, an “original Kuwaiti” can 
easily spend his whole life without ever having been in Jahra99, which 
is only 32 km from Kuwait City. On this point, Aseel al-Ragam (2017) 
and Farah al-Nakib (2014) underline the role that the housing programs 
in Kuwait had in constructing such a polarized society, contributing also 
to the ḥaḍar/badū divide: 
[…] state housing policies divided the population into discrete 
social residential zones and, through the provision of different 
and unequal standards and facilities within these different 
districts, created a “hierarchy of spaces” associated with 
particular social groups100.  
Following an ideal time line, Kuwait gained independence in 
1961 and in the same year the Arab League—over violent protests of 
the Iraqi government which still questioned the Emirate’s very 
sovereignty—welcomed it into the organization, thus legitimizing it 
among all the other Arab nations. Two years later, on November 11, 
1962, a new constitution was written and ratified and full elections were 
held and in 1963 Kuwait became member of the United Nations. 
Moreover, in May 1981, Kuwait joined with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE in the newly formed Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). 
                                                          
99 Indeed, while I was in Kuwait City in Spring 2017 I asked my 30 years old Kuwaiti 
friend to bring me in Jahra by car for making an interview and he had to use the car 
GPS to get there. 
100 Al-Nakib op. cit., 8. See also Asseel Al-Ragam, “Negotiating the Politics of 
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However, this brief overview won’t be complete without 
mentioning the Iraqi invasion and occupation (2 August 1990 – 28 
February 1991), not only because of its obvious significance in the 
country’s history but especially because it can be read as the biggest 
outcome of the sovereignty and legitimacy crisis experienced by the 
country from its very formation. Besides, such traumatic event 
strengthened the Kuwaiti national identity while the Arab brotherhood 
gradually lost all its value. 
The Gulf War (2 August 1990-28 February 1991) 
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The reasons101 behind 
the Iraqi government’s action are several and deep-rooted in the 
countries’ history. In fact, tribalism and more specifically its 
transnational element102 tied Southern Iraq and Kuwait over time. They 
experienced a degree of social mobility greater than any other Arab 
provinces, not to mention the common cultural heritage and historical 
memory that their people share. Besides, before the discovery of oil in 
Kuwait, there was a strong current of opinion in favour of unity with 
Iraq, especially in the mid-Thirties, following Iraq’s independence and 
the relative prosperity it had achieved from oil revenues. Iraq, for many 
                                                          
101 Interestingly, Muslim scholars make a distinction between two categories of 
“reasons”: sabab, the remote factor that initiates a fact before it becomes a more 
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Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 
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Kuwaiti citizens was an example to follow, the ideal progressive Arab 
country.  Moreover, there was the issue of the borders. Ever since it 
came in existence, Iraq inherited unresolved frontier problems with Iran 
(namely the dispute was over the control of Šaṭṭ al-ʿArab, the major 
waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Iranian ports of 
Khorramshahr and Abadan, and the Iraqi port of Baṣra) and Kuwait and 
its adjacent islands of Warba and Būbiyān103.  
It is within such context that, in July 1990, Saddam Hussayn 
(Ṣaddām Ḥusayn ʿAbd al-Majīd al-Tikrītī, 1937-2006) delivered a 
speech in which he accused the Emirate of siphoning crude oil from the 
al-Rumayla oil fields located along the two countries’ common border. 
He insisted that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia cancel his country’s 30 billion 
dollar debt and accused them of conspiring to keep oil prices low thus 
siding with the Western oil-buying nations104. Then, he begun to gather 
Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border. The Egyptian President at the time 
Hosni Mubarak (Muḥammad Ḥusni Sayyid Ibrāhīm Mubārak, b. 1928) 
initiated negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait trying to avoid foreign 
interventions but Hussayn broke off the negotiations after only two 
hours, and on August 2, 1990 ordered the invasion of Kuwait. Two-
thirds of the 21 members of the Arab League condemned Iraq’s act of 
aggression, and Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd (Fahd ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-
Saʿūd, 1921-2005), along with Kuwait’s government-in-exile, turned to 
the United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization for support. U.S. President George H.W. Bush, the 
                                                          
103 Khadduri and Ghareeb, op. cit., 9-10. 
104 During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Kuwait was allied with Iraq, largely looking 
for Iraqi protection from Islamic Iran. After the war, Iraq was extremely indebted to 
several Arab countries, including a $14 billion debt to Kuwait. Iraq hoped to repay its 
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governments of Britain and the Soviet Union immediately condemned 
the invasion and on August 3, the United Nations Security Council 
called for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. As Saddam accused the Saudis 
of being illegitimate and unworthy guardians of the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina, President Bush quickly announced that the U.S. would 
launch a “wholly defensive” mission to prevent Iraq from invading 
Saudi Arabia under the code name “Operation Desert Shield”105. 
Operation Desert Shield began on August 7, 1990 but quickly lost its 
“wholly defensive” character when, on August 8, the Iraqi government 
formally annexed Kuwait naming it the Iraqi “19th province”. On 
November 29, 1990, the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of 
“all necessary means” of force against Iraq if it did not withdraw from 
Kuwait by the following January 15, 1991106. The U.S.-led coalition 
force against Iraq numbered about 750,000 units, including 540,000 
U.S. personnel and smaller forces from Britain, France, Germany, the 
Soviet Union, Japan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iraq, for its part, had the 
support of Jordan, Algeria, Sudan, Yemen, Tunisia and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO). By February 27, most of the Iraqi 
forces were defeated and Bush declared a ceasefire on February 28, 
1991, ending the First Gulf War. According to the peace terms that 
Saddam Hussayn subsequently accepted, Iraq recognized Kuwait’s 
sovereignty. In all, an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 Iraqi forces were 
                                                          
105 See Bill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and 
Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and Gregory S. Kavka, “Was 
the Gulf War a just war?,” Journal of Social Philosophy 22, no. 1 (March 1991): 20-
29. 
106 Interestingly, on January 17, 1991 the Jordanian government decided to close all 
the schools in order to reduce the risk of manifestations. Francesca Maria Corrao, 
“Rassegna della stampa araba 15 gennaio-31 marzo 1991. Guerra del Golfo,” Oriente 
Moderno 1991. 
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killed, in comparison with 300 coalition troops107. In September 1991, 
Kuwait signed a 10-years defense pact with the United States: “the Arab 
state system failed to give Kuwait security in its time of need, and since 
1990, Gulf security has been in the firm hands of the United States and 
its allies”108. 
The Kuwaiti political system 
In conclusion, it must be stressed that, despite the above 
mentioned criticalities, the political system of Kuwait is the most open 
among the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Kuwait in fact 
is an imperfect constitutional monarchy109 classified as “partly free” by 
Freedom House110. Its constitution states that Kuwait’s national 
sovereignty resides in the people, who are also described as the source 
of all ruling authority. Besides, its Parliament or National Assembly 
(Mağlis al-Umma) is composed of 50 members elected on a district 
basis every four years (unless the Emir decides to dissolve the 
Parliament before the expected date according to articles 80-4 of the 
Kuwaiti Constitution) and this assembly, unlike other representative 
authorities of the Persian Gulf Countries, does have real powers. It has 
the power to declare results of elections invalid (Article 95); the power 
to dismiss and to impeach a minister, including the Prime Minister 
(Articles 101-102); the power to reject laws proposed by the 
government (Article 66) and to propose laws and regulations 
autonomously and independently (even though the law has to be 
                                                          
107 Donna Miller, “15 Years After Desert Storm, U.S. Commitment to Region 
Continues”, American Forces Press Service (Feb. 22, 2006), 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=14792 
108 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘, Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab 
Intellectual History (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 5. 
109 See Doron Shultziner and Mary Ann Tétreault, “Representation and Democratic 
Progress in Kuwait” Representation 48, no. 3 (2012): 281-293. 
110 Freedoom House, “Freedom in the World 2018. Kuwait Profile” (2018), 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/kuwait 
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approved by the Emir in order to enter into force). The Kuwaiti Prime 
Minister is nominated by the monarch and the key-ministries are 
assigned to members of the large Āl Ṣabāḥ dynasty. Although the 
setting-up of political parties is not permitted, different organized 
political groups quite often support or ally with parliamentary 
candidates. The opposition has frequently called the legitimacy of the 
Government and its ministries into question. Thus, even though 
democratization still has a long way to go, constructive economic 
competition has supported the creation of a new social élite, offering 
hope for more active community participation and better 
representation111. 
The episode regarding the succession to the 13th dynasty ruler 
Ğābir al-Aḥmad Āl Ṣabāḥ in charge since 1977 to 2005 reveals the 
actual power of the Parliament. The death in December 2005 of the 
long-standing Emir, šayḫ Ğābir al-Aḥmad, gave the parliament the 
courage to take unprecedented steps in asserting itself over Kuwaiti 
political life. As crown prince, the elderly šayḫ Saʿd al-ʿAbd Allāh al-
Sālim Āl Ṣabāḥ (1930-2008) initially became Emir upon the death of 
šayḫ Ğābir. However, his advanced age and poor state of health led to 
public doubts emerging in the parliament over his suitability. Here the 
parliament asserted itself by voting (unanimously) to overthrow the 
new Emir on the grounds of poor health, thus he remained in power less 
than a year, since January 15, 2006 to January 29, 2006. This was the 
first time within any of the GCC states that an elected body had 
overruled a ruling tribe’s candidate for Emir112.  
                                                          
111 See Riad al-Khouri, “Kuwait: Rentierism Revisited,” Arab Reform Bulletin 
(September 2008), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/21948 
112 Steven Wright and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Political Change in the Arab Oil 
Monarchies: From Liberalization to Enfranchisement”, International Affairs 83, no. 5 
(2007): 924-926. 
223 
 
3.1 The expatriates  
The population of Kuwait, mostly Muslim (70% Sunnis, 30% 
Shiites), is estimated at 4.206.000113: 1.300.000 are Kuwaiti citizens 
while the remaining 2.906.000 include the expatriates and the stateless 
people. Non Kuwaitis account for about 70% of Kuwait's population 
thus Kuwaiti citizens are a minority group within their own country. 
How can the Emirate control so many foreign nationals within its 
territory? Will they be loyal to their host state? According to Baaklini, 
their presence has weakened the Kuwaiti tribal legitimacy but 
strengthened tribal solidarity against the “other”114. 
Kuwait has a long history with foreign labor force; even before 
the discovery of the oil there were many non-national workers in the 
country but from the Forties their number started to gradually increase 
on a yearly basis and by 1965 they outnumbered the Kuwaiti citizens 
representing already the 60% of the total population. The non-citizen 
employees, mostly Asian and Arab unskilled laborers performed 
practically all the manual work and filled all the essential service 
occupations: Kuwait’s entire economic infrastructure would have 
collapsed without them115. 
Notably, the presence of foreigners proved to be one of the 
major difficulties of the country when Kuwait faced Iraqi invasion in 
1990. At the outset of the invasion only around a quarter of the Kuwaiti 
army was composed of Kuwaiti citizens. Besides, many Kuwaiti 
Shiites, suspected of being disloyal, had already been removed from the 
military forces during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). The remaining 
members of the Kuwaiti troops (three-quarters) were non-nationals, the 
                                                          
113 World Population Review, Kuwait Population 2018, 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kuwait-population/ 
114 Baaklini, op. cit, 361. 
115 Casey, op. cit., 10. 
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majority coming from Palestine, Pakistan, India, Egypt, and the 
Philippines. Indeed, in the mid-Eighties Palestinians were the biggest 
community of expatriates in Kuwait but when the PLO officially 
backed the Iraqi invasion and thousands of Palestinian and Jordanian 
workers demonstrated in support of the Iraqi Arabism, the government 
took its measures. A Palestinian man, born in Kuwait to a Palestinian 
father and an Egyptian mother stressed how his life worsened after the 
war: 
[…] Whoever supported Iraq at that time, it was hell for them, 
especially Palestinians, because Palestinians from Iraq... 
came along with the Saddam army. So this started to ravage 
Kuwait, they started to do so many bad stuff... but the 
Palestinians people in Kuwait didn't do anything. They put the 
blame on us, my father […] lost everything, he couldn't go 
anywhere because he didn't have a passport from Palestine, he 
has a passport which is from Egypt, it's not allowing him to go 
anywhere, unless he got visa […]. And most of them they don't 
accept him because there's no embassy in that country, so 
here's the life changing from... my father was here from 1972, 
so he started to make all his life in Kuwait, this is my home 
now, I'm not going anywhere. After the war, hell. We started to 
get, like racism... Palestinian you are a traitor, you are sh*t, 
you are like this... I used to hear it from all my friends, even as 
a joke or serious. So many people hate us...oh, you're 
Palestinian? You're a traitor, you're like this, you're the worst 
people. 
Many Palestinians were deported and the frontiers were closed 
to those who fled Kuwait during the war, the majority of which settled 
in Jordan, as noted before. Moreover, after the war the Emir imposed 
the martial law then replaced in 1992 by the Special State Security 
Court in charge until 1995. The position of non-Kuwaitis was indeed 
particularly fragile as they were perceived as traitors of the country: 
about 300, mostly Palestinians and Syrians, were tried for collaboration 
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in the security court and many more were kept in custody for more than 
a year awaiting trial. Amnesty International documented several human 
rights abuses such as torture, imprisonment and unlawful arrests116. 
The government adopted several measures over time in order to 
change the unbalanced landscape that saw Kuwaiti nationals as a 
minority as it undermined the domestic sovereignty of the Emirate. For 
example, in 1975 an Amendment to the Residence Law introduced the 
legal obligation of kafāla (sponsorship): every foreigner willing to start 
any kind of business in the Emirate henceforth needs a Kuwaiti sponsor 
(kāfil) who in exchange for his guarantee role gets the 51% of the 
business in question. Thus, the separation between nationals and non-
nationals progressively widened, the expatriates could not organize 
strikes or participate in working unions’ affairs and the (male) 
naturalized Kuwaitis obtained the right to vote only in 1996117, the same 
year in which second-class citizens born in Kuwait (those who settled 
between 1921 and 1959, according to the 1959 Nationality Law) were 
finally equalized to the first-class citizens, thus gaining full political 
rights118. Moreover, in 1992, a legislation was enacted to keep the 
presence of non-Kuwaiti workers at less than 50% of the total 
population. At the same time, it was decided that every foreign 
nationality shouldn’t exceed the 10% of the Kuwaiti total population. 
Finally, very recently (August 26, 2018), the Kuwaiti 
government “has cancelled the contracts of 3,140 foreigners working in 
                                                          
116 As for the Palestinians’ strategies of survival in Kuwait and the significance of the 
family as cross-national entity even before the first Gulf War, see Shafeeq Ghabra, 
“Palestinians in Kuwait: The family and the Politics of Survival,” Journal of 
Palestinian Studies 17, no. 2 (winter 1988): 62-83. 
117 Bacik, op. cit., 230. 
118 Claire Beaugrand, “Statelessness & Administrative Violence: Bidūn’s Survival 
Strategies in Kuwait,” The Muslim World 101 (2011): 237. 
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the public sector as part of the state policy to replace expatriates with 
Kuwaitis in public offices”119. 
To conclude, it is important to stress how, regardless of their 
field of work, foreigners do not have complete access to the Kuwaiti 
welfare system, especially education and health. Regarding this, Sylvie, 
a Syrian girl resident in Kuwait for 21 years when asked if she ever felt 
to be Kuwaiti said: 
Ah no, never. Because the ones that weren't born here… like 
you never feel you belong to Kuwait […] they will not give you 
any kind of precedence, health, job, education, everything is 
for them... you are always under threat... they will always treat 
you as a foreigner, not like a Kuwaiti. 
Moreover, Kuwait lacks of a fixed minimum wage in the private 
sector and physical and emotional abuse of female domestic servants 
are very common and frequent: “A total of 196 Filipino workers died 
in Kuwait since 2016 – almost 79% of the victims died due to physical 
abuse, according to an Overseas Workers Welfare Administration 
officer (OWWA)120”. 
3.2 The bidūn 
As noted, in Kuwait and more generally in the Gulf region the 
concept of citizenship began to be discussed only in the Fifties while 
previously tribal membership was the only bonding criteria within the 
communities and there was no connection whatsoever with a state 
entity. Accordingly, the bidūn in Kuwait are only one manifestation of 
                                                          
119 Antonino Occhiuto, “Gulf in Review: 26- 30 August,” The Euro Gulf Information 
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a regional problem, with 500,000 people believed to be in their same 
situation across the Gulf region121. 
The bidūn ğinsiyya, literally “without citizenship”, are the 
stateless people of Kuwait and make up about 30% of the country’s total 
population122. Socially integrated and economically and legally 
discriminated at the same time (social integration actually being an 
important survival strategy for them), they did not emerge as a problem 
until the promulgation of the 1959 Nationality Law and more clearly 
after the achievement of Independence in 1961.  Notably, the first 
Human Rights Watch report specifically dedicated to the stateless 
people in the Emirate (The Bedoons of Kuwait: “Citizens without 
citizenship”) and that contributed to raise awareness about their status 
is dated 1995. Moreover, the politicization of the issue emerged only in 
the 2000s when Kuwaiti human rights activists123 along with “liberal” 
figures of the Kuwaiti scene demonstrated in support of the bidūn’s 
cause, thus becoming a wāsṭa, an intermediary, between them and the 
government. However, the bidūn’s voices have been heard for the first 
time only in 2006 during an event organized by the Kuwaiti Association 
for Human Rights and indeed entitled al-bidūn yataḥaddatūna (the 
bidūn speak)124; finally, new generations of bidūn leaders led the 
protests in 2011, protests defined by Beaugrand (2017) as an “act of 
                                                          
121 Minority right group international, “Kuwait. Bidoon”,  
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citizenship” through which they managed to “assert their right to have 
rights”125. 
The different terms used by the government to define them are 
quite revealing of how their status progressively worsened over time: 
in the Sixties they were labelled as “Semi-desert” or “Desert People” 
while the term bidūn appeared only in the Seventies. Since the Eighties 
the government addressed them with increasingly derogatory terms that 
placed them outside the legal citizenship canons, such as “non-Kuwaiti” 
(NK), “of unidentified nationality” and “of unknown identity” 
(respectively before and after the Iraqi invasion126). Today and since 
1993 the only term used is “illegal residents”127 that equates them to 
third-country citizens resident in Kuwait without a valid permit of stay. 
Perhaps a punishment, among other reasons, for having joined the 
Popular Army of Saddam during the 1990-91 invasion, following the 
order of the Iraqi authorities that imposed to all the non-Kuwaitis to 
enroll. 
The bidūn were among the nomadic tribes who, depending on 
the season and availability of resources, moved from one place to 
another within the area of the present-day states of Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Syria. Some of them began to move nearer to 
the Kuwaiti urban settlements around the 1920s, attracted by earning 
opportunities around the port and a more sedentary lifestyle. Then, after 
the oil discovery in the Thirties the Emir invited the tribes to settle near 
the city walls or future oil fields and a new wave of Bedouins decided 
to abandon their nomadic life-style for tempting promises such as a 
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secure job in the energy sector (and afterwards in the public and military 
sphere), housing programs and government subsidies. 
The majority of these nomads could have obtained citizenship 
automatically or through naturalization but that did not happen for 
several reasons and they ended up as stateless persons. First of all, as 
already noted the concept of citizenship was entirely new for the Gulf 
and before the 1948 decree on citizenship of šayḫ al-Ğābir a declaration 
of loyalty to the Emir was practically the sole requisite for obtaining 
citizenship. Also, the Special Committee created by Emir al-Sālim 
(1913-1977) soon after the independence and charged with the task of 
registering residents was unable to define clear parameters and the 
necessary requirements for obtaining citizenship, and proceeded instead 
on the basis of informal criteria. Besides, until the 1900s the desert 
nomads had never been connected to any particular place and many of 
them, mostly illiterates, did not understand the importance of having a 
document. On the contrary, they had always been averse to any kind of 
registration, for fear of being taxed or simply traced; as Beaugrand 
(2011) pointed out, before the discovery of oil “the border was a horizon 
rather than a fence for the diasporic bidūn128” and they considered the 
musābila—“codified” journeys undertaken for “bringing camels for 
sale and to purchase food”129—a sufficient proof of their presence in 
the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent. Thus unsurprisingly, the 
registration process found them completely unprepared and the 
Committee did not consider the need to educate them about the benefits 
that would ensue with citizenship. As a consequence, after the first 
registration process only a third of the resident population was 
effectively considered part of Kuwait, while another third was granted 
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partial citizenship and the remainder were defined as “potential 
citizens” and issued temporary passports. Quoting al-Hajeri: 
[…] shortening the period of the announcement on the request 
of the Kuwaiti citizenship, and the weakness of the campaign 
for awareness of the importance of acquiring citizenship at that 
time, especially among the population living outside the city 
after 1959, were significant reasons for the loss of the rights of 
many. Moreover, the requirement of residency in Kuwait 
between 1920 and 1950 as a condition for citizenship of various 
degrees may have contributed to the increase of the problem for 
this group130. 
However, the bidūn condition worsened between 1962 and 1967 
as the number of migrants started to increase exponentially. At that 
time, many immigrants entered the country both legally and illegally 
and the non-nationals outnumbered the Kuwaiti citizens, unbalancing 
the demography of the state. Therefore, the Ministry of the Interior after 
having repetedly promised over the years an imminent process of mass 
naturalization131 to the bidūn, especially during times of major crisis in 
the country, in 1970 officially reversed its position. Having taken note 
of the great number of stateless persons, the Ministry started to accuse 
them of having hidden their true passports aiming to acquire the benefits 
that the Kuwaiti citizenship would bring them, a narrative now widely 
spread within the Kuwaiti society; for example Kinān, a Syrian engineer 
who lived in Kuwait City most of his life, when addressed about the 
issue said: 
                                                          
130 Al-Hajeri, op. cit., 23. 
131 Besides, the naturalization process have been blocked in the Sixties following the 
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Actually this people [the bidūn] are crazy. They had passports 
before, they had identities, the government here know where 
they come from, they are lying. 
Furthermore, between the 1960s and 1980s the National Law 
was continually amended. In December 1986, a ministerial committee 
formulated a classified twelve-point decree (made public only in 2003 
by the opposition newspaper Al-Ṭalī‘a, The Vanguard) that initiated a 
repressive policy toward the bidūn: their gradual replacement from the 
armed forces became a priority; in fact, many bidūn were part of the 
army and that contributed to raise sympathy for their cause among the 
Kuwaiti nationals through the nationalist topos of “dying for the 
nation”. Moreover, they started to be subjected to the Law on the 
Residence of Aliens (17/1959) from which they had been exempted 
until then as afrād al-‘ašā’ir (tribesmen), meaning that they were 
required to pay an annual tax of KD 200 (about 540 Euros) just like the 
other foreign residents working in Kuwait and they were given six 
months to produce the documents necessary to regularize their position 
in the country132. Basically, they were equated to the migrants, yet 
unlike them, the bidūn did not have another identity to claim to nor an 
alternative sense of belonging with which to replace the Kuwaiti one. 
In 1987, the Ministry of the Interior forbade the renewal of 
driving licences and car ownership documents for all bidūn; moreover, 
they could not purchase new cars or any kind of real estate133. A further 
obstacle was introduced in education: public schools started to refuse 
bidūn children and private ones raised tuition costs to exclude those 
who could not afford the fees. The University of Kuwait adopted a 
                                                          
132 Ibid., 234, 235. 
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similar policy and started to reject the applications made by the stateless 
persons for whom enrolment in foreign universities was not an option, 
as leaving the country without guarantees proved to be too risky. 
Moreover, the bidūn were expelled by all associations and 
professional organizations—such as those of lawyers and doctors—
which had received clear orders from both the Ministry of Labour and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs. Also, carrying a biṭāqa madaniyya (civil 
ID) became mandatory for every resident and many everyday life 
activities such as opening a bank account or buying a SIM card became 
precluded to non-holders. The bidūn got instead a temporary card that 
needs to be annually renewed and that guarantees only a limited access 
to the life of the country. 
In 2001, the Law no. 22 supposedly enacted to modify the 
National Law thus making the process of naturalization more 
accessible, added instead new and increasingly strict requirements 
(such as demonstrating ties to the country previous to 1965, completion 
of high school studies in Kuwait and an unblemished criminal record) 
that prevented many bidūn from applying for citizenship. Along with 
the new law, a provision was introduced permitting those who declare 
their citizenship (real or presumed) to acquire a residency permit valid 
for five years. While on the one hand, this provision gives the bidūn a 
way to legalize their presence in Kuwait, on the other hand, if they 
decide to do so they will definitively be barred from acquiring Kuwaiti 
citizenship in the future, something that generally they cannot accept as 
they consider Kuwait to be their only and true homeland: 
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Honestly, I feel to be Kuwaiti, I do not belong to anywhere else 
and when you love a place and you identify with it is not possible 
to get away from it134. 
For this same reason, when in 2007 the government decided to 
issue temporary driving licensees to the bidūn, many refused to register 
as the licenses’ “nationality” field labelled them as muqīm bi-ṣūra ġayr 
qānūniya (illegal residents). 
The impossibility of obtaining any kind of document—birth, 
marriage and death certificates, passport, licences—and the burden of 
the illegal status (‘ayr qanūnī) imposed upon them by the government, 
forced the bidūn into a dramatic condition. Such process of rights 
deprivation is defined by Beaugrand (2011) as an “administrative” 
violence, one of the three layers of violence perpetrated by the 
government against the stateless people along with the “systemic 
violence” (meaning the forced integration of the country into the 
international system made of sovereign Nation-States that radically re-
defined its society) and the “structural violence” (linked to the 
definition of citizenship). In many cases (the only exception being the 
holders of the “passport-article 17” valid also to travel for studies and 
medical treatment) they are even denied the right to travel to Mecca to 
perform the ḥağğ, the ritual pilgrimage that every Muslim must make 
at least once in his lifetime, a source of great frustration and suffering 
that alongside the many other restrictions listed above led them to 
emigration (mostly in Australia, Canada or Scandinavia), passport-
forgery or even to buy the citizenship of other countries such as 
Columbia, Liberia, Dominican Republic and lately Comoro Islands. 
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Kuwait City, March 2017. The interview was made in Arabic, here in the English 
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Indeed, in 2001 the Dominican Republic was a destination for 
many stateless persons who had purchased their “freedom” for 1,000 
Kuwaiti dinār. While around 2008, Comoro Islands launched a plan 
with the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait to sell an “economic 
citizenship” to stateless people in those countries, in return for cash to 
help develop the Indian Ocean archipelago135. Nevertheless, such 
citizenship sales (4, 600 euro per passport) have stopped in 2016 due to 
suspicious missing revenues. 
To conclude, the government’s refusal to grant citizenship and 
civil rights to such large segment of the society represents a threat to 
the state sovereignty and national identity. Indeed, Hanna Arendt in the 
Origin of Totalitarianism (1951) while reflecting on the condition of 
the stateless person (a condition in which she found herself as a Jewish 
refugee) realized that in a world that conceives of humanity as a group 
of states and equates human beings with citizens, the stateless people 
who are removed from their countries, without a homeland and 
citizenship, are in fact excluded from humanity itself: they end up 
losing not only their legal and social identity, but also that of human 
beings, for whom universal rights should apply. Although it may seem 
paradoxical, it is only by committing a crime that stateless persons are 
recognized by law and can assert some rights. 
                                                          
135 See for example the following articles: 
“The bizarre scheme to transform a remote island into the new Dubai,” The Guardian 
(November 25, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/11/the-bizarre-
scheme-to-transform-a-remote-island-into-new-dubai-comoros 
“The controversial plan to give Kuwait’s stateless people citizenship of a tiny, poor 
African island,” The Washington Post (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/17/the-
controversial-plan-to-give-kuwaits-stateless-people-citizenship-of-a-tiny-poor-
african-island/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e928d7b33c92 
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4. The interviews’ findings 
This last section is dedicated to the data analysis. The open 
semi-structured interviews made in Jordan and in Kuwait are to be 
discussed within four conceptual dimensions (“national belonging”, 
“Islamic identity”, “arabhood” and “hybridity, tribal affiliations and 
clientelism”) perceived to be the most significant and revealing as far 
as the study subject is concerned. Each paragraph starts with a brief 
outline of the specified dimension. The interviews’ findings are then 
discussed by stressing similarities and differences between the case 
countries’ societies and also between the sub-categories that have been 
individuated within them such as Jordanians/Jordanians of Palestinian 
origin and Kuwaiti/ Expats (either born in Kuwait or long-term 
residents); excerpts of the interviews are reported (in the English 
translation when originally in Arabic) when particularly interesting and 
significant. As stated before, the interviewees’ (first) names are 
mentioned only when they have agreed to it, otherwise they will be 
referred to as “interviewees” or “participants” (while I stands for 
interviewer). Moreover, gender, age range, faith, level of education 
and/or occupation will be always reported. Finally, the following 
abbreviations have been used: 
JJ “Jordanian-Jordanian” (or “Purely Jordanian”) 
PJ Palestinian Jordanian 
K Kuwaiti citizen 
E (Arab) expat in Kuwait; the country of origin will be specified for 
each case. 
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4.1 National belonging 
The first identified dimension is national belonging136 and its 
perception within an Arab-Muslim context.  Which role does it play on 
a social, cultural and political level? How deeply is it rooted within the 
case countries’ societies and on which foundations does it lie?  
This dimension has been investigated through the following questions, 
asked to verify both the level of the respondents’ political awareness 
and their attachment to the country in which they live, by testing their 
basic knowledge of their countries’ political history: 
[Kuwait] 
2. You said that you are Kuwaiti. Can you explain to me better 
what being Kuwaiti represents to you? Are you proud to be 
Kuwaiti? 
4. What can you tell me about the State you live in? Are you 
interested in the history of Kuwait? For example, could you tell 
me in which year it gained its independence? 
[Jordan] 
2. You said that you are [Jordanian/Palestinian] (referred to Q1 
“where are you from”). Can you explain me better why do you 
feel to be [Jordanian/Palestinian] and what this represents to 
you? 
6. What can you tell me about the State you live in? Are you 
interested in its history and foundation? Do you know the 
historical and political process that made it as it is nowadays? 
As stressed since the very beginning of the study, national 
belonging revealed to be the first and the strongest identity criterion 
both in Jordan and in Kuwait. Thus, this section aims to highlight its 
peculiar nature rather than to confirm its self-expressed and undeniable 
                                                          
136 Notably, in the Arabic version national belonging has been translated with šu’ūr bi 
al-intimā‘ al-waṭanī, literally “feelings of national belonging”. 
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significance. Concepts such as legitimacy, sovereignty and citizenship 
in an Arab-Muslim context have been analyzed in the first chapter that 
also retraced the faith of the Nation-State in the MENA region, its 
meanings and its inner contradictions through the ideas of the very 
thinkers who contributed to asserting its leading role in the area. 
Moreover, in this chapter the nation and state building processes of the 
case countries have been detailed giving particular attention to the 
constituencies of both societies with the aim of understanding how 
political stability is guaranteed and “national unity” maintained.  With 
these tools, it is now possible to analyze the empirical data (being aware 
of the methodological specificities discussed in the second chapter) and 
investigate the multilayered nature of the Jordanian and Kuwaiti 
national identities. 
As noted before, when talking about national belonging in 
Jordan the Palestinian element is unavoidable. Questions 5 and 8 of the 
interview outline used in Jordan aimed indeed to investigate the 
differences, when present, between Jordanians and Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin from a legal but especially a social perspective and 
also to understand why Jordanian citizens born in (Trans) Jordan who 
lived in the country their whole lives, still define themselves as 
Palestinians. 
5. Talking about Jordan, do you think that the personal lives of 
the citizens can be in some way influenced by their identity (e.g. 
access to education, work, health services etc.)? If yes in which 
way according to you? Can you tell me an episode you 
witnessed? 
8. What do you think about the expression “purely Jordanian” 
[as opposed to Palestinian Jordanian]? What does it mean to 
you? 
By analyzing the empirical data, the Palestinian and the (Trans) 
Jordanian elements came up as two essential components of the 
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Jordanian national identity. While only Gazan Palestinians live under 
limiting legal conditions, each and every Jordanian that I had the chance 
to address with this (identity) issue contributed, of course from his own 
perspective (for example, Christian citizens of Palestinian origin, are 
more inclined toward a “modern” notion of citizenship than 
Muslims137) to create the image of a state that is still adjusting to the 
marked nationalist narrative that actually distinguishes it. Proof of that 
is the fact that the label “Jordanian-Jordanian” or “pure/purely 
Jordanian” as opposed to “Palestinian Jordanian”, even though widely 
criticized is still very common in the country. Accordingly, one 
interviewee said that such distinction, alongside the religious affiliation 
is what defines a Jordanian: 
 […] I can just say “I am Jordanian” […] but when I go more 
into detail, in my country... identity for me would be 
Muslim/Christian, pure Jordanian/Palestinian Jordanian. This 
is if you go to like very deep in the Jordanian identity138. 
Moreover, a 25-year-old student (female, Muslim, PJ) affirmed: 
I am Palestinian, Palestine is my country. I consider Jordan to 
be my second country, not legally speaking but in my feelings. 
However, it is also true that this division is narrowing generation 
after generation, a trend confirmed by the increasing number of 
intermarriages139, although largely limited to middle and upper socio-
economic strata in the capital. Besides, many interviewees stressed the 
impact that the Syrian crisis and the flux of refugees that followed had 
                                                          
137 Notably, the Christian Jordanian identity has not been investigated within the 
present study if through the absence of a majoritarian Islamic identity. To further 
analyze such an important dimension see for example Mohanna Haddad, “Christian 
Identity in the Jordanian Arab Culture: A Case Study of Two Communities in North 
Jordan”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 20, no. 1 (2000): 137-146. 
138 18/40 years old, Christian, male, PJ, accountant. 
139 “Some 7,000 Jordanians married Arab nationals in 2017,” The Jordan Times (July 
25, 2018), http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/some-7000-jordanians-married-
arab-nationals-2017 
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on the Jordanians of Palestinian origin. For example, Sulaymān (18/40 
years old, Christian, JJ, Freelance) said: 
[…] in comparison with Syrians, Palestinians are now looked at 
differently, it [the refugees’ flux] made them more Jordanian, 
closer... so, yeah, that's something that was positive for the 
Palestinian-Jordanian relationship, in a way, cause now there's 
a new enemy. 
Likewise Ḥakīm (18/40 years old, Muslim, student, PJ) affirmed: 
[…] when I'm asked the question "Where are you from?", I 
answer depending on which people I'm talking to...so when 
people ask you where you were born, you say Jordan...but when 
asked by Jordanians where I'm from, I'll say I'm Palestinian. So 
if you're from outside the country and ask me where I'm from, 
I'll say I'm from Jordan because I was born in Jordan. […] but 
when I'm in Jordan and asked by Jordanians, or any person in 
Jordan, I say I'm Palestinian... […] Now that you have all of 
these other foreign people [Iraqis, Syrians] in Jordan I feel more 
Jordanian, I feel more welcome. But I still believe that I am 
Palestinian. 
I: So you think that after Iraqi refugees came and after Syrian 
refugees came, now with the Syrian crisis, Jordanian society 
changed? 
Ḥ: yeah, they hate the Syrians now. It's moved from Palestinians 
to Syrians. 
Nevertheless, Rāša (18/40 years old, Christian, JJ) a Jordanian 
secretary, to the question “Where are you from?” straightforwardly 
answered: 
I am Jordanian, pure140. My father is Jordanian and my mother 
is Jordanian. 
Notably, intellectuals and generally highly educated 
interviewees, regardless for their origins and faith, acknowledged but 
                                                          
140 Notably, even though the interview has been made completely in Arabic, Rāša 
said the word “pure” in English, as to underline it. 
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refused such label. For example, Aḥmad (40+ years old, Muslim, PJ), a 
writer and Arabic teacher said: 
[…] there is no true as opposed to false. The only true 
[Jordanian] is the one who loves his country, who fears for his 
country, regardless for his origins. Citizenship for me is to 
belong to a nation even though I am more than proud of my 
Palestinian origins. 
On the other side, many “pure Jordanians” criticized the 
expression accusing the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin of 
disrespecting their only and true nation by always reaffirming their 
origins. A participant (18/40 years old, Christian, female, JJ) affirmed: 
Palestinians got the Jordanian nationality but they keep 
referring at themselves as Palestinians. Even though they live in 
Jordan since very long time or they were born in Jordan. They 
would never tell you “I am Jordanian”. They say “Palestinian 
Jordanian or Jordanian of Palestinian origin”. I say “Why?” 
Likewise, the already quoted Circassian141 scholar ‘Alī (18/40 
years old, Muslim) said: 
Palestinians in Jordan do not have a full understanding of 
nationality as a concept, their understanding is limited, that’s 
why they still define themselves as “West Bankers”. […] Do you 
know that the Palestinians call the 1970 civil war black 
September while we [Jordanians] call it white September? 
Because that was the end of the story.  
Dr. Qāqīš (40+ years old, economist, Christian, PJ)—whose 
story is particularly interesting as his Palestinian father took his 
Jordanian mother’s surname in order to gain the Jordanian citizenship 
(when it was still legally possible)—somehow agrees with this 
narrative: 
                                                          
141 This extract is particularly interesting as it also shows the strong national feeling 
of the Circassian minority, the reasons of which have been detailed above. 
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My name is Hanna Qāqīš which is a Jordanian family but I was 
born in Lydda142, in Palestine. In 1946, we immigrated to 
Jordan, and we stayed in Jordan till now. So we are immigrants, 
Palestinian immigrants. But […] we got the Jordanian 
nationality, and we are now Jordanians, we can't say we are 
Palestinians. […] I don't know. I don't know. They [referring to 
the Jordanians of Palestinian origin] are loyal to Palestine... ok 
I'm also loyal to Palestine. I'm loyal to Saudi Arabia, I'm loyal 
to Kuwait [Dr. Qāqīš worked in both countries for many years]. 
But my identity... is Jordanian. The next time, if you meet 
someone who says that he is originally from Palestine, tell him 
to prove it. 
Ismāʻīl (18/40 years old, Muslim, Jordanian father and Spanish 
mother, Spanish/Arabic Teacher at Cervantes) raised an interesting 
point in this respect. In his opinion, the Palestinian identity in Jordan 
has been allowed to survive by the very nature of the multifaceted 
Jordanian national identity that he contraposed to the “violent” 
Lebanese one: 
[…] The Palestinians who live in Lebanon speak in a 
Lebanese accent, but here everyone has their own accent 
because they retain their identity... The Jordanian identity is 
not as “violent” as the Lebanese one. It doesn't really even 
out the differences. I think the Jordanian identity can adapt 
to differences more easily than the Palestinian one, for 
example, or the Lebanese one, which is really strong. The 
Lebanese identity sure is strong, but it's not national, it's very 
fragmented... I could even go as far as to say that there isn't 
a national identity in Lebanon... they have a sectarian 
identity based on religion. That's not the case over here in 
Jordan. Here you can be Jordanian and at the same time you 
can be of Circassian, Chechen, Armenian, Palestinian, 
Syrian descent... 
                                                          
142 Lydda is a mixed Jewish-Arab city 15 km southeast of Tel Aviv in the Central 
District of Israel. 
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Sulaymān (18/40 years old, Christian, JJ, Freelance) does not 
deny the coexistence of several constituencies under the “Jordanian 
national umbrella”. However, when asked if there is a common identity 
that unite them all, he answered as follows: 
No, there is no common identity in my opinion. I think a common 
identity does exist only if you take certain places out of the 
picture […] but I mean, Jordan is very small, it should be more 
homogenous than this, but it's not.  
Furthermore, as stressed before, the case of the Palestinians 
from Gaza needs to be discussed separately as it is of course very 
peculiar for the political and historical reasons discussed in the previous 
sections. In fact, Gazans are not Jordanian citizens (they do not have 
the “national number”143) and that limits, if not completely negates 
them access to the welfare, health and educational system and to the job 
market. The “children of Gaza” call themselves refugees even though 
they arrived in Jordan when they were just infants. Being refugees for 
them is indeed an identity criterion itself and many are not willing to 
give it up as resistance and resilience truly define them. When referring 
to themselves and their status in the country, along with lāği’ūn 
(refugees) or nāziḥūn (displaced persons) many also used the word 
ḍuyūf (guests) that both shows the success of the governmental 
“guesthood” narrative (al-Abed, 2014) rooted in the Islamic, Arab and 
Bedouin tradition, and well expresses how they still perceive their 
permanence in the state to be only provisional. Unsurprisingly, they 
professed gratitude and respect toward their “host country” and its King 
but they never lost either the hope or the will to go back one day to their 
                                                          
143 The raqm waṭanī is a civil registration number accorded at birth or upon 
naturalization which is recorded on national ID cards and on the family registration 
books issued only to citizens. 
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true homeland (that the majority have never seen or, if so, do not 
remember). 
Palestinians in Kuwait had a different faith compared to their 
Gazan brothers but they also live at the margins of society. In fact, 
because of the PLO official support for Iraq during the First Gulf War, 
they have seen their social and working position extremely reduced 
over time. Such a sudden exclusion from the country they once 
considered their own, has been felt as a profound and even painful 
injustice by many: 
I: What is identity for you? If you want to... the first thing that 
comes to your mind when you think about identity. 
P: Nothing, I can't think about any identity. I don't have 
identity, at all. I am a different person… 
I: According to who is in front of you? 
P: Yeah, depending who's in front of me, […] I will never show 
them my real self. I talk to everyone in his accent, so I can 
communicate with people. 
I: So they feel closer to you... 
P: Yes! If he's Syrian, I will speak to him in a Syrian accent, if 
he's Kuwaiti modern [he means ḥaḍar], I will speak to him in 
Kuwaiti modern accent... like, some people don't know who I 
am, where I am from. […] I'm Palestinian, I'm not ashamed of 
my country, I'm so proud, even if I've never been there... but 
this [Kuwait] is my country, that's the thing they don't 
understand, here I was born, here I was raised, here I lived 
and I live... but I am nothing to them, that's what hurts me the 
most, makes me angry144. 
If an analysis of the Jordanian national identity must take into 
consideration the Palestinian element as both a threat to its very 
existence and its integral part, when discussing the Kuwaiti national 
identity, it is impossible to ignore the majority of the Emirate’s 
                                                          
144 Male, 18/40 years old, Muslim, unoccupied, E-Palestine. 
244 
 
inhabitants who are forcibly excluded from the national identity.  
However, their cases will be presented within the last dimension as the 
perpetual marginalization from the political and social life of 70% of 
the country’s population is undoubtedly an indicator of the state’s 
sovereignty crisis, due to its hybrid nature. 
As for the Kuwaiti citizens’, age, education145, gender but 
especially the belonging to a (originally) Bedouin or settled family play 
a crucial role in defining both personal and political awareness of the 
respondents and consequently the nature of their national identity. In 
fact, the ḥaḍar/badū dichotomy is unavoidable when discussing the 
Kuwaiti identity. As already noted, the badū have been alienated from 
their own nationhood as the townspeople consider themselves the 
founding fathers of the (city) state, and, even though they do not exist 
anymore as a distinct, ontological entity they are still considered a 
sociologically and culturally distinct group. 
The scheme below shows the correlation among the above listed 
indicators by placing the data outcomes on a continuum that sees as the 
most politically aware a male, highly educated, ḥaḍar over forty years 
old, while as the least politically aware and thus with a poorly 
articulated conception of national identity, a low educated badū, 
regardless of gender and age range. 
  
                                                          
145 The literacy rate in Kuwait is particularly high (total population: 96.2%; male: 
96.4%; female: 94.5%), according to UNDP the Emirate’s educational system is 
above the regional average and education is free for all citizens. Therefore, within this 
reasoning high educated citizens are university graduates (or PhD holders), while low 
educated are secondary school graduates. See the 2018 Human Development Report 
of Kuwait http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KWT  
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The following three interviews’ abstracts are exemplary of the 
third to last category, in bold: 
Mahā (University student) 
Kuwait represents to me the best thing ever, you know, for me 
it's the best country, and Kuwait for me is like both my son and 
my father, so I'm nothing without Kuwait, and...I'm super sure 
that I'm proud to be Kuwaiti, because I think Kuwait provides 
us with many things… other Arabic rich countries, they don't 
provide to the people living there as much as Kuwait does. 
Fāṭima (Bank employee) 
[…] Being Kuwaiti is like you feel secure in your country, 
because our government provides us with a very secure system 
for retirement, we have a very good welfare system here in 
Kuwait.  Also, for couples they get married, in the future, they 
can afford a house, so you feel secure in your country. 
Šayma (Unemployed) 
Kuwait is a very unique country, that is my opinion, Kuwait is 
very special and unique, although we are a very small country, 
Kuwait presents many good things. We present hospitality, 
kindness, generosity, we are fighters, we are people who stand 
in front of the enemies, and in front of anyone who's trying to 
put us down, or trying to harm or hurt us in any way. So, yes I 
am very proud to be Kuwaiti. 
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4.2 Islamic identity 
Notably, both Jordan and Kuwait have mixed legal system made of 
civil law, customary law and šarī‘a inspired law, and both countries’ 
personal law is fully based on šarī‘a. Besides, in Kuwait, in order to be 
considered effectively part of the community and the beneficiary of 
rights, an individual must be Muslim. The condition of religious 
membership was introduced in the country with a specific Law, art.1 of 
Law 1/1982, which states that only a Muslim can obtain naturalization; 
if conversion to Islam has occurred, it must have happened at least five 
years before applying for naturalization1. Islam is an intermediate legal 
entity in the sense that ecclesiastical membership has bearing on 
political citizenship by making Islam part of the state or with the 
socialization of šarī‘a. Clear evidence of this is the sin of apostasy: 
some states establish that a person stained with this crime must 
immediately forfeits his or her citizenship. In Kuwait there was a case 
of loss of citizenship in 1996 following an accusation of apostasy2. In 
Jordan, as in Kuwait, Islam is the state religion; however, religious 
freedom is ensured by the Constitution (article 6, chapter 2) and since 
2016 new smart IDs no longer indicate the holder’s religion3. 
Nevertheless, a big part of the Banū Hāšim’s legitimacy comes from 
their lineage from the Arab chieftain Qurayš, the same tribe of Prophet 
Muḥammad. Accordingly, the constitution (article 28, chapter 4) states 
                                                          
1 Gianluca Parolin, Dimensioni dell'appartenenza e cittadinanza nel mondo arabo 
(Napoli: Jovene, 2007), 193-196; 234. 
2 The reference here is to Ḥussaīn ‘ Alī Qambar’s conversion to Christianity. See 
also Anh Nga Longva, “The apostasy law in the age of universal human rights and 
citizenship. Some legal and political implications,” in The Fourth Nordic 
Conference on Middle Eastern Studies: The Middle East in a Globalizing World, 
Oslo (13-16 August 1998),  https://org.uib.no/smi/pao/longva.html  
3 “Jordan Removes Religion from New ID Cards,” Mashreq, politics and culture 
Journal (July 5, 2016), http://mpc-journal.org/blog/2016/07/05/jordan-removes-
religion-from-new-id-cards/ 
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that “no person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a Muslim, mentally 
sound and born by a legitimate wife and of Muslim parents”4. Besides, 
the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood since its foundation in 1942 (‘Abd 
al-Laṭīf Abū Qūra, 1906-1967) has been very close to the Hashemites 
for several reasons. In fact, the ruling family needed a powerful ally to 
gain popular support against the nationalist, anti-monarchic and 
Nasserist currents that threatened its legitimacy to rule in the Fifties; 
besides, at that time the two Banks had just been united and the 
Brotherhood’s intention of freeing Palestine from the Zionist invader 
well matched with the expansionist aims of the Hashemites in the 
region. Notably, to strengthen this convenient alliance, the Hashemites 
assigned to the Brotherhood the Ministery of Education, a decision that 
deeply impacted the school curricula and the textbooks, revised only in 
2015 and 20175.  
The interviews’ findings highlight how Islamic identity complete 
and strengthen the national identity of Muslim citizens rather than 
substitute it, both in Jordan and in Kuwait. The significance of 
religiosity and—given the focus on two Muslim-majority countries—
specifically of Islam, has been investigated through the following 
question which required the interviewees to order the listed identity 
criteria from the most to the least relevant for them:  
                                                          
4 Foreign Ministry of Jordan, “Jordanian nationality, how to acquire, relinquish and 
the relevant instructions”, 
https://jordan.gov.jo/wps/wcm/connect/gov/egov/government+ministries+_+entities/
ministry+of+foreign+affairs/services/jordanian+nationality%2C+how+to+acquire%
2C+relinquish+and+the+relevant+instructions 
5 Particularly interesting is the case of the text for Islamic studies in Jordanian 
universities, al-ṯaqāfa al-Islāmiyya wa qaḍāyā al-‘aṣr (Islamic culture and issues of 
the era), published by Hamid House and edited by twenty members of the šarī‘a 
faculty of the University of Jordan in Amman. In this text, before the 2015 and 2017 
revisions modern Jordan did not exist and religious authorities had power over the 
monarch. See Kirk Sowell H., “Downplaying Jihad in Jordan’s Educational 
Curriculum, 2013-2107,” Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (December 2017). 
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9. I will give you some identity criteria, can you order them from 
the most relevant to the least relevant according to your perception 
and then justify your decision? 
 Religion 
 National Belonging 
 ‘Arabhood’ - Language  
 Family  
 Palestinian origins [only for Jordan] 
While not surprisingly, Christian Jordanians chose nationality 
over religion, Islam proved to be the most relevant identity criterion for 
the majority of the Muslim interviewees, a data that implicitly 
confirmed the words of Father Bassām: 
[…] In Jordan we always put our religion at the first place... 
Yeah, first it comes religion, and after religion “I am 
Jordanian and I am Palestinian”... And then your home 
country, as your nationality. […]. But I think that in the whole 
Arab World, religion comes first, then your home country, 
and then the king6. 
Likewise, Sulaymān (18/40 years old, Christian, JJ, Freelance) 
thinks that only Islam has the power of uniting Jordanian people and he 
references the above mentioned “jordanization” programs of King ‘Abd 
Allāh and his (failed) efforts of proposing a “modern” sense of 
belonging, based only on citizenship and not on religious affiliations : 
Well, they didn't work... I'm not sure what the king was trying 
to base them on […]. I like his policies here but... I'm not sure 
what he did, but I think the only thing that unites people here 
is religion. Islam is what unites people. 
I: But if that is true, why is the government perceived as 
legitimate by everyone? 
S: It's not. It's not perceived as such. It is perceived by some to 
be legitimate, and the government here is scary, and Jordanians 
have a tendency not to speak up, not to do anything... Anyway 
the king started to take religion out of the curriculum in school, 
                                                          
6 Father Bassām (40+ years old, Christian, JJ). 
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like not forcing...like I was forced to learn all about Islam at 
school, in Arabic class... so he tried to take that out. And he tried 
to, for example... something about religion in the books for kids, 
it used to be represented by a mosque, but now they have 
changed it to include pictures of a mosque, church and the 
Buddhist temple. 
Besides, among the Christian interviewees in the 18/40 years old 
age range, many affirmed that living in a Muslim-majority country can 
be challenging for a young Christian, although not form a legal 
perspective: 
[…] Our country is driven by... it's a Muslim country, and it's 
driven by Muslim traditions and customs […]. I mean, the law 
of Jordan, the Jordanian law is pretty ok, it's not too bad, but 
our society is driven by certain traditions and customs that 
are very close-minded, it makes everything like... shameful7. 
As for the Emirate, the majority of Kuwaiti citizens affirmed 
that only “the Islamic religion leads toward a conscious citizenship”, 
thus equating a good Muslim with a good citizen and reasserting the 
status of the (Islamic) religion as an integral part of nationhood: 
Of course, I am proud of being a Kuwaiti... my national identity 
to me is my Islamic identity, my religion...because from people's 
religion you can know who they are, where they really belong to, 
you know?8 
To me national identity is religion. I think a person without 
religion is nothing, cause religion decides who this person is9. 
First comes religion because religion explains you what 
nationality means, religion explains you the sense of belonging, 
how to be loyal to the Emir and to the nation10. 
                                                          
7 Interviewee (18/40 years old, Christian, male, PJ, accountant). 
8 Sara (18/40 years old, Muslim, middle school English teacher, K). 
9 Mahā (18/40 years old, Muslim, university student, K). 
10 Female, 18/40 years old, employee of the Ministry of Justice, K. 
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4.3 Arabhood 
According to Webb (2015) “an ethnic identity is both a 
capricious intellectual construct and a potent force that shapes how 
people organize themselves and interact with others11”. As already 
stressed, Pan-Arabism ceased to be a realistic political objective in the 
Seventies, with the Arab defeat against Israel in the 1969 and 1973 wars 
and the death of General Nasser. Notably, according to Eid (2007) Islam 
has filled the space left empty by its demise: 
The failure of pan-Arabism and Western-type liberalism to 
provide the principles needed to shape a postcolonial identity 
triggered a search for new normative grounds that might give 
meaning to the idea of “Arabness.” […] a new religious 
nationalism emerged within this ideological vacuum, a 
nationalism asserting a collective identity freed from the 
remnants of the former “colonized” identity imposed by the 
West. Islamist discourses and movements became increasingly 
politicized and militant, advocating for the Islamization of 
social structures in both public and private domains […]. One 
can contend that religion became interwoven with national 
selfhood in the post 1970s Arab world12. 
However, the aim of this query is to gain a deeper understanding 
of the identity criteria that are perceived as most significant within the 
case studies’ societies, regardless of their actual feasibility. 
Accordingly, the strength of “Arabness” or better “Arabhood” (as to 
stress the claimed brotherhood that supposedly unites all Arabs) as a 
source of identity have been investigated through the interviews. The 
fact that some respondents claimed to be confident that a sort of “Arab 
nation” could and should be realized in the future, has been considered 
                                                          
11 Peter Webb, “Arab Origins: Identity, History and Islam,” British Academy (20 July 
2015), https://www.britac.ac.uk/blog/arab-origins-identity-history-and-islam 
12 Paul Eid, Being Arab: Ethnic and Religious Identity Building among Second 
Generation Youth in Montreal (Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2007), 14.  
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an indicator itself, along with the disillusionment expressed by the 
majority toward an Arab brotherhood perceived as unreal, mainly due 
to the lack of inter-Arab support, especially but not exclusively from 
the Gulf countries toward Syrian citizens, following the events of the 
so-called Arab spring. 
Indeed, the majority of the highly educated men over 40 years 
old both in Jordan and in Kuwait consider Arabhood as one of the most 
relevant identity criteria, and some of them even placed this ethnic 
affiliation above the religious one: 
We are Arabs, we are part of the Arab nation, we belong to this 
Arab nation, we have the same language, same habit, same 
culture, same biases, same fears13. 
The real identity to me is the Arab identity. We are Arabs. The 
Arab identity is more important than the Islamic one. According 
to me, and I believe that most of the intellectuals would agree, 
the Arab identity is universal, Christians can have it, Muslims 
can have it, Shiites and Sunnis, are all Arabs. Then if you want 
you can talk about the Arab Muslim identity or the Arab 
Christian identity14.  
Nevertheless, opposite views are not uncommon, especially in 
Kuwait where the First Gulf War, the resultant of an aggression by a 
fellow Arab country, obviously contributed to the end of the (Pan-) 
Arab narrative, both on a political and personal, emotional level. 
I: And what do you think about “Arabhood”? Do you believe 
there is, or not? 
P: Not at all. Not at all. 
I: It's just a concept. 
P: Only a concept, only a concept, and nobody cares about it 
now. Now we care about our country. We don't care about Egypt 
for example; we don't care about... Sometimes, sometimes it's 
                                                          
13 Nāṣir (40+ years old, University Professor, Muslim, PJ). 
14 Ğamāl (40+ years old, writer, intellectual, Muslim, PJ). 
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good to think of this criteria, but they do not mean anything 
anymore. 
On the other hand, younger interviewees like Maḥmūd (18/40 
years old, Muslim, Engineer, PJ) believed that Arab nowadays look for 
smaller identities hence the macro Arab identity has lost its value and 
its power. 
Likewise, another Palestinian girl said: 
As Palestinian refugee who lives in a camp and who has lived 
in a very unwelcoming country such as Saudi Arabia, I think 
that Arab identity lost its meaning. 
Particularly interesting is the stand point of Sara, an Egyptian 
university student resident in Kuwait that completely denies her Arab 
lineage, a discourse common also among Lebanese people who claim 
to be descendants of the “Phoenicians”, Phoenicianism being in fact a 
form of Lebanese nationalism15. Indeed, as discussed in the first 
chapter, Egyptian nationalism until the Thirties had Pharaonic or 
Mediterranean basis: 
First of all, to be honest, I do not see me being an Egyptian as 
me being an Arab, we just happen to speak the same language, 
but if you go back in history, we're actually not, we're Coptic 
[Copts; Coptic is the North Africa ethnoreligious group’s 
language], we are not Arab. We were not called Egyptians 
before, we were called Coptics. So, to me, Egypt is not an Arab 
country... actually, 90 percent of our DNA is pure, it's pure 
Egyptian... right now, you don't have pure Egyptians, but the 
percentage of Arab blood in the Egyptians citizens is 17 
percent. We are not even related to Arabs. Arabs are not even 
Lebanese, Arabs are like the Kuwaitis, the Saudi Arabians... 
these are the Arabs, we are not Arabs, we are Coptics. So, I 
don't see myself in the Umma arabiyya [The Arab community], 
I don't see myself as a part of that at all. […] The Syrian crisis 
                                                          
15 See Asher Kaufman, “Phoenicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon in 
1920. Middle Eastern Studies 37” no. 1, (2001): 173-194, 
https://phoenicia.org/phoeleb.html  
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showed a lot of the truth, the full truth about what is going on, 
so it's not...they call us Arabs, they say that the Middle East is 
Arab, they say that the Middle Eastern should stand by each 
other, but the Syrian crisis showed that we are nowhere close 
to that, and it became all political instead of humanitarian... 
there's no humanity in what's happening right now, people are 
thinking selfishly. 
Nevertheless, despite the detected difference of significance 
given to the Arab identity depending on the age range, the vast 
majority of the Jordanian participants, when addressed about the 
Syrian issue stressed the refugees’ belonging to their same ethno-
linguistic and in many cases also religious community: 
Identity in the bilād al-šām, that is Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and 
Palestine, is the same. We have very similar customs and 
traditions, thus the effect of the Syrian refugees [on Jordan] 
stays within the same identity circle. There is no new identity 
as if the refugees were Turks or Afghans or Europeans16. 
Moreover, language is an essential part of the Arab identity and 
interestingly, in both Jordan and Kuwait knowledge of Arabic language 
is a condition for obtaining naturalization. The linguistic dimension and 
its undeniable relevance have been already discussed, especially from 
a methodological perspective in the previous chapter. However, its 
significance can be reaffirmed once more through the words of 
Professor Yasir Suleiman: 
In spelling out the content of this position, the Arab nationalists 
adopt as an article of supreme faith the view that language is not 
just a means of communication, of conveying messages between 
interlocutors, but a most eloquent symbol of group identity and 
one whose ultimate strength lies in its ability to provide the 
cultural and instrumental backbone of the group’s legitimate 
objective of furthering its ethno cultural self-interest17 
                                                          
16 Ğamāl (40+ years old, writer, intellectual, Muslim, PJ). 
17 Samir I. Bitar “Language, Identity, and Arab Nationalism: Case Study of Palestine,” 
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) 5, no. 4 (2011): 51. 
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The significance of the Arabic language has been reasserted by 
the majority of the interviewees in both countries. The following words 
of Suhā (18/40 years old, Muslim, employee and university student, E-
Palestinian Jordanian born in Kuwait) perfectly show its identity power; 
in fact, she chooses English over Arabic because such power for her is 
too difficult to handle: 
I like speaking English more than other [languages]. Because 
I don't know how to speak my own language, Arabic. There are 
special criteria, special words that you have to show your 
identity with, that you can identify yourself with... this is 
Palestinian, this is Syrian, this is Lebanese, (because they are 
very close, those three countries, especially), everything is 
clear when you speak in Arabic, so I prefer English, 
unfortunately. 
 
4.4 Hybridity, tribal affiliations and clientelism 
Before the spread of the Islamic faith, the spirit that drove the 
Bedouins to unite and submit to the authority of one family was called 
'asabiyya, a concept which Ibn Ḫaldūn tackles in his work, al-
Muqaddima and which Mansoor Moaddel (2002) re-proposes, in the 
meaning of “group solidarity based on blood ties and relations among 
members of the same tribe which leads them to fight and die for one 
another”18. In the Gulf Region and in Jordan, identity paradigms typical 
of tribal traditions (membership within the kinship group and the 
religious community) are embedded in the state structure, thus continue 
to co-exist today alongside the concept of a modern State. The hybrid 
nature of the Jordanian and Kuwaiti states has been a sort of guiding 
                                                          
18 Mansoor Moaddel, “The Study of Islamic Culture and Politics: An Overview and 
Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002): 368. 
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thread since the first chapter and the present section, by investigating 
this dimension, aims to look at it from an inner perspective. 
Even though there were not specific questions in the interview 
outline aimed to detect such dimension, relevant indicators of the 
hybridity of the two states somehow permeated all the answers which 
implicitly highlighted how both countries lack of a full domestic 
sovereignty mainly because their basic institutions are not always 
“objective, accountable, predictable and transparent”19 as the 
institutions of modern statehood should be but still rely on personal 
affiliation and tribal allegiances. The following excerpts are very 
revealing in this regard. 
To start, Professor Nāṣir (40+ years old, University Professor, 
Muslim, PJ) acknowledges and confirms the coexistence of modernity 
and tradition in Jordan: 
I also love Jordan because of its still significant Arab culture, a 
sense of belonging to a tribal society... you know there's been 
globalization that has taken place in the world... I think you can 
still feel, in Jordan, that you're still part of a traditional culture 
that still exists, that is special and has not developed to such an 
extent where you are influenced by the rush of modernity and 
globalization, and so forth. So it makes me feel like I'm in a place 
that is warm... backward but warm. 
While another participant (female, 18/40 years old, PJ born in 
the Philippines, Muslim, Arabic teacher) affirms that origins and 
familiar affiliations in Jordan play a big role in defining both the 
personal and the national identity of people: 
[…] It's just how the culture sees the identity, so...I think origins 
is a very important thing in our culture, so not what passport 
you hold, or where you live...it's more where your family comes 
from. I think that plays a big role in how people see you, and 
then how you can see yourself, because part of what we identify 
                                                          
19 Bacik, op. cit., 18, 19. 
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ourselves as is how people see us. […] Even though I have a 
passport, and my father is Jordanian, and I speak Arabic. Once 
people look at me think...“mmm maybe not!” Even if I have 
nothing to do with it [Palestine], even if I've never been there 
[Palestine]...even if...I was born in the Philippines, but I've never 
been there....it's still a big part of who I am and how people see 
me. […] I think for Jordanian tribes...maybe they feel that they 
have created Jordan, and hence they can be called Jordanian. 
But, for other people, I don't know how they identify as 
Jordanians, because they did not participate in creating Jordan. 
Likewise Tamīm (18/40 years old, Muslim, PJ, Hotel 
receptionist and university student), points out the difference between 
Western and Eastern understandings of nationality: 
[…] for example, if you go to government office or anything, you 
would have a question about where your father was born... 
regardless of the fact that you hold Jordanian nationality, or 
nationality number… I think it's not the same way as in the 
Western culture, as long as you have their nationality, that's 
fine. They ask where you were born, but they don't ask you about 
your father, or your mother... where they were born. So, here's 
different. 
While the episode narrated by Aḥmad (18/40 years old, teacher, 
non-believer, JJ) actually shows how such difficulties can effect a 
citizen’s daily-life:  
I: does someone's life in this country depend on how they 
identify? Like the way you identify yourself is giving you 
different opportunities than someone who might identify in 
another way? 
A: yeah, like, I feel like it totally does that. I can give you 
examples. I don't remember precisely, but I guess if you were 
stopped by a police officer on the street like in Irbid20, or like 
in Petra streets...sometimes when we were in Irbid me and my 
cousins, we would just go out to smoke cigarettes and drink tea 
                                                          
20 Irbid is a city in northern Jordan, the third largest city of the country after Zarqa 
and Amman. 
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or coffee...and we were at a gas station we would get stopped 
by police and they were like Mīn antom? La wen raḥīn? [Who 
are you? Where are you going?]21...we speak the same dialect, 
then we give him ids [identity cards], oh (last name)! Where 
are you guys from? Do you guys know Maḥmūd? I worked with 
him 2 years ago! We were on that traffic light over there, 
harassing people...and he was like, oh you guys can go, but 
you must give me a cigarette, give me a cigarette. And 
basically I was like, “Oh, shit, if I were Syrian I'd be like 
shi**ing bricks, you know?” 
Notably, Nāṣir (18/40 years old, Arabic Teacher and employee 
at AICS, Muslim, PJ) describes Jordan as a family headed by a fatherly 
monarch: 
I: So you define yourself as Jordanian. And do you think there 
is a difference in everyday life, between Jordanians and 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin? In the educational system, 
for the job market access, welfare... 
N: So, for me they are equal 100%. But there is an aspect… 
when you for example... when you go to a public place, a public 
office... they always look at your surname, and they know 
you're Palestinian, Jordanian-Palestinian, or you're 
Jordanian-Jordanian. When you're Jordanian-Jordanian they 
treat you in a way more ... I do not know, they make things 
faster. 
Identity, like ... it's a difficult question ... I think Jordan is the 
king and queen, I swear to you. Because all the Jordanians say 
"ah we are Jordanians, long live King ‘Abd Allāh and Queen 
Rānīā!" So in my opinion ... their family is our family, their 
family is Jordan and the king is our father.  
Ismāʻīl (18/40 years old, Muslim, Jordanian father and Spanish 
mother, Spanish/Arabic Teacher at Cervantes) despite acknowledging 
the heterogeneity of the Jordanian society, is sure that every 
constituency has a proper place: 
                                                          
21 The interview have been made in English but Aḥmad chose to say that one sentence 
in Arabic perhaps to confer more authenticity to his story. 
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Jordanians of Palestinian descent, come from the region 
east of the Jordan River and owns the private market, they 
are more into businesses, while us Trans Jordanians have 
more power in the army, police, government affairs, 
bureaucracy... then there are the Circassians, who mainly 
work in the intelligence services and as royal guards...  they 
play a bigger role in state affairs compared with other 
ethnicities. Then there are the Christians, they're not an 
ethnicity but they're still a minority group. They generally 
have very good levels of education, they attend 
internationals schools, so this helps them get good jobs in 
international firms, more than any other groups including 
Muslims, both of Jordanian and Palestinian descent. 
And he praised late King Ḥusayn’s diplomacy, crucial for 
Jordan’s survival as a sovereign country: 
King Ḥusayn, he was a good statesman, but he didn't have 
an ideology you could easily label. I think he did... he was a 
very pragmatic man. He went for what worked. This is 
Jordan's character, it's a very diplomatic country, it doesn't 
have any serious conflicts with any other country, and has 
strong allies that assist it. And this is why Jordan has been 
able to survive. For example, King Ḥusayn was a good ally 
of the Soviet Union, but he was even a better ally of the 
United States, and had good relations with the English as 
well. During the 1990 war against Iraq, he had good 
relations with Saddam Hussein... he was on his side but also 
had good ties with Western nations. 
Another young interviewee (18/40 years old, Christian, 
male, PJ, accountant) stressed how Jordanian society is made of 
many components: 
There's the pure Jordanian, Palestinian Jordanian, plus the 
Muslim and Christian. 
And he added that 
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[in university] you would get your papers done more easily 
if you were a pure Jordanian, if you come from a pure 
Jordanian... Muslim family... it would make things easier. 
Sulaymān (18/40 years old, Christian, JJ, Freelance) pointed 
out the wasṭa system (literally “middle”, as it has an intermediary 
role), an institutional part of the Jordanian society since its very 
creation, a product of the state’s tribal origins that, according to Al-
Ramahi (2008), “summarizes the personal and collective nature of 
the Jordanian society and it is also a personal exchange system 
between members of society that is entrenched in the tribal structure 
of the country”22. 
If someone asked me where you are from, I would answer 
with where I am... where I was raised, I'm from Amman, I 
was raised here. But, usually people insist on asking where 
you are really from and I think the question is... you know, 
we have these stereotypes that apply to Jordanians, and 
other stereotypes about Palestinians, and when you meet 
someone new, you're trying to make those assumptions 
about that person. I think it's not...I think it's not very 
practical to do that, it can be judgmental, and... Also it has 
to do a lot with the wasṭa system, and in some cases if you're 
purely Jordanian, it helps, and if you're not Jordanian-
Jordanian, then no one cares about you... but even the other 
way around, depending on who's offering the wasṭa. […] 
Being Jordanian helps like in dealing with the police, for 
example... 
I: It makes it easier? 
S: It makes it easier for me, because the police, they're all 
Jordanians. 
I: If you want to apply for a governmental job... 
S: that also helps... in the government most of them are 
Jordanians, so yes it helps. 
                                                          
22 Aseel Al-Ramahi, “Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle 
Eastern Society,” Arab Law Quarterly 22 (2008): 36. 
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As for Kuwait, the Arab expatriates, most of which were born 
in the Emirate, report in the following interviews’ excerpts how they 
have seen their status progressively worsening over the years 
(especially since the 2000s) and how they are nowadays living under 
the constant threat of deportation and mistreated both on a professional 
and personal level. Quoting Bacik (2009): 
The expatriates problem reveals that Kuwait is well short of 
being a modern nation; instead, it exists as a collection of 
discrete constituencies. […] citizenship does not function as the 
basic mechanism of people-state relations. This has created a 
serious domestic sovereignty crises23. 
Suhā (18/40 years old, Muslim, employee and university 
student, E-Palestinian Jordanian) used to feel part of the country where 
she was born but she has now changed her perspective: 
I: Do you feel to be Kuwaiti somehow? 
S: No, I gave up the way I used to love Kuwait. Before I was 
working in an office, and I had never communicated with 
Kuwaitis, now I know the reality, the impolite way, the bad 
behaviors with the people, all the people here, they just treat 
them, very bad, all the nationalities, especially the Indians and 
Asians... they underestimate them, they treat them bad, my 
point of view has completely changed about Kuwait, before I 
was putting the Kuwaiti flag in my car, I was not putting the 
Palestinian one or the Jordanian one, or Indian, being married 
to an Indian. […] I didn't feel to be truly Kuwaiti, but I felt like 
I belong to this country, I love this country, my blood is 
Kuwaiti, that's what I thought... When I travelled, and anything 
wrong happened to the country, I cried. I felt for it, I loved the 
country... sincerely, seriously, when I spoke about Kuwait, I felt 
emotional, I don't know what you call this, but if Jordan or any 
country, played soccer...I supported Kuwait […]. I wanted to 
be here, now I've changed, I said yes, I can go and leave. 
                                                          
23 Bacik, op. cit., 132, 133. 
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While another participant of Egyptian origin (18/40 years old, 
Muslim, Engineer) shares a personal experience that truly shows the 
climate of injustice and disrespect in which foreign workers live:  
[…] they are treating us like we're just animals who came here 
to work and to take their money. I think they should treat us 
like we have lived in this country more than we have lived in 
our country. […] If I saw any check-in in the road...even 
though in the papers [documents], I don't have any problems...I 
feel like, if you don't like my face, you will stop me, for any 
reason, you will take me. […] I remember before, I had a sport 
car, Camaro, and it was just new... and there is a check-in, the 
police officer told me one thing I cannot forget, they told me 
“You are Egyptian and you have a Camaro”...I told them “So 
what?”.... “Some Kuwaitis cannot afford for this Camaro” he 
said... I told them, I'm sorry, you did not pay my car from your 
money, I'm paying it from my money, so why do you judge 
me?... because of that, because I said that, they threw me in 
jail for one night. Then, my father called a lot of people until I 
went out. […] Especially someone like me, born in this country, 
lived most of his life in this country, this was a very bad 
experience. […] You know that there is there is a Kuwaiti lady, 
she got in the newspapers, Internet, everywhere... and she said 
that all the foreigners must pay because they're walking in the 
streets of Kuwait?24 
                                                          
24 He is talking about Ṣafā’ al-Hāšim (b. 1964), the only woman currently elected to 
the Kuwaiti Parliament. She has very harsh positions toward expatriate workers. 
Indeed, in April 2017 she “had proposed to reduce the number of expatriates in the 
country, stop giving them free medicines at public clinics and hospitals even though 
they pay annual health insurance and taxing foreigners for walking on the road. She 
also proposed to charge expatriates for money transfers to their home country”. “MP 
Safaa Al-Hashem targets expats again”, Indians in Kuwait.com (Monday, April 3, 
2017), 
http://www.indiansinkuwait.com/ShowArticle.aspx?ID=43748&SECTION=0#ixzz5
PgIlF3kQ. 
See also “Proposal of MP Safa Al-Hashim ‘Expat workers to be deported once their 
projects are completed’ approved,” Arab Times (25/02/2018), 
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/proposal-of-mp-safa-al-hashim-expat-
workers-to-be-deported-once-their-projects-are-completed-approved/; “MP Safaa Al-
Hashim: Expats are opportunistic bacteria,” Arab Times (16/02/2018), 
http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/mp-safaa-al-hashim-expats-opportunistic-
bacteria/; “MP Safa Al-Hashem: Expats should be banned from hiring maids,” Kuwait 
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Likewise Sara (18/40 years old, Muslim, university student, E-
Egypt) complains about the unwelcoming environment in which she 
is forced to live, under the constant threat of deportation:  
I: So, like, even if you've lived here since you were born, you 
still feel as an Egyptian, you never feel to be a Kuwaiti. 
S: I never felt that, because citizens here, or many of the 
citizens here, not all of them, make you feel like you're not 
home. […] They never miss a chance to make you feel like 
you're not home. Like, this is not your country, you're here on 
a temporary stay… They never make you forget that, they never 
give you a chance. Like, for instance, I'm gonna give you one 
of the easiest examples. When you are walking in a mall and a 
guy is flirting with you, and you don't give him recognition, 
you don't give him attention... he starts to tell you "Ok, I'll 
deport you". Why are you going to deport me, just because I 
didn't give you attention? And this word, deporting, it's so easy 
[commonly used].  
Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, Palestinians’ 
condition is even worse:  
I can't feel home at all, walking in the street, trying to 
understand why those people hate us, especially expats. Why 
did they start to hate us? What did we do? We've been so good 
with them, we eat their food, we live with them, we sleep at 
their house, we did everything nice, why had everything 
changed? Especially in the late 2000's. […] The most common 
thing they say to you, always, always, they have to tell you “we 
will kick you out of the country if you open your mouth”, as a 
joke... but it's like, any Kuwaiti... talk to him right now, you 
fight with them, I fight with them normally... there was a car 
accident, we bumped each other... “You’re an expat, I will kick 
you out of this country!”. This is the normal. […] In Europe, 
or America, or Australia, they treat you as a human... you live 
there for 5 years, you have their nationality, at that time, they 
will never tell you “you are an  Arab”...they may tell you 
                                                          
Times (30/08/2018), http://news.kuwaittimes.net/website/mp-safa-al-hashem-expats-
banned-hiring-maids/.  
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you're an Arab Australian, you are a British American, 
whatever...they will never tell you “I will kick you out”. I've 
lived here 30 years of my life, I was born here, and I know 
everything. I can speak their language better than them. And 
after all, what's my nationality? You're an expat. They compare 
us to animals, we are here to steal their money, we are here to 
take all their food, their life, and we transfer to our country... 
we don't have a country [as Palestinians]. I was before... let's 
say a decade ago, 10 years ago, I was still having this thought 
"If anyone attacks this country, I will kick them", now, no25. 
On the contrary, expats from Saudi Arabia (that in many cases 
have been naturalized Kuwaiti and even obtained the first class 
citizenship) and in some degree from Lebanon have a better status in 
Kuwait: 
Šahīd (18/40 years old, Muslim, University student, E-Saudi Arabia) 
Well, Kuwait is my first home, as I said I was born and raised 
here, and I studied here, I have my relatives here and I'm going 
to work soon here, so it's like, you know, it's my home, and of 
course I am happy to live here. 
Interviewee (female, 18/40 years old, Muslim, English teacher, E-Saudi 
Arabia) 
I've lived in Kuwait all my life, although we are from Saudi 
Arabia, but both my parents have been living here for 
years...they were both born here, so you can say that we've 
been living here since... before the 60s. I really love this 
country, I feel like I am a Kuwaiti because I've lived here all 
my life. I'm really happy to be living in Kuwait, I wouldn't see 
myself living anywhere else, to be quite honest. 
Tūfīq (40+ years old, Christian, Business man, E-Lebanese) 
I think... of course, if you have a good job, it makes all the 
difference. But the difference between this country and the 
other GCC countries like Qatar, here you mingle, you work 
                                                          
25 Male, 18/40 years old, Muslim, unemployed, E (Palestine). 
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and interact with the locals a lot. Which makes a big 
difference, because you get to know their culture, their 
families, you get into them basically, and you become very 
good friends after a while. Because we are Lebanese... we are 
usually well regarded in this country, we have a good 
relationship with Kuwaitis. […] 
I: Did you ever feel Kuwaiti? 
T: No, you never do, because they make sure that you won't 
feel like that. You are still welcome, you still feel like part of 
the country professionally, but as far as belonging, identifying 
with this country...no. Here you keep your identity as Lebanese, 
because you cannot have the nationality, because of so many 
cultural differences, so you still identify yourself as Lebanese, 
but you assimilate, you start understanding the culture here 
and living it, but you don't become like that. 
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Conclusions 
The quest for legitimacy in Muslim contexts has been defined 
by the already mentioned Moroccan philosopher Abdou Filali-Ansary 
as a “four-act tragedy”, the four acts being: the birth of Islam and the 
era of the Rightly Guided caliphs until the Omayyad caliphate; the 
Sultan model of the Abbasids and the Ottomans; the arrival of the 
Europeans; the contemporary age. By retracing the evolution of the 
notion of legitimacy through the ages, Ansary aims to stress the political 
plurality of the Muslim world characterized by many political 
languages “certain representing ‘a return to service’ of words linked to 
the past (caliphate, shari‘a, etc.) and others spreading re-appropriations 
of notions and norms with universal characteristics”26. 
Indeed, the present project begun by investigating the 
peculiarities of the Islamic umma, considered the counterpart of the 
Western concept of the modern Nation-State and whose ideal 
boundaries have been unceasingly narrowed and widened by 
governments, leaders and thinkers according to the necessities of their 
time and in order to legitimate their standpoints. Then, following a 
chronological time line, the analysis continues by describing the 
challenges faced by the Prophet Muḥammad (570-632) who laid the 
foundations of the umma by making allegiance pacts (bay’a27) with the 
local communities (the relations among which were regulated by the 
Charter of Medina, 622), and especially by the Rightly Guided caliphs 
(632-661) that had to deal with the issue of succession and to guide the 
community toward a new political and identitarian dimension. In fact, 
the founding moment of the first act, according to Ansary’s 
                                                          
26 Abdou Filali-Ansari, op. cit. 
27 For the role of the bay’a as the foundation of the Moroccan monarchy, see George 
Joffé ed., North Africa. Nation, State and region (New York: Routledge, 1993), 207-
214. 
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periodization, is al-fitna al-kubrà, the great disaccord after which the 
Islamic community, previously led by religious principles, entered the 
new era of mulk (hereditary sovereignty) where “religion was placed at 
the service of politics”28, and not vice versa. 
The legitimacy of the Omayyad dynastic caliphate (661-750) 
was undermined by such profound shift as their aim was not, as it was 
for their predecessors, the creation of a moral community driven by the 
Islamic message: in fact, the Omayyads introduced the principle of 
heredity; the first caliph Muʿāwiya (d. 680) designated his son Yazīd 
(d. 683) as his successor; besides they launched a centralizing policy 
and made of Arabic the official language. They based part of their claim 
to legitimacy on the assertion of the superiority of Arab culture, thus 
their “Arab kingdom” tended to give preeminence to the ethnic identity 
element over the religious one. A major issue, the one of the 
discrimination and marginalization of the non-Arab newly converted 
(mawālī), would be solved by the “Islamic” Abbasid caliphate (750-
1258) that built a cosmopolite society around a new political center, 
Baghdad, founded in 762 by the second caliph al-Manṣūr (d.775)29. 
However, albeit the Abbasids called for religious legitimacy, 
their dynasty was more monarchic, hereditary and dominated by the 
interest of the reigning families than the one of their predecessors. As a 
response, and fearing that a fully legitimate form of power was by then 
only an illusion, some felt the urge to teach to the people how to follow 
an Islamic path (šarī‘a) independently of those in power: the schools of 
jurisprudence (maḏāhib) were born. The birth of the maḏāhib marked a 
separation between the political and the religious realms, not to be 
understood as a form of secularization but as a separation of domains: 
                                                          
28 Filali-Ansari, op. cit., 4. 
29 Francesca Maria Corrao, Islam, religion and politics (Rome: LUISS University 
Press, 2017), 24-26; 37, 38; 46-48. 
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the political power existed only to maintain public order and defend the 
community from any external threats while the šarī‘a was sacralised, 
thus becoming a fundamental source of legitimacy. 
After the Abbasid caliphate’s fragmentation, many dynasties 
fell and rose, always failing in maintaining the umma united but 
eventually, between the 14th and the 15th centuries, the Ottomans 
progressively took control over a great part of Southeast Europe, 
Western Asia and North Africa, again legitimizing their power on 
Islamic grounds and becoming “the last great expression of the 
universality of the world of Islam” (Hourani, 1991). 
However, when between the 17th and the 18th centuries the 
Ottoman system started to collapse, the ruling élite understood that a 
step toward the modernity was necessary for the very survival of the 
Empire, thus, even if they tried to revitalize the caliphate, they move 
toward a program of reforms, the Tanẓīmāt (1839-1876), aimed to make 
the Empire a modern centralized State. Its Vilayet Law of 1864 divided 
the Empire into provinces ruled by a governor, which started a process 
of territorial definition and created the earliest forms of modern and 
central statehood in the Arab lands. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottoman nationality 
ceased to exist alongside the political unity of the Ottoman rule, and the 
post-war peace treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) 
completed the partition of the Empire and drew new artificial political 
boundaries in the region, which entered the colonial phase that led to 
the codification of the šarī‘a into a collection of rules, thus its 
sacralisation as a divine path was transferred to the juridical codes of 
the 20th century newly formed states. 
It is within this historical and political background that a 
discussion of nationalism gains different meanings and becomes 
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significant even in the current globalized era, as pointed out by Nasser 
(2005): 
[…] Nationalism can be viewed as an integral process of a 
previous phase of globalization where cultural imperialism 
during the era of colonialism forced local cultures to reconfigure 
their identification after colonial forces drew new boundaries. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that the past phase of 
globalization marked by colonialism, disintegrated empires, and 
differentiated communities has given birth to a new form of 
identity-nationalism30. 
Moreover, on the impact of colonialism on the nation-ness of 
“the colonized” Anderson (1991) wrote: 
The expansion of the colonial state […] ‘invited’ nationals into 
schools and offices [while] colonial capitalism excluded them 
form boardrooms [thus] the key spokesman for colonial 
nationalism were lonely, bilingual intelligentsias unattached to 
sturdy local bourgeoisies. […] However, they had access to 
models of nations, nation-ness, and nationalism distilled from 
the turbulent, chaotic experiences of more than a century of 
American and European history. These models, in turn, helped 
to give shape to a thousand of inchoate dreams31. 
Aiming to examine on which identity criteria the legitimacy of 
the Arab-Muslim States is founded, the present thesis discussed the 
political, historical and theoretical reasons that made the Nation-State 
the prevalent political system in the MENA region.  The events that 
occurred since the end of the 19th century are described in the first 
chapter through the works and the ideas of the Arab thinkers and 
scholars who experienced the great political and cultural changes of that 
time. While the first nahḍa pioneers still considered Europe as an 
                                                          
30 Riad M. Nasser, Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel. The Necessary ‘Other’ 
in the Making of a Nation (New York & London: Routledge, 2005), ix. 
31 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 140. 
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example to follow and remained to some extent loyal to the Ottoman 
Empire, the second generation of thinkers (1870-1900 in Hourani’s 
periodization), faced a very different reality and started to see Europe 
as a threat: al-Afġānī, ‘Abduh, al-Kawākibī, ʿAbd al-Rāziq and Riḍā 
articulated their answers to the challenges of modernity from an Islamic 
perspective while Qāsim Amīn, al-Ḥuṣrī, Luṭfī al-Sayyīd, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn 
and ‘Aflaq did it within a modern Western institutional frame. 
Moreover, at the end of the Ottoman caliphate (1924) Ḥasan al-Bannā 
and Abū al-’A‘lā al-Mawdūdī (d. 1979) took in consideration the 
possibility to revitalize the caliphate in modern times. 
Over time, Western colonization triggered the Arab National 
awakening that led to the achievement of independence and then, in the 
Fifties, took a transnational form based on the (Pan-) Arab identity, as 
‘Aflaq and then Nasser translated al-Ḥuṣrī’s Pan-Arab ideology into 
political action. 
Then, the demise of the Pan-Arab ideology in the late Sixties 
apparently meant the consolidation of the state in the area, as if the Arab 
State as such, or its public perception, had become a source of 
legitimacy for the regimes that managed it. A discussion of the “post-
1967 generation” of thinkers—composed by some of the major 
exponents of the contemporary Arab thought such as Sadeq al-Azm, 
Laroui, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Arkoun, Hanafi, al-Jabri and Rashid al-
Ghannushi—has been essential in order to understand the significance 
of the Six Days War  and its impact on the Arab self both on a political 
and an intimate level, a shift exemplified by the enthusiastic 
exclamation “Write down, I am an Arab!” written in 1963 by Mahmoud 
Darwish (Maḥmūd Darwīsh, 1941- 2008) as opposed to the ending line 
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of Nizar Qabbani’s (Nizār Tawfīq Qabbānī, 1923-1998) poem dated 
1998: “Are we Arab one big lie?”32.  
Eventually, to the demise of Pan Arabism followed a post-
populist phase, within which Arab regimes managed to incorporate 
political parties, the press, universities and unions, thus reaching a 
stability that seemed invulnerable. 
Finally, by the Nineties, the Islamic opposition, that the 
authoritarian regimes had failed to cripple completely, tried to profit 
from their weakened legitimacy, and the regimes, in turn, being under 
increasing internal and external pressure to open up political space, 
proposed the counter-argument that doing so would open the door for 
radical Islamists33. Therefore, they maintained their authoritarian and 
coercive character, never tied their legitimacy to a genuine popular 
participation in the political life and thus prevented both a civic society 
from developing and the establishment of genuine participatory 
institutions34. 
The Arab regimes have been both product of threats and 
coercions, underpinned by widespread legitimacy formulas composed 
of a mix of patrimonialism, nationalism and tribalism, which eventually 
led to the state crisis and the uprisings of 2011. Such a great upheaval 
in turn revealed the weaknesses of both Arab states and Arab societies, 
as in almost all cases a coherent and effective opposition failed to 
materialize, Tunisia being the only case in which a transition toward 
democracy is taking shape gradually. 
                                                          
32 Martin Kramer, “Reconstructing Nations and States,” Daedalus 122, no. 3 
(summer 1993): 171. 
33 Paul Salem, “The Arab State Assisting or Obstructing Development?,” Carnegie 
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To conclude, the crisis of the Arab States— both a consequence 
and a cause of the collapsed political legitimacy across the region—has 
been triggered by many factors, considered of crucial significance by 
Michael Hudson (2015) when thinking about contemporary Arab 
statehood. These factors are: the use of social media and New 
Information Technologies that provided new platforms for public 
expression; the emergence of the Radical Islamist Ideology that 
challenged nationalism as regimes’ legitimizing principle; the 
emergence of a non-state (or anti-state, the Kurdish regional 
government in Iraq, being another example as it holds almost all formal 
attributes of statehood), such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIS or 
Daesh), a transnational Islamist network that had deeply shaken the 
regional state system; and finally the foreign, mainly the American, 
intervention that destabilized the region even more35.  
Within the present thesis, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and 
the State of Kuwait have been used as exemplary cases of the “hybrid” 
system (in Bacik’s account, 2008), whose historical and conceptual 
reasons have been previously outlined. The argument of this research is 
that the two states are the result of the encounter between modern and 
traditional forms of belonging that came to coexist, thus legitimizing 
and strengthening one another rather than competing with each other. 
After contextual and methodological considerations in the first 
two chapters, the third chapter focuses on the state and nation-building 
processes of these two apparently far realities. The two studied 
countries are small artificial states deeply affected by the British 
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occupation that they both experienced, turned into Muslim-majority 
constitutional hereditary monarchies characterized by a deeply-rooted 
tribal structure and a rentier economic system; hence an in-depth 
analysis of the states’ communities and especially of their constituents 
proved to be cucial. Particularly revealing are the Palestinian element 
in Jordan and the status of the stateless persons in Kuwait as they 
properly exemplify the hybridity of the two states’ institutions and their 
ongoing legitimacy and domestic sovereignty crises. 
Beaugrand (2011) associated the violence perpetrated by the 
Kuwaiti state against the bidūn (the stateless) “with the metaphor of the 
modern state as Kafkaesque bureaucracy rather than as an Orwellian 
forcible and repressive security apparatus”36. However, even though 
Kuwait was never a police state and its encounter with the West was 
quite peaceful, the “spread of the European state system in [its] 
borderless region”37 had a dramatic impact and led to a radical re-
definition of Kuwaiti society, forced to adopt alien concepts of civil 
identification in a very short period of time. Nevertheless, this forced 
adoption failed in eliminating tribalism and tribal identity: before the 
discovery of oil, sovereignty meant nothing but the control of the inland 
tribes, their trade routes and their military resources and nowadays 
many elements of the original tribal model have been maintained. For 
example, as noted by Maestri (2009), the diwāniya and the mağlis 
(informal meetings) are still spread in the whole Gulf region. In Kuwait, 
the diwāniya has a special significance, as within those weekly 
meetings, important political decisions are often taken, which deeply 
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influence the electoral campaigns and generally speaking the political 
life of the country38. 
Likewise, the analysis of the Palestinian element in Jordan led 
to a discussion on the notions of sovereignty and citizenship by adding 
to it the dimension of temporality, especially when dealing with the 
Gazan case. Indeed, Feldman (2008) investigates how sovereignty and 
citizenship have been reconfigured after the end of the mandatory 
system39. Gazan citizenship became latent (both in the Gaza strip and 
in the present-day Jordan) and extended itself both across the space of 
the Nation-State and over time, imagining itself in a future where the 
full sovereignty would be a reality and the citizenship a legal status and 
not only an experiential category. Moreover, according to Nasser 
(2005) “national discourses are system of meanings in which identities 
develop via difference”40, hence such a crystallization of the Palestinian 
identity, as still an “other”, played a crucial role in the making of the 
Jordanian national identity. 
In this research, the data collected through the empirical work 
confirmed the plurality stressed by Ansary and emerged at all the levels 
of the analysis. The open semi-structured interviews made with 
Jordanians, Palestinian-Jordanians (and Gazans), Kuwaiti citizens, 
long-term resident Arab expats and stateless persons born in the 
Emirate reaffirmed the centrality of the national belonging and at the 
same time revealed its deep-rooted multidimensionality. A profound 
awareness of the specificity of the context (discussed in the second 
chapter) made the qualitative method and especially the individual 
interview particularly effective as it built a bridge between the 
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274 
 
interviewer and the interviewees’ perspectives. In fact, when dealing 
with the MENA region there are many factors of due consideration; for 
the purposes of this study the conception of the self (and its pluralistic 
nature) and that of time and space, naturally linked to the linguistic 
dimension, were of particular interest. The distinction between fuṣḥā 
and ‘ammiyya mirrors two different conceptions of time, the first being 
what Agha (2007) calls “biblical time”, opposed to the “evolutionary 
history” proper to the latter. 
In conclusion, national belonging proved to be the most 
important identity criterion both in Jordan and in Kuwait though it 
functions as an umbrella that includes many other forms of belonging 
both modern and traditional, thus forming a hybrid model of Nation-
Sate. Besides, not all the constituents of these countries’ societies have 
the same perception of the state they live in: if the Kuwaiti citizenship, 
enjoyed by a minority of the actual residents in the country, is embodied 
by the state subsidies, in Jordan the nationals of Palestinian origin, with 
a few exceptions mostly within the Christian minority, have a double 
feeling of belonging, while the Gazan non-holders of a national number 
still define themselves as “refugees” or “guests” of the generous 
fatherly king.  
The Lebanese scholar Amin Maalouf (Amīn Ma‘lūf, b. 1949) in 
In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong (1996) 
summarizes the multi-layered nature of the Arab (national) identity. 
Maalouf is Arab, Lebanese, Christian, Melchite (he belongs to the 
Greek Catholic Community), a native speaker of Arabic, a fluent 
French speaker, and all these components are equally important when 
it comes to defining him. He wrote: “Identity can't be 
compartmentalized. You can't divide it up into halves or thirds or any 
other separate segments. I haven't got several identities: I've got just 
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one, made up of many components”41. This may summarize the cases 
of Jordan and Kuwait as this research has tried to show. 
 
  
                                                          
41 Amin Maalouf, In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong, trans. 
Barbara Bray (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 2. 
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